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Introduction
Every night and every morn
Some to misery are born.
Every morn and every night
Some are born to sweet delight.
Some are born to sweet delight,
Some are born to endless night.
— William Blake, “Auguries of Innocence”
In 1974 Frank Speck, a victim of the neurological disease neurofibromatosis
and father of two daughters with the same condition, decided that it would
be best if he was sterilised in order to prevent passing on the disease to any
possible future child. A physician was contacted and a vasectomy performed
which, the physician assured, would render Mr Speck sterile. Later, however,
Mrs Speck became pregnant which prompted the Specks to contact a differ-
ent physician for an abortion. The abortion was performed and the physician
reassured the Specks that the foetus had been successfully aborted despite the
fact that Mrs Speck was still pregnant. Some time later Mrs Speck gave birth
to a child with neurofibromatosis.
The Specks took the matter to court where one of their claims against the
two physicians was on behalf of the child which they had tried to prevent
from having. That is, they claimed that the physicians should repair for harm
done to the child which would not have existed had either of the physicians not
been negligent in their practice. In December 1979, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused this claim. According to one of the judges
[w]hether it is better to have never been born at all rather than to have been born
with serious mental defects is a mystery more properly left to the philosophers
and theologians, a mystery which would lead us into the field of metaphysics,
beyond the realm of our understanding or ability to solve. The law cannot assert
a knowledge which can resolve this inscrutable and enigmatic issue. (Speck v.
Finegold, 408 A. 2d 496 - Pa: Superior Court 1979).
The judge’s puzzlement is certainly understandable. If it would not have been
better for the child never to have been born, what is it exactly that the physi-
cians are supposed to repair for? Furthermore, how can they be required to
repair for anything if the child would not even have existed had they not been
negligent? Here it is important to note that neurofibromatosis is only rarely
a life-threatening disease. Most victims of the disease are able to live normal
ix
and by any reasonable standard “good lives”. It therefore seems especially
dubious to claim that the child would have been better off never existing.
The questions which the story of the Specks raises, and which the judge ad-
mitted defeat to, have since the 70-ies been subjected to careful philosophical
and jurisprudential scrutiny. On the jurisprudential side, the question whether
a child can be harmed by being brought into existence has taken center stage.
In American law at least, it is necessary in order to establish liability that the
defendant (the physicians in this case) has harmed the victim (the child). Many
have thought that because the child would not have existed had the defendant
not done what he or she actually did it is impossible to establish that the child
has been harmed. The child would not have been better off, it is often pointed
out, had the defendant not done what he or she did, so there cannot be any
harm done.
Philosophers have focussed on similar issues. Harm is a concept which
plays a special role in legal practice but also a concept which carries moral
weight. However, as Derek Parfit (1984) has argued, when we consider our
obligations to future generations, and reproductive choices in particular, it be-
comes clear that we cannot explain why some actions which we take to be
clear cases of wrongdoing are wrong by appealing to harm. In a case like
Speck v. Finegold, for example, it seems evident that the child would not have
been better off had she not existed so, again, there is no sense in which she
has been harmed.
Harm plays a special role in our ordinary moral discourse. For example,
harming others is, without a proper justification, wrong. Similarly, that an act
would prevent harm is something we take to speak in its favour. While harm
is not the only relevant consideration to common-sense morality, it is at the
very least an important part. Procreative decisions, and obligations to future
generations, pose a special problem however. Intuitively, to do harm is to make
someone worse off but in procreative decisions the people we are concerned
to protect from harm would in some cases, like in Speck v. Finegold, not have
existed at all had the putatively harmful act not been performed. How, then,
can we in a morally relevant sense harm them?
In this thesis I will argue that for an analysis of harm according to which
an act can harm a person even though the person would not have been better
off had the act not been performed. The structure of the thesis is as follows.
In chapter one I introduce the main principle I will be defending, the Harm
Principle. According to this principle, if an act would harm someone then this
is a reason against performing that act. I also introduce the main objection
to this principle based on harm to future people, the so-called “non-identity
problem”. I argue that once we unpack the objection to the Harm Principle it is
evident that it presupposes a Counterfactual Condition for doing harm: an act
harms a person if and only if the person is worse off than she would have been
had the act not been performed. This condition for doing harm is the weakest
premise in the argument against the Harm Principle and if the principle is to
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be saved from the non-identity problem then the most plausible approach is to
reject the Counterfactual Condition.
In chapter two I argue that the Counterfactual Condition is not plausible
and should be rejected for reasons independent of what we think about harm
to future people. The main objection against the Counterfactual Condition
is that it has unacceptable consequences in cases of overdetermination and
pre-emption. If the effects of a prima facie harmful act are overdetermined by
another act or event, then it is not the case that the victim of the act would have
been better off had the act not been performed. The Counterfactual Condition
is therefore not a plausible necessary condition for when an act does harm.
Chapter three discusses one alternative to the Counterfactual Condition,
the Non-Comparative View. According to the Non-Comparative View harm
should be analysed in relation to a “baseline” state such that an act harms a
person if and only if it makes the person worse off than the baseline. While the
Non-Comparative View has certain advantages over the Counterfactual Con-
dition I argue that the existing formulations are flawed. It is characteristic of
doing harm that it is to make a person’s life go worse in some sense. The Non-
Comparative view does not capture this “contributive character” of harm and
should therefore be rejected.
In chapters four to six I present an analysis of harm which I call the Min-
imalist View. According to the Minimalist View, a harms b if and only if a
person performs an act which (1) is responsible for the obtaining of a state
of affairs, S, and (2) S makes b’s life go worse. In chapter four I discuss the
second condition and argue that the way in which harms make life go worse
is captured by the Same-World View. According to this view, a state of affairs
makes a person’s life go worse if and only if the person’s life is worse for her
taking the state of affairs into account than the life is not taking the state of
affairs into account.
In chapter five I argue that the first condition should be analysed in terms
of counterfactual dependence: an act is responsible for a state of affairs if
and only if the act makes a difference to the state’s obtaining in a salient
way. I compare this analysis with the Counterfactual Condition and argue that
this analysis of responsibility has more plausible implications in cases of pre-
emption and overdetermination. I also argue that analyses of responsibility in
terms of counterfactual dependence in general do not imply the Counterfactual
Condition.
In chapter six I argue that we should not add any further condition pertain-
ing to intentions, foresight or consent to the Minimalist View. The reasons
which suggest that further conditions are needed are not decisive and often
involve intuitions about the overall moral assessment of an act and not only
whether it does harm or not. In this chapter I also defend the Minimalist View
against the objection that it is too far removed from common-sense. I argue
that while it does depart from common sense this is only because in ordi-
nary harm discourse we typically do not make a distinction between “total”
xi
(harm all-things-considered) and “partial” harm (harm-in-a-way). The Mini-
malist View is an analysis of partial harm, not total, and the fact that the Min-
imalist View does not account for intuitions about total harm should therefore
not count as evidence against it.
In chapters seven and eight I argue that the Minimalist View enables us to
save the intuition that the addition of a person to the world with a life worth
living can not be required by morality, whereas adding a person with a life not
worth living can be forbidden. In chapter seven I argue that it is difficult to
reconcile this intuition, sometimes called “the asymmetry” or “the intuition of
neutrality”, with other solutions to the non-identity problem.
In chapter eight I defend the claim that the asymmetry can be explained by
appealing to the Harm Principle and an analogous Principle of Beneficence.
This defence of the asymmetry rests on a distinction between two kinds of
benefits; benefits that provide only compensating reasons and benefits that
also provide requiring reasons. The way to make sense of this distinction, I
argue, is to endorse a Principle of Permissibility which states that agents are
allowed to perform acts which are not favoured by the balance of reasons if
the act does no harm. The Principle of Permissibility captures the importance
of respecting people’s autonomy and is a way of grounding the claim that
benefits to contingent future persons do not provide requiring reasons. Finally,
in chapter nine I discuss some of the consequences and possible applications
of the Minimalist View of harm and the defence of the asymmetry.
xii
1. The non-identity problem
When considering how the present generation can affect future generations it
is common among philosophers to distinguish between three different kinds
of cases. First, an act may affect how well off future people will be but what-
ever we do the same people will exist. Call these same-people cases. Second,
some acts also affect the number of people who will exist in the future. When
choosing between different courses of action it might be the case that one al-
ternative will lead to there being more or less people in the world than some
other alternative. Cases of this kind will be referred to as different-number
cases. Thirdly, some acts affect the identity, but not the number, of those who
will exist in the future. For example, a couple who considers whether to have
a child at twenty or at thirty are facing a scenario where their choice will lead
to different people existing: having one child at twenty or having a different
child at thirty.1 Call cases of this kind same-number cases.
In this chapter I will discuss a special problem which arises in same-number
cases: the non-identity problem. What the non-identity problem shows is that
when an act affects the identity of future people then it is possible that what is
intuitively an impermissible choice is not worse for anyone.
The non-identity problem is a problem for many normative theories, so-
called person-affecting theories, and theories which appeal to harm in partic-
ular. To harm a person, it is often claimed, is to make that person worse off
than she would otherwise have been. What the non-identity problem shows is
then that we cannot appeal to harm in order to explain why certain identity-
affecting acts are impermissible.
The main aims of this chapter are to clarify the non-identity problem and to
formulate an argument against the moral relevance of harm. I will also argue
that many attempts to solve the problem without appealing to harm are ei-
ther unsuccessful or comes with counter-intuitive consequences. Finally, I will
evaluate the premises in the argument against the moral relevance of harm. I
will suggest that the weakest premise is the claim that an act harms a person if
and only if it makes the person worse off than she would otherwise have been.
1 Parfit (1984, p. 351–355) argues for this claim, as does Kavka (1982). It has been claimed by
Roberts (2003a) that at least Kavka exaggerates how common these cases are. For my purposes
it is not necessary that different-people cases are very common, only that they exist.
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1.1 The problem
In Reasons and Persons, Derek Parfit argues that the fact that we can affect the
identity of future people presents us with a problem which he dubs “the non-
identity problem”. Consider the following case, The Young Girl’s Choice:
This girl chooses to have a child. Because she is so young, she gives her child
a bad start in life. Though this will have bad effects throughout the child’s life,
his life will, predictably, be worth living. If this girl had waited for several
years, she would have had a different child, to whom she would have given a
better start in life. (Parfit 1984, p. 358).
In this case it seems clear that the girl ought to postpone her pregnancy. Ac-
cording to common-sense this might be for several reasons but one way of
justifying this conclusion would go as follows. If the girl does not postpone
her pregnancy then she would harm her child by causing the child to have
a bad start in life. Postponing her pregnancy does not involve any significant
cost which could justify imposing this harm on the child and there are no other
relevant benefits of not postponing pregnancy. Therefore, she ought to wait.
This piece of common-sense reasoning involves a number of considera-
tions. One important normative principle which it relies on is the follow-
ing:
The Harm Principle: if an act would harm someone then this is a reason against
performing that act.
What Parfit and others2 have pointed out is that it is not evident that the girl
can be said to harm her child if she does not wait. The problem with appealing
to the Harm Principle, it is often claimed, is that a necessary condition for
doing harm is that one makes the victim worse off. More specifically:
The Counterfactual Condition: An act harms a person if and only if that person
is worse off than she would have been had the act not been performed.
Suppose the girl does not wait. Then her child will suffer a bad start in life but
all things considered the child’s life will be worth living. Can we plausibly say
that the child is worse off than she would have been had the girl postponed
her pregnancy? There are several reasons why this is not plausible. The first is
that the child would not be at all if the girl had postponed; the child would not
have existed. It is therefore unclear whether it makes sense to say that the child
would have been better, or worse, off had the girl acted otherwise. The second
reason is that even if it can be better (or worse) for this child to exist rather
than not, then the least plausible answer in this case is that existence would
be worse than non-existence for the child. The child’s life is, after all, worth
2 See for example Kavka (1982) and Feinberg (1986).
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living, and this seems to rule out that existence would be worse for the child
than non-existence. We should therefore say either that existence is neither
better nor worse for the child or that existence is better. Saying that the child
would be worse off existing, and better off not existing, is the least plausible
alternative.
One way to reconcile common-sense with the Counterfactual Condition
would be to say that, in a sense, the girl makes her child worse off if we read
“her child” as a non-rigid designator.3 As a non-rigid designator, “her child”
does not refer to a particular future person but to the girl’s child, whoever
that may turn out to be. This solution to the problem is not plausible however
because it would make the Harm Principle very unintuitive. Harming people,
in the sense suggested, is simply not something we care about.4 What this
interpretation of the Counterfactual Condition would suggest is that I would
make “my neighbour” worse off, and thereby harm him or her, if I were to
move to a new apartment where the referent of “my neighbour” changes from
a happy person to a depressed one. A further problem for this view is that it
is restricted to same number cases. Reading “her child” non-rigidly is of no
help when the choice is between having a child with a life not worth living
and having no child at all, though it seems very plausible to say that in such
cases the child would be harmed by being brought into existence.
The non-identity problem also arises at a larger scale, as Parfit illustrates
with the following example:
The Resource Policy. As a community, we must choose whether to deplete or
conserve certain kinds of resources. If we choose Depletion, the quality of life
over the next two centuries would be slightly higher than it would have been if
we had chosen Conservation. But it would later, for many centuries, be much
lower than it would have been if we had chosen Conservation. This would be
because, at the start of this period, people would have to find alternatives for
the resources that we had depleted (Parfit 1984, p. 361–2).
Suppose this is a same-number case. That is, whether we choose Depletion
or Conservation will affect the identity but not the number of future persons.
We also assume that life will still be worth living for future persons whatever
we choose. Intuitively it seems that we ought to choose Conservation. The
common-sense reasoning behind this could be that Depletion involves a small
gain in the near future at a large cost in the far future. Conservation on the
other hand involves a small cost in the near future and a large gain in the far
future. Weighing the costs against the gains gives that we ought to choose
Conservation. However, the Harm Principle does not support this reasoning.
Choosing Depletion is not worse for anyone because those who will exist in
the far future if we choose Depletion would not have existed had we chosen
3 Hare (2007) argues along these lines.
4 Parfit (1984, p. 359) makes a similar point.
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Conservation. That is, the Depletion-people are not worse off than they would
have been had we chosen Conservation. Therefore, we cannot appeal to the
Harm Principle to explain why we ought to choose Conservation.
It could be argued that the Counterfactual Condition does not rule out that
we can harm future groups of people since a group may be the same even if
all its members are replaced. For example, a football team seems to be the
same team even if the entire roster is changed over time. In the same way one
could argue that a generation does not depend on the identities of the people
who make up the generation for its identity. It could then be argued that we do
make future generations worse off than they would otherwise have been by
choosing Depletion, even though we do not make any particular person worse
off than she would otherwise have been.
A problem for this reply is that, on the face of it, talk about generations is
merely a loose way of speaking about a number of individuals who exist dur-
ing a certain period of time. A generation seems to be merely a collection of
people, like the collection of all red-heads for example, and there is intuitively
a difference between such “mere collections” of people and other, less dis-
joint, groups like a football team. In the latter case it makes sense to say that
the group, the football team, is something in addition to the current members
of the team. A generation, however, is not a group of this sort.
However, even if we agree that generations are groups in a more robust
sense, like football teams for example, a version of the objection raised above
against the “non-rigid” response to the case of the young girl applies here as
well. I do not harm the group consisting of my neighbours merely by changing
the composition of this group from a happy one to a less happy one.
What about different-number cases? It is easy to see that they too present a
problem for the Harm Principle since they are, by definition, also cases where
different people will exist depending on what we do. For example, suppose
that the young girl’s choice is between having a child while she is very young
or to never have a child. In this version of the case, the Counterfactual Con-
dition does not imply that the girl would harm her child if she decides to
have a child for the same reasons as in the same-number version. Any objec-
tion against the girl’s choice to have a child could therefore not be based on
the Harm Principle. It should be noted, however, that the Harm Principle is
not the only view which has trouble with different-number cases. These cases
raise a host of further problems, such as how to weigh the number of lives lived
against the quality of those lives.5 However, if the Harm Principle cannot ac-
count for our intuitions in same-number cases then this is sufficient reason to
reject it. The main focus of this thesis will therefore be same-number cases,
even though I will consider different-number cases to some extent in chapters
seven and eight.
5 See Arrhenius (2000) for a rather pessimistic conclusion regarding the possibility of finding
a moral theory which can solve the many problems connected with different-number cases.
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The non-identity problem can be summed up as follows. An act harms a
person if and only if that person is worse off than she would have been had
the act not been performed. In cases like the Resource Policy it cannot be true
that we make people worse off by choosing Depletion. Therefore, it cannot be
true that people are harmed in cases like these. However, we clearly ought to
choose Conservation over Depletion. Therefore, the reason why we ought to
choose Conservation cannot be that we would harm someone and we need to
look to some other principle than the Harm Principle to explain why we ought
to choose Conservation rather than depletion, or why the young girl ought to
postpone her pregnancy.
This argument only establishes that the Harm Principle cannot account for
what we ought to do in same-number cases. One could, theoretically at least,
hold that the Harm Principle is not intended for same-number cases and that it
is therefore not an objection at all that we cannot explain why the young girl
should postpone her pregnancy by appealing to harm. However, restricting the
principle in this way to same-people cases seems ad hoc. If harm is relevant at
all then one would expect that the Harm Principle could explain what we ought
to do all kinds of cases, not just same-people cases. What we are looking for is
not one set of principles for same-people cases and another set of principles
for same-number cases. Rather, we think that there is one set of principles
which accounts for what one ought to do in same-people cases and in same-
number cases. The mere fact that a case like the young girl or the Resource
Policy are same-number cases, that there is “non-identity”, does not seem
sufficient to think that different moral principles apply to them.
The claim that identity does not make a difference is however a crucial
premise if the non-identity problem is to have any bearing on the plausibil-
ity of the Harm Principle. If one were to claim that identity makes a differ-
ence then there is no difficulty with combining the non-identity problem and
the Harm Principle because the latter might only be one normative principle
among many. We therefore need to consider whether identity makes a differ-
ence.
1.2 Does identity matter?
The argument against appealing to the Harm Principle in order to explain what
we ought to do in same-number cases relies on the claim that identity does
not make a difference morally. That is, we are not justified in making different
moral judgements regarding same-people cases and same-number cases, other
things being equal. Parfit (1984, p. 367) calls this view the no-difference view
and uses the following example to illustrate it:
The Medical Programmes. Suppose there are two medical programmes, A and
B, but that there is only funding for one. We therefore have to decide which
should be cancelled. Programme A would treat pregnant women who have a
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certain condition. If this condition is not treated it would cause the women’s
children to be handicapped. This handicap would not be so severe as to make
life not worth living. Programme B would warn women not to become pregnant
during unfavourable circumstances, for example while taking some special
medication. If a woman were to become pregnant during these unfavourable
circumstances, then this would cause the child to have the same handicap as
in programme A. A woman who postpones her pregnancy would conceive a
different child than if she had not postponed.
Let us assume that the two programmes would be equally effective. Whatever
we choose, the result would be that a certain number of children are born with-
out the handicap. If you think that one of the programmes is more worthwhile
than the other, then you do not accept the no-difference view. The only differ-
ence between A and B is that programme A is a same-people case while B is
a same-number case. According to the no-difference view this is not enough
to judge them differently. The fact that in A we are making people better off
than they would otherwise have been while in B we are merely seeing to it
that different people are born is not a morally relevant difference.6
The Harm Principle, coupled with the Counterfactual Condition, strongly
suggests that we should favour programme A in this case. We are not making
anyone worse off by cancelling programme B and therefore not harming any-
one by cancelling it. If we were to cancel programme A however we would be
making future children worse off.7
It could be objected that it does not follow from the assumption that A and
B are equally worthwhile that the no-difference view is true. One possibil-
6 The no-difference view as it is understood here is similar to the following axiological principle
suggested by Arrhenius (2009, p. 290):
Impartiality: If there is a one-to-one correspondence from outcome A to out-
come B such that every person in A has the same welfare as their counterpart
in B, then A and B are equally good.
Unlike this principle, the no-difference view as understood here does not necessarily rely on A
and B being equally good. Rather, the claim is that they are equally worthwhile. On one view,
of course, what makes A and B equally worthwhile is that they are equally good. However,
it is preferable at this stage to leave it open exactly what it is that makes the programmes
worthwhile. For example, if the Harm Principle is supposed to explain why the programmes
are equally worthwhile then such an explanation will be in terms of the harm the programmes
would prevent, not in their respective value.
7 Some would endorse this conclusion and reject the no-difference view. See for example
Buchanan et al. (2001, pp. 249–50). This also seems to be the view of some courts as Fos-
ter et al. (2006) argues. I argue against this view below. Foster et al. (2006) also notes that
philosophers tend to accept either the no-difference view, or that identity makes some differ-
ence but not much. They argue that the English law, in contrast, is based on the claim that
identity makes an enormous difference. As I argue below, from a philosophical point of view
we have good reason to accept the no-difference view. This does not rule out, however, that
there can be pragmatic reasons to formulate laws or policies as if identity makes a difference.
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ity is that it does make a difference that in cancelling programme A we are
making people worse off but that in B there is some other feature, which is
not present in A, which makes B more worthwhile than A with respect to this
additional feature. The claim would be that we cannot derive that A would
be more worthwhile all-things-considered from the fact that A and B differ
merely in the harm-respect. If this were the case then it could be argued that
A and B are equally worthwhile but for different reasons.
While this is a possibility, it is difficult to see what this further difference
could be. As was just mentioned, we should assume that the two programmes
are similar in all other relevant respects and that the only difference is with
respect to identity. There does not seem to be any feature of programme B
which is exclusive to this programme, that is, any feature which is morally
relevant and which cannot be assumed to be a feature of programme A.8
It could also be objected that the no-difference view is too strong. Consider
the following case:
Extension or Addition. Suppose we can choose between implementing either of
two policies; extension and addition. If Extension is implemented, a number of
people who would live for 40 years would live for 80 years in stead. If Addition
is implemented, an equal number of people, who would not exist if Extension
is implemented, would exist and live for 40 years.9
Assume that the resources cannot be split between these two alternatives and
that implementing either of them will only affect the life-expectancy of these
people and not the quality of their lives. What we are choosing between is
whether to extend the lives of already existing people (without affecting the
quality of these lives) or adding as many people to the world (with the same
short life-expectancy).
The objection to the no-difference view with respect to this case is that the
intuitive thing is to favour Extension and this is because choosing Addition
would be to make people worse off. However, according to the no-difference
view this is not a relevant feature. If we accept the no-difference view we
would then, according to this objection, be forced to draw the counter-intuitive
conclusion that extension and addition are equally worthwhile.
While it is intuitive to favour extension over addition, it is not clear that it
is identity that makes the difference in this case. There are further differences
between the Medical Programmes and Extension or Addition which might
8 Steinbock (2009, pp. 169–71) suggests that one programme is favoured by “impersonal”
reasons while the other is favoured by “person-affecting” reasons. According to this suggestion,
the same-people programme is worthwhile because it benefits people, while the same-number
programme is worthwhile because it reduces the amount of suffering in the world. This would
not amount to the programmes being equally worthwhile however because the same-people
programme also reduces the amount of suffering in the world. The same-people programme
would therefore seem to be superior to the same-number programme.
9 A similar case is discussed by Arrhenius (2008). See also McMahan (2001).
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account for why, in the former example, identity does not seem to matter while
in the latter it does. For example, one difference between the two cases is that
the choice between the two medical programmes will not affect the number of
people who will exist while the choice between extension and addition will.
On the basis of this difference it could then be argued that the reason we should
favour extension is that we should, other things being equal, favour improving
the lives of existing people over adding people with lives worth living to the
world.10
The no-difference view seems plausible, but in fact we do not need to claim
that it is true in order to construe an argument against the Harm Principle.
What we have to assume is that the two medical programmes A and B are
equally worthwhile. With this assumption, which is significantly more inno-
cent, we can formulate a condensed version of the argument against the Harm
Principle in the following way:
(1) An act harms a person if and only if that person is worse off than she would
have been had the act not been performed (the Counterfactual Condition).
(2) It is not the case that a person with a life worth living is worse off than she
would have been had she not existed at all.
(3) Therefore, a person who would have a life worth living is not harmed by
being created.
(4) If a person who would have a life worth living is not harmed by being
created, and the Harm Principle is true, then it would be more worthwhile to
cure people of a handicap (invest in programme A) than to prevent this handicap
from occurring (invest in programme B).
(5) However, programme A and B are equally worthwhile (the no-difference
view).
(6) Therefore, the Harm Principle is false.
This argument against the Harm Principle can be generalised into an argument
against a whole class of normative principles. That it is formulated in terms of
harm is not essential. A popular view is that morality is essentially “person-
affecting”. To capture this it is often thought that the normative status of an
act depends in some rather direct way on whether the act affects people for
better or worse.11 For example, if the young girl should indeed wait then we
have to explain this in terms of how her choice affects other people.
It is not entirely clear however how to understand the intuition that moral-
ity is essentially person-affecting. According to the “narrow” person-affecting
view, one state of affairs is better (worse) than another only if the former is
better (worse) for someone. Assuming that we ought, other things being equal,
10 This view, sometimes referred to as “the asymmetry”, will be more thoroughly discussed and
defended in chapters seven and eight.
11 The person-affecting view is sometimes understood only as an axiological claim about the
relation between impersonal and personal goodness. See for example Parfit (1984, pp. 396–
400), Temkin (1987, pp. 166–7) and Holtug (2010, pp. 156–63).
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to do what would be best the narrow person-affecting view captures the intu-
ition that the normative status of an act depends on whether the act affects
people for better or worse and implies that we ought to perform an act only if
the act would be better for someone.
The narrow person-affecting view is of course problematic because it is
unclear in what sense the girl’s choice could be worse for her child. As was
noted above the claim that the girl’s choice would be worse for her child seems
to be the least plausible answer since the child would have a life worth living.
Any normative principle which is person-affecting in this sense is targeted by
argument above and will have to explain why we should choose Conservation
over Depletion and why the two medical programmes are equally worthwhile.
Alternatively, the intuition that morality is essentially person-affecting can
be understood in a “wide” sense. According to this view, the intuition that
morality is “person-affecting” is a view about what has value. Raz, for exam-
ple, claims that “the explanation and justification of the goodness or badness
of anything derives ultimately from its contribution, actual or possible, to hu-
man life and its quality” (Raz 1988, p. 194). It might be valuable that people
have high welfare, or that their rights are respected, but not that the ecosystem
is in balance or that scenery is beautiful. The ecosystem and the beauty of the
scenery could be valuable because they contribute to human flourishing but
not in themselves. According to the wide person-affecting view, morality is
essentially person-affecting in the sens that all values are realised by, or in,
persons.12
The wide person-affecting view is not threatened by the non-identity prob-
lem. If the intuition that morality is essentially person-affecting merely means
that all values are realised by, or in, persons then this does not purport to
be normative so it does not entail anything about what the young girl ought to
do, or whether the two medical programmes are equally worthwhile. What the
wide person-affecting view amounts to is rather a constraint on theories which
aim to explain why the young girl should wait, or what the worthwhileness of
the two medical programmes consists in.
The intuition that morality is essentially person-affecting has been a popu-
lar view both among those who propose a more consequentialist theory and
those who are more on the deontological side.13 The non-identity problem
calls the narrow version of this approach to ethics into question. Though the
wide person-affecting view is not threatened by the non-identity problem, it
12 See Arrhenius (2009, pp. 291–3). Arrhenius distinguishes between a “human good view”
and a “personal good view”. According to the former, all goods are realised by humans while
according to the latter all impersonal goods (bads) are good (bad) for someone. According to
the personal good view, then, one need not hold that all impersonal goods are realised by, or in,
humans. Both the personal good view and the human good view are however versions of the
wide person-affecting view as it is understood here.
13 See for example Temkin (1987), Holtug (2003, 2010), Scanlon (1998) and Roberts (2003b).
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cannot solve it either. The wide view merely imposes a constraint on a solution
to the problem but it does not amount to a solution in itself.
1.3 Ways of responding to the problem
The non-identity problem presents a theoretical problem for a large class of
normative principles. There are a number of ways in which one can respond
to this problem. The most common response is to abandon the narrow person-
affecting approach to ethics and the intuitions that fuel the person-affecting
view. What the non-identity problem shows, many seem to think, is that iden-
tity is not a morally relevant difference and that it should go the same way
as other distinctions which have been thought to be morally relevant such as
gender or race.
An alternative solution is to appeal to what would be best from an imper-
sonal point of view in these cases. It would be better if the young girl waits,
and if we choose Conservation, and this explains why the young girl should
wait and why we should choose Conservation. According to this solution to
the problem, people ought, other things being equal, to do what would be best.
Proponents of this view can also point out that Parfit has suggested a perfectly
good explanation of why it would be better if the young girl waits (i.e., why
she ought to wait) and why it would be better to choose Conservation over
Depletion (i.e., why we ought to choose Conservation), namely the “same-
number quality claim”:
Q: if in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would ever
live, it would be worse if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality
of life, than those who would have lived. (Parfit 1984, p. 360).
We can see how Q solves the non-identity problem. By appealing to Q one
can claim that it does not matter whether particular people are better or worse
off, what matters is that those who will exist if we were to do something are
better off than those who would have existed, had we acted otherwise. In the
case of the young girl, what justifies the intuition that she ought to wait is that
she ought to do what would be best, other things being equal, and it would
be better if she decides to wait because the child she would then have would
be better off than the child she would have were she not to wait.14 Similarly,
in the case of Depletion, what justifies the intuition that we ought to choose
Conservation is that those who would exist if we were to choose Conservation
would be better off than those who would exist if we were to choose Depletion.
Conservation is therefore the better policy and the one we ought to choose. Q
is also consistent with the no-difference view because it does not attach any
14 Note that a proponent of this solution to the problem need not claim that one ought always
to do what would be best. The “other things being equal”-clause is important because it allows
for the moral status of an act to depend other factors than goodness.
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importance to whether the programmes make future people better or worse
off, but only to how well off those who will exist if we were to choose one of
the programmes would be compared to how well off those who would exist if
we were to choose the other programme would be.
Advocates of this approach agree that the Harm Principle gives the right re-
sult as long as we are dealing with same-people cases. However, as soon as we
move to same-number cases the Harm Principle gives the wrong result and we
should therefore appeal to Q instead. This is because if we only consider ordi-
nary cases where what we choose will only affect people’s well-being, then Q
cannot be distinguished by what it prescribes from the Harm Principle. If, for
example, the young girl could have had the same child even if she had waited,
then both Q and the Harm Principle would justify the claim that she ought to
wait. Since Q gives the right verdict in these cases and in same-number cases
it is plausible to say that Q replaces the Harm Principle.15 Furthermore, Q is
clearly compatible with the wide person-affecting view because Q is a formal
claim about what makes one outcome better than another, not a claim about
what has value.
Extending Q to work for different-number cases is more problematic,16 but
such cases raise further difficulties which Q was never intended to handle
anyway. As I have also mentioned, different-number cases are also a problem
for the Harm Principle. That Q does not solve these cases is therefore not
something which should make us prefer the Harm Principle (or any narrow
person-affecting principle) over Q.
Proponents of this way of dealing with the problem can then claim that
(i) we can solve non-identity problem by appealing to Q, and (ii) this so-
lution does not force us to give up anything of significance. Therefore, the
non-identity problem can be considered solved.
However, we should not be so quick to accept the claim that we do not have
to give up anything of significance by appealing to Q in same-number cases.
For example, suppose a couple has to decide whether to have a fortunate child
now, who would be very well off, or a “normal” child later. In this case Q im-
plies that it would be better to have the fortunate child, but it is not obvious that
one ought to have the fortunate child. It strikes many as deeply unintuitive and
elitistic to deny that it is permissible to have the normal child in such cases.
It might be objected that Q, an axiological claim, does not suggest anything
about what people ought to do. It simply says that it would be better to have
the fortunate child and nothing more. While this is certainly true, this defence
of Q would undermine its effectiveness in dealing with the non-identity prob-
lem. The non-identity problem is, as I said above, the problem of explaining
why the young girl ought to wait, and why we ought to choose Conservation
over Depletion. Q was put forward as an answer to that question. If we do not
15 See Parfit (1984, pp. 370–1).
16 See Parfit (1984, chs. 17–19) and Arrhenius (2000).
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think that there is a connection between what we ought to do and betterness,
then Q will not even count as a solution to the non-identity problem.17
Furthermore, while appealing to Q is compatible with the wide person-
affecting view it is questionable whether this is sufficient to capture the in-
tuition that morality is person-affecting. After all the explanation of why the
young girl ought to wait is not because waiting would be better for that child.
Rather, the explanation is in impersonal terms. That is, the explanation of why
girl ought to wait seems to have little to do with what she does to her child. By
appealing to Q what we can say is that the girl should wait, not because she
does something bad to the child she would have if she does not wait, but rather
because she could do much better for some other child. But, this does not cap-
ture very well the intuition that morality is person-affecting. Intuitively, what
justifies the claim that the girl would do wrong if she does not wait seems to
be the intrinsic nature of the state of affairs which she would then bring about.
Perhaps it is not the only reason to object to the girl’s choice, Q might be one
relevant factor, but it certainly seems to be a reason.
This suggest is that the second claim above, that solving the non-identity
problem by appealing to Q does not carry any significant costs, is doubtful. In
what follows I will discuss three person-affecting solutions to the non-identity
problem which have been put forward as alternatives to appealing to Q: con-
ditional duties, wronging and harming. There are three things to keep in mind
when considering these alternatives. First, these alternatives should actually
solve the non-identity problem and give a plausible explanation of why the
young girl ought to wait. Second, for these alternatives to actually be superior
to Q they must also explain some intuitions which Q does not account for. Fi-
nally, an alternative solution should either be consistent with the no-difference
view or show why this view is mistaken.
1.3.1 Conditional duties
It has been suggested that the non-identity problem can be solved by conceiv-
ing of duties to future persons as conditional duties. By a conditional duty I
mean a duty whose existence is conditional on certain acts being performed. A
promise to φ , for example, creates a duty to φ which is conditional on the act
of promising in this way. A duty to promote the good, on the other hand, is not
conditional in this way. If an act promotes the good, then the duty to perform
this act does not depend on whether some other act have been performed in
the past.
The idea is that duties to future persons are conditional in the sense that
we can now make it the case that in the future we will have certain duties to
people who will then exist. On this view present persons do not have duties
17 I will postpone a more careful discussion of these matters to chapter eight. Here it is enough to
note that Q together with the assumption that there is a reason to promote the good has certain
counter-intuitive consequences which support including some person-affecting consideration.
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to future persons in the same way as they have duties to their contemporaries.
Rather, we only have duties to people who currently exist but we can make
it the case that we will have duties in the future to people who will exist. In
the case of the young girl, for example, the reason she ought to postpone her
pregnancy is that if she does not then she will create duties for herself which
she will not be able to fulfill.
Let us make this view more precise. The view is that what makes it im-
permissible for the young girl to have her child now is that it would create
duties for the girl which she cannot fulfill. One way of understanding this is
as follows:
The Conditional View-1: One ought not to perform acts which make it impos-
sible for oneself to fulfill future duties.18
This view assumes that there are some set of duties which we have to our
contemporaries. Exactly what these duties are is rarely articulated but let’s
for the sake of argument assume that there is a duty to give people a good
start in life. With this assumption it could then be argued that when the girl
does not decide to postpone her pregnancy she performs an act which makes
it impossible for her to fulfill her future duties, namely the duty to give her
child a good start in life.
It certainly seems plausible to say that one should not put oneself in a posi-
tion where one cannot do what one ought to do, if such cases exist (more on
this below). This cannot be the whole story about our obligations to the future,
however. Consider a case where we can bring about a disaster in the far future.
Presumably we should not bring about disasters in the far future but the Con-
ditional View-1 seems badly equipped to justify this belief because we will
not exist in the far future. We will not have any obligations which we cannot
fulfill.
In an attempt to make the view more plausible, the conditionalist might
suggest the following principle instead:
The Conditional View-2: One ought not to perform acts which makes it impos-
sible for anyone to fulfill their future duties.
By saying that we should not create duties for anyone which they cannot fulfill
one can accommodate the intuition that our duties to future persons extend
even to the far future where we will no longer exist.
A problem for both versions of the Conditional View is that they rather
blatantly violate “ought implies can”. The Conditional View is based on the
assumption that there are situations where it is my duty to φ but it is not
possible for me to φ . Note that this is not the same claim as the more plausible
18 Narveson (1973, p. 73), Parsons (2002, p. 145) and Vanderheiden (2006, p. 344) hint at a
view of this kind though none of them gives it a very precise formulation.
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one that there are situations where the conjunction of all one’s duties cannot
be satisfied but where each duty is possible to satisfy. Consider for example
promises again. The conditionalist might point out that if one promises Black
to φ and White not to φ , then one is in a situation where one cannot fulfill all
one’s duties. However, this is a case where, presumably, one can φ and one can
refrain from φ -ing. The problem is, of course, that one cannot do both. What
the Conditional View suggests is something much more extreme, namely that
it could be the case that one ought, or has a duty, to φ but it is impossible that
one φs. This, I think, is enough reason to reject it.
In order to avoid this problem the conditionalist might suggest that we
should reformulate the conditional view once more:
The Conditional View-3: One ought not to perform acts which create duties
which someone will not fulfill.
According to this version of the conditional view, what is important is that we
do not create duties that will not be fulfilled rather than duties that cannot be
fulfilled. With this modification the conditional view is no longer in conflict
with “ought implies can” while still accounting for duties to future persons.
While the Conditional View-3 is an improvement, I think there are more
general arguments to be had against this approach to the non-identity prob-
lem in general. First, appealing to conditional duties does not account for our
person-affecting intuitions. According to this approach, the objection to the
young girl’s choice to have the child has nothing to do with the nature of how
this choice will affect her child. Rather, it has to do with something akin to the
agent’s moral integrity: we ought not to create persons who will have a bad
start, neurofibromatosis or what have you because it will make us unable to
perform our duties. It is only in an indirect way that our duty to future people
depends on the effects of our choices on them. While preserving one’s moral
integrity might be one factor, it is hardly the decisive one in cases like the ones
we are considering.19
Second, a question which so far has not been answered is why we have
to bring in these conditional duties in the first place. The Conditional View
obviously assumes a set of duties; those which are held to contemporaries.
Why cannot these be applied across times in a more straightforward fashion?
Presumably there will be duties to promote the well-being of others (at least to
an extent), not to harm others and so on. The Conditional View does therefore
seem committed to explaining why future people do not come under the scope
of these duties.
One reason why the Conditional View might seem plausible concerns meta-
physical worries about duties to non-present people. The worry is that if future
19 One consequence of the self-regarding nature of the Conditional View is that it seems rather
fetishistic with respect to duties. I will ignore this objection however since there are further, and
more serious, objections to the Conditional View.
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people do not exist, now, then they cannot be said to exist at all and it is not
possible to have any duties towards people who do not exist.20 I think this
worry is exaggerated. Everyone agrees that non-present things do not exist
now but this trivial claim is irrelevant to whether acts which affect the future
can be impermissible in virtue of their effects. If the consequences of an act
would be very bad for a future person then it is this fact, not the fact that it
is very bad for that person, which makes the act impermissible (or at least
counts against doing it). What the conditionalist would have to claim is that
future facts, such as what the consequences of an act would be, cannot be what
makes the act right or wrong since the consequences do not exist when the act
is performed. This seems to be inconsistent with what the conditionalist wants
to say. The idea is that we should not do certain things because this will in the
future cause a situation where people will not do (or will not be able to do)
what they ought to do. But this is just to say that the impermissibility of an act
depends on future facts; that some people will not do what they ought to do.
The metaphysical “rationale” for the conditional view actually undermines it
rather than supports it.
1.3.2 Wronging
An alternative approach to the non-identity problem is to argue that while the
young girl does not harm her child she ought to postpone her pregnancy be-
cause if she does not then she wrongs her child. The idea is that by affecting
people in certain ways one can “wrong” them and that affecting people in this
way, that is, wronging them, is what makes an act impermissible. This ap-
proach preserves the person-affecting intuition since the reason the girl ought
to postpone her pregnancy is because of the effects this choice has on her child.
If this view does not face the same problems as the Harm Principle when it
comes to the non-identity problem then it would have a considerable advan-
tage since it solves the problem and preserves the person-affecting intuition.
Crucial to this approach is of course what one means by “wronging”. A
natural way of interpreting “wronging”, at least as we tend to use it in ordinary
language, is in terms of rights. Rights are, by most definitions, personal and
are sometimes thought of in terms of claims or demands. A failure to respect
a right is to treat someone, the bearer of the right, in a way which is not
in accordance with what one owes the bearer, i.e., the bearer can claim or
demand not to be treated in this way.21
Rights are very complex things, and they are used in a number of different
ways. To simplify the discussion I will adopt the following terminology. Let’s
20 This objection has been raised by for example Macklin (1980) and De George (1980). For a
reply, see Elliot (1989).
21 According to the traditional analysis of rights, claim-rights are merely a species of rights. See
Hohfeld (1966). It should however be noted that Hohfeld’s analysis is primarily an analysis of
legal rights and not moral ones.
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say that the content of a right is a state of affairs. This content is specified by
what the bearer has a right to. For example, the content of the right to health is
the state of affairs that the person who possesses the right is healthy. Let’s also
say that a right is satisfied if and only if the content obtains. That is, a right
to health is satisfied if and only if the bearer of the right is healthy. Negative
rights can be treated in the same way. A right not to be tortured is satisfied
if and only if the content obtains. That is, the right is satisfied if and only if
it is false that the person is tortured. Finally, let’s say that rights ought to be
satisfied, other things being equal.
This terminology does not tell us anything about the content of rights, i.e.,
what rights there are. A common view is that rights are connected with peo-
ple’s interests: a person has a right if and only if it is in that person’s interest
that the right is satisfied.22 Formulating the connection between rights and in-
terests in this way is very vague but it may still serve as a guiding principle
when discussing the content of a theory of rights.
With this terminology in place, one way of understanding what it means to
wrong a person is to say that a wrongs b if and only if a sees to it that a right
possessed by b is not satisfied. For example, Jeffrey Reiman holds that “in
choosing the negative policies [i.e., Depletion], one has wronged the future
people who are negatively affected as a result – even though the alternative
is that those people would not have existed at all. Indeed, I contend that in
these cases, living people are violating the rights of future people” (Reiman
2007, p. 72). Reiman then argues that the in typical non-identity cases, like
the case with the young girl or Depletion, one would fail to satisfy future
people’s right to “a normal level of functioning” by making the intuitively
impermissible choice.
An objection which has been raised against this approach is that it is prob-
lematic to talk about rights without bearers.23 The future people whose rights
are supposed to explain how our choices can wrong future people do not exist
now and therefore their rights cannot exist now either. But, the objection con-
tinues, if the rights which are supposed to explain how we can wrong future
people do not exist now then they cannot explain any duties which we have
towards future people. This objection has much in common with the kind of
reasoning mentioned at the end of the last section where it was claimed that
some people are attracted to the conditional approach for metaphysical rea-
sons. As we saw, however, there is nothing metaphysically mysterious about
duties to future persons and the same reasoning can be applied here. Future
people will have rights when they exist, and choices we make can bring about
states of affairs that will satisfy or fail to satisfy these rights. That the bearers
of these rights do not exist at the time of the choice, or that these rights cannot
be satisfied at that time, is beside the point.
22 This so called “interest view” of rights goes back at least to Bentham. See also Waldron (1984)
and Raz (1984).
23 See Macklin (1980) and De George (1980).
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A more serious objection to rights as a solution to the non-identity prob-
lem is that in order for the rights-approach to be an alternative to the Harm
Principle it cannot rely on a right not to be harmed to solve the non-identity
problem. The rights-approach cannot simply assume that the child would vio-
late the child’s life not to be harmed because, as we have seen, the child is not
worse off than she would otherwise have been. The rights-approach therefore
has to find some other right which the young girl would fail to satisfy by not
postponing her pregnancy. However, it is quite unclear what right this would
be. Prima facie, it is the right not to be harmed which is violated in the case of
the young girl. In order to understand the content of a theory of rights, it seems
expedient to rely on harm. The rights-approach therefore does not have a clear
advantage over the Harm Principle when it comes to solving the non-identity
problem.
It might be suggested that the right which the young girl would violate is the
child’s right to a decent start in life and that this right should not be spelled out
in terms of harm. Steinbock (1986), for example, claims that “it is a wrong to
the child to be born with such serious handicaps that many very basic interests
are doomed in advance, preventing the child from having a minimally decent
existence to which all citizens are entitled” (Steinbock 1986, p. 19). It could
however very well be questioned whether this right is independent of a right
not to be harmed. It is not clear that we should care about “doomed basic
interests” unless this also involve harm.
I will not push this objection to Steinbock’s view however because there
is a more general objection to the rights-approach. If rights are always “in
the interest” of their bearers (see above) then the rights-based approach faces
much the same problems as the Harm Principle. The right which is supposed
to be in the child’s interest cannot be satisfied, and it is unclear in what sense
it is in the interest of the young girl’s child to have such a right to a decent
life satisfied. The child cannot have a better start in life and of all the avail-
able alternative open to the girl, not postponing is best for this child. The girl is
therefore clearly acting in this child’s best interest by not postponing her preg-
nancy.24 The rights-based approach to the non-identity problem does therefore
not avoid the objections which were raised against the Harm Principle above.
In defence of the rights-approach it might be suggested that harm is not
prior to rights, or wronging, and that the interest-view of rights does not cap-
ture all rights. An objection along these line has been raised by Kumar (2003)
who argues that harm, understood as a “setback of one’s interests”, is neither
necessary nor sufficient for wronging. Kumar argues for this claim by con-
sidering various examples which purport to show this. First, that harm is not
necessary for wronging is illustrated by an example of a drunk driver. What
makes drinking and driving wrong, Kumar thinks, is that it exposes others to
risk and this can be said to wrong those who are exposed to this risk. A drunk
24 See McMahan (1981, p. 126) for a similar claim regarding whether a rights-based approach
could solve the non-identity problem.
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driver need not harm anyone for his behavior to be impermissible. Merely ex-
posing a person to a risk is not to harm the person on Kumar’s view because
“the risk did not in fact blossom into an actual harm, or end up setting back
one’s interests in any way” (Kumar 2003, p. 103). Harming is therefore not
necessary for wronging.
Turning to whether harm is sufficient for wronging, Kumar merely states
that “[c]onduct may result in another being harmed without it being a moral
violation” (p. 100). What Kumar seems to have in mind here are cases where
one is justified to set back a person’s interests but which are nevertheless not
wrong or even objectionable to an extent. Typical examples of this are cases
where the harm is necessary for an equal or greater benefit. Amputating a per-
son’s leg in order to save her life seems to be a case where we do harm in
a sense but where this harm is justified. Amputating a leg in order to save a
life does not constitute a “wrong” done to the person, because of the greater
benefit (the person’s life is saved). Other examples are cases involving prior
agreement. The participants in a professional (and fair) boxing-match, or com-
petitors on a fair market, impose setbacks to each other’s interests, but there
does not seem to be a moral violation here. Another example: a person who
has been injured at a construction site is perhaps not “wronged” if the person
had agreed to working at the site and the security measures were adequate.25
Kumar’s examples are not entirely convincing for a couple of reasons. For
instance, Kumar’s claim that the ordinary concept of harm does not count ex-
posure to risk as a harm could be taken as an argument in favour of expanding
our ordinary concept of harm. Indeed, Kumar’s claim that being exposed to a
risk of harm is itself not a harm because it is not setting back one’s interests
could very well be questioned. Kumar’s motivation for not saying that risks
(can) constitute harm is that nothing actually happens to the victim. But, ex-
posing someone to risk is for something to happen to that person. The risks
Kumar refers to are not “free-floating”, they have subjects just like broken
limbs, heart-failures and so on. It is also not obviously counter-intuitive to
hold that it is “in a person’s interest” to not be exposed to risks. One could
therefore hold that reckless driving under the influence does harm to others
because it exposes them to a risk.
Regarding whether harm is sufficient for wronging it could also be ques-
tioned whether life-saving amputation is a “genuine harm”. We could, for ex-
ample, distinguish between harm in a wide sense and harm in a narrow, or
moral, sense. In the narrow sense one does no harm by performing life-saving
surgery, but in a wide sense one does. If we add that harm in the wide sense
is not sufficient wronging, while harm in the narrow sense is, then we seem to
have accounted for Kumar’s counterexamples.
25 There is, I suppose, a much more complicated story to tell about this example. For instance,
mere agreement from the worker does not seem to be enough. We would also require, I think,
that the agreement was reasonable, not made under duress and so forth.
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I will not push these points further, however, because it would take us too
far into the finer details of an analysis of harm; whether harm should be under-
stood as setbacks of interests and whether there is a “morally relevant sense”
of harm. These matters will be pursued in greater detail in the following chap-
ters. Instead, let us grant for now that harming is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for wronging and turn to Kumar’s way of characterising this notion.
Kumar characterises wronging as such:
One person wronging another, then, requires that the wrongdoer has, without
adequate excuse or justification, violated certain legitimate expectations with
which the wronged party was entitled, in virtue of her value as a person, to
have expected her to comply. (Kumar 2003, p.107).
To harm a person is sometimes to “violate a person’s legitimate expectations”
though not always, and there are other such expectations on Kumar’s view
which are not related to harm.
A preliminary objection to Kumar’s way of characterising wronging is that
it is unclear what it implies in same-number cases. In the case of the young girl
for example, the child she would have if she decides not to wait cannot reason-
ably expect any outcome other than a life with a bad start or non-existence. It
would be unreasonable of the child to expect any other outcome because those
are the only possible outcomes. If that’s the case, however, it is not clear in
what way the girl would “violate” any legitimate expectations on the child’s
part. The child, once she exists, certainly would prefer existence over non-
existence since her life is worth living. How Kumar expects this notion of
wronging to explain why the young girl ought to wait is therefore less than
obvious.
It could be argued in Kumar’s defence that the girl’s child cannot have epis-
temically legitimate expectations on a better start in life but that the child can
have normatively legitimate expectations on a better start. In other words, the
child could object to the girl’s choice, not on the grounds that the girl could
have done better for her, but on the grounds that she should have done better.
However, saying that the child can have normatively legitimate expectations
to a better start is just to assume what has to be shown; namely that it would
be morally objectionable of the girl not to postpone her pregnancy. It is this
intuition which the appeal to wronging is supposed to justify but with this
reply it is merely assumed.
A further objection to Kumar’s view, and the appeal to wronging in gen-
eral, concerns the Medical Programmes. Recall the structure of the case. If
we choose to implement programme A, the same people case, then we would
make a number of future children better off than they would otherwise have
been. If we implement programme B, the different people case, we would not
be making future people better off than they would otherwise have been, but
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we make it so that a number of healthy children are born instead of unhealthy
children.
With respect to this case Kumar has the following alternatives: (i) they
are not equally worthwhile (ii) the two programmes are equally worthwhile
because they prevent wrongs, not because they prevent harms, (iii) they are
equally worthwhile because they prevent harm and therefore wrongs, (iv) they
are equally worthwhile because one prevents harm while the other prevents
wrongs.
First consider option (i). As before, we should assume that the merits of
these two programmes are wholly dependent on their effects on the children’s
well-being and that other factors (such as desert) are equal. The problem for
Kumar is that in the same-people case (programme A) we can say, assuming
the Counterfactual Condition, that it is worthwhile because it prevents harm,
and therefore does not wrong future people. In the same-number case however
there is no harm to prevent, according to the Counterfactual Condition, despite
the fact that the children who would be affected undergo a qualitatively identi-
cal ordeal as those in the different people case. As I argued above, however, it
is very difficult to see what would justify this difference. We should therefore
be sceptical about (i).
To avoid this Kumar could opt for alternative (ii): the two programmes are
equally worthwhile, not because they prevent harm, but because they prevent
people from being wronged. This does not seem very plausible however. In-
tuitively, the merits of the same-people programme is the effect it would have
on future people’s well-being, namely that it would prevent harm. But if the
merits of this programme is that it prevents wronging, and wronging is not
understood in terms of how it would affect future people’s well-being, then it
is exceedingly unclear what is meant by “wronging”. Kumar says that it re-
quires the “violation of certain legitimate expectations” but as we saw above it
is not clear what this implies in same-number cases. In the same-people case
(programme A) it might seem plausible to say that the affected children can
legitimately expect us to do what is best for them, that is, to implement the
programme. However, the same reasoning could be used against the imple-
mentation of programme B (the same-number case) since not implementing
this programme would be to do what is best for those who would exist if we
do not implement this programme. So it is unclear how we on Kumar’s notion
of wronging can say that the two programmes are equally worthwhile.
Alternatively, Kumar could opt for alternative (iii): the programmes are
equally worthwhile because they prevent harm and therefore wrongs. This
alternative faces the same difficulties as the rights-approach discussed above.
If he were to take on board the view that we can harm people in same-number
cases then he would be required to develop an analysis of harm which can ac-
count for this judgement. That is, we are led back to defending some version
of the Harm Principle against the non-identity problem.
32
Finally, Kumar could opt for alternative (iv): the programmes are equally
worthwhile because one prevents harm (the same-people case) while the other
prevents wrongs (the same-number case). However, this alternative suffers
from similar problems as (ii). It is not clear that the same-number programme
would prevent any wrongs. Whether the same-number programme is imple-
mented or not, it is not clear that the people who will exist because of this
choice will have any of their legitimate expectations violated.
This shows that wronging is a poor substitute for harming. Appealing to
wronging has no clear advantage over the Harm Principle when it comes to
solving the non-identity problem. In short, Kumar’s view faces the following
dilemma. Either, wronging a person is understood in terms of how an act af-
fects that person’s well-being or it is not. If wronging is not understood in
terms of well-being then wronging becomes much less plausible as a solu-
tion to the non-identity problem. Intuitively, what is objectionable about the
young girl’s choice has to do with how she affects her child’s well-being and
the merits of the two medical programmes are how they affect future peo-
ple’s well-being. On the other hand, if wronging is understood in terms of
well-being then it does not have any advantage over the Harm Principle as a
solution to the non-identity problem. What makes the girl’s choice impermis-
sible is that she wrongs her child if she does not wait. This is supposed to be
true in virtue of how she affects this child’s well-being and not in virtue of
what she could have done for some other child. However, this claim faces the
same problem as the Harm Principle but in slightly different terms: how can a
person be wronged by an act if she would not have been better off had the act
not been performed?
An alternative approach is to understand wronging in terms of desert. This
way of looking at wronging seems not to be vulnerable to the objections just
made, and might be what some philosophers who are attracted to the idea have
in mind.
There are mainly two ways in which one could take this view. On the first
one specifies an amount of well-being and say that people deserve at least that
much well-being. One can then say that a person has been wronged if and only
if she gets less well-being than she deserves.26
A problem for this view is where to place the desert-level. If it is placed
high then many future people, even those who are relatively well-off, would
be wronged by being brought into existence. This seems counter-intuitive. If
it is placed low, however, then the view loses most of its bite since few acts
would wrong future persons. Striking this balance is therefore one of the main
difficulties for this version of the desert-view.
One way to resolve this issue would be to investigate the grounds for desert.
This leads us to the second way of understanding the desert-view. Here the
26 See Feldman (1997, part III) for the idea that people deserve a certain level of well-being. I
will ignore a version of this view where a person has been wronged unless her actual well-being
exactly matches her deserved well-being. This view is too implausible.
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idea is that people do not deserve some specific amount of well-being but
rather that they deserve certain particular goods, and perhaps the absence of
certain evils. This version of the desert-view comes closer to the view dis-
cussed above, where wronging was understood in terms of rights, and points
similar to those which were made against rights apply here as well. We should
ask: when is a particular condition an evil? The most plausible answer here, it
seems, will be that a condition is an evil, and serves as a ground for desert, just
when the condition is also a harm. Or, more cautiously, some harms ground
desert, though there might be desert which is not grounded in harm. However,
in a case like the young girl it seems clear that harm is the most plausible
ground for desert and we would therefore be led back to defending the claim
that the girl would harm her child if she does not postpone her pregnancy. This
weaker thesis seems to me very plausible and, if correct, shows that sidestep-
ping the non-identity problem by bringing in desert might work in some cases
but not all.
In short, the objection against appealing to wronging as a solution to the
non-identity problem is that it either (i) neglects the importance of individual
well-being, in which case it is implausible as a solution to the non-identity
problem or (ii) that it takes well-being into account, in which case the ap-
proach has no significant advantage over appealing to harm. One possibil-
ity which should be mentioned in this context is to follow Melinda Roberts
and define wronging directly in terms of well-being.27 On her view, to wrong
someone is roughly to fail to maximise that person’s well-being. However,
as Roberts herself notes, the difference between harming and wronging then
turns out to be largely a terminological matter.28 The mere introduction of this
distinction will not solve the non-identity problem and the merits of Roberts’
account of wronging will have to be evaluated in the same way as one has to
evaluate accounts of harm which purport to solve the problem.
1.3.3 Harming
The two approaches to the non-identity problem, conditional duties and
wronging, both seem to be problematic in one way or another. Though the
problems I have highlighted for these views may not be conclusive against
them, they show that the person-affecting intuition is not so easily preserved,
and the non-identity problem not so easily dispatched, as some philosophers
have thought.
To solve the problem in person-affecting terms it therefore seems reason-
able to return to the argument against the Harm Principle:
27 See Roberts (1998, 2003a,b). Roberts has in her latest works (2010, 2011) dropped the term
“wronging” altogether. We will have reason to return to Roberts’ view in chapter seven.
28 See Roberts (2011, p. 337).
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(1) An act harms a person if and only if that person is worse off than she would
have been had the act not been performed (the Counterfactual Condition).
(2) It is not the case that a person with a life worth living is worse off than she
would have been had she not existed at all.
(3) Therefore, a person who would have a life worth living is not harmed by
being created.
(4) If a person who would have a life worth living is not harmed by being
created, and the Harm Principle is true, then it would be more worthwhile to
cure people of a handicap (invest in programme A) than to prevent this handicap
from occurring (invest in programme B).
(5) However, programme A and B are equally worthwhile (the no-difference
view).
(6) Therefore, the Harm Principle is false.
The solutions from the previous sections tried to solve the non-identity prob-
lem by rejecting the Harm Principle and replacing it with something else (con-
ditional duties or wronging). The alternative route, which I will explore in this
section, is to see if any of (1) to (5) can be questioned.
Most, if not all, of the premises in this argument have been questioned at
some point so let me comment on those parts of the argument which I will ac-
cept without any further discussion. To some, the most controversial premise
in the argument is probably (5). It is important to remember however that (5)
is weaker than the more general claim that identity does not make a differ-
ence. All it says is that in this particular case, the two medical programmes
are equally worthwhile. As I argued above, this claim seems very difficult to
deny. I will therefore assume this premise.
We should also grant (4). As I argued above, it is not very plausible that
there is some further condition which could explain why the two medical pro-
grammes are equally worthwhile if we assume the Counterfactual Condition
and the Harm Principle. This leaves us with premises (1) and (2).
First, consider (2). It has been argued that one cannot meaningfully compare
the value of existence for a person with the value of non-existence for that
person. After all, if the person does not exist then there is no person for which
non-existence can have value.29 However, the argument leaves it open whether
such comparisons can meaningfully be made. All that premise (3) commits
one to is that it is not the case that a person with a life worth living is worse off
than she would have been if she had not existed. This claim is compatible with
a wide range of views on the value of existence. For example, it is compatible
with a life worth living being better for the person than non-existence as well
as the two states being incomparable. All that it excludes is that a person with
a life worth living is worse off than she would be had she not existed, and this
claim seems very plausible.
29 See for example Broome (1999, p. 168).
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This leaves us with (1). This condition for an act to harm a person has been
rather popular but has also met a lot of criticism. In the next chapter I will
consider this condition in greater detail and its plausibility. If there are suf-
ficiently strong reasons for rejecting this analysis of harm then the argument
against the Harm Principle outlined above would fail.
1.4 Summary
In this chapter I have argued that the argument against the Harm Principle,
based on the non-identity problem and the no-difference view, rely on a cer-
tain analysis of harm: the Counterfactual Condition. I have argued that al-
ternative person-affecting solutions to the non-identity problem, conditional
duties and wronging, do not have a clear advantage over the Harm Principle.
If anything, these alternative solutions seem to face the same problem as the
Harm Principle. I argued that the most plausible way of approaching the prob-
lem is therefore to consider the Counterfactual Condition and whether it is a
plausible analysis of harm.
However, merely showing that the Counterfactual Condition is not plausible
is not sufficient to vindicate the Harm Principle. First, one would also have to
develop an alternative analysis of harm which actually solves the non-identity
problem. That is, an analysis of harm such that the young girl’s choice, or
choosing Depletion, actually involves doing harm. Second, the analysis must
be compatible with the no-difference view. As I have argued in this chapter
an analysis of harm should not make a difference between same-people and
same-number cases. Third, the analysis must be intuitively acceptable. We
have a rough idea about what is and what is not harm and an analysis of the
concept should not stray too far from this pre-theoretical idea.
A brief comment regarding the third condition. As we will see, people, and
philosophers no less, tend to have very diverging intuitions when it comes to
harm. It is reasonable to expect that an analysis will not be able to satisfy
all of them. However, it is possible, or so I will argue in the next chapter, to
describe a “basic structure” which incorporates a couple of central features
which have a good claim to being essential to the pre-theoretical concept of
harm. However, this basic structure is too thin in order to determine any par-
ticular analysis. In this thesis I will give priority to the first and the second
constraint and my aim is therefore not to give an analysis of harm which fits
our pre-theoretical ideas about harm perfectly. Rather, the aim is to find an
analysis of harm which solves the non-identity problem and which satisfies
the no-difference view while not being too revisionary.
36
2. The Counterfactual Condition
In the previous chapter I argued that in order to defend the Harm Principle
against the non-identity problem we should take a closer look at the Counter-
factual Condition:
The Counterfactual Condition: An act harms a person if and only if that person
is worse off than she would have been had the act not been performed
This claim is the weakest premise in the argument against the Harm Principle.
If we can show that it is not plausible then the argument against the Harm
Principle based on the non-identity problem and the no-difference view fails.
A successful argument against this condition would not establish the Harm
Principle, however, since the challenge of accounting for same-number cases,
within the constraints of the no-difference view, would still stand. However,
the positive argument against the Harm Principle would have been disarmed.
2.1 Distinctions
Before discussing the Counterfactual Condition there are a couple of useful
clarifications and distinctions to be made. Ordinary harm-talk is extremely di-
verse and the following is not an attempt to completely map ordinary discourse
but only to bring out a couple of distinctions. The Counterfactual Condition is
a part of an analysis of the concept “harm” and there are several points to be
made regarding analyses of harm in general, and the Counterfactual Condition
in particular, which will be important both when evaluating the Counterfactual
Condition and when discussing rival views in later chapters.
2.1.1 The ontology of harm
To start things off we should distinguish between doing harm and harmfulness.
The former, doing harm, is a relational property which can be attributed to
wide range of things. For example, smoking (an act) does harm because of
how it affects people. The relation here is between the act of smoking and
the smoker, and sometimes other people as well. Similarly, an earthquake (an
event) does harm because it has certain consequences for those affected by it.
Harmfulness, on the other hand, is a non-relational property which is roughly
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synonymous with “injury”. States of affairs and events can be harmful in this
sense without doing harm, that is, without having harmful consequences.
The distinction between these two is often not clear cut and many harmful
states or events do harm as well. Furthermore, if an event or state of affairs
does harm then this typically means that it has harmful consequences. It is
important to note however that there is a conceptual difference between the
two and that when analysing harm we have to be clear about which of these
two senses we are trying to analyse. If our aim is to analyse doing harm then
we should take into account the plausible claim that doing harm is to cause
something harmful. Also, we should be careful not to object to an analysis of
doing harm that it does not capture our intuitions about which states of affairs
or events are harmful. If, however, the aim is to analyse harmfulness then we
should consider in virtue of what certain states of affairs and events have the
non-relational property of “harmfulness”.
A further ontological question concerns which ontological category doing
harm should be attributed to. In the Harm Principle, harm is being attributed to
acts. In this thesis I will understand acts as a species of events in the sense that
the performance of an act, φ , is just the occurrence of an event. An analysis
of when an act φ performed by some person, a, harms someone else, b, is
therefore an instance of the more general analysis of when an event e does
harm to b.1
Which ontological category harmfulness is properly attributed to is not so
clear. States of affairs, events and concrete objects are all possible candidates.
Here I will make the assumption that states of affairs are the primary on-
tological category for harmfulness. Attributions of harmfulness to events or
concrete objects can, it seems to me, be rendered in terms of states of affairs.2
This assumption is mainly to simplify the exposition and does not have any
significant effect on what I will argue.
With respect to the Harm Principle it should be obvious that it is a princi-
ple about the moral relevance of doing harm. For an analysis of harm to be
relevant to the Harm Principle it must therefore be an analysis of doing harm
rather than harmfulness. The Counterfactual Condition, then, should be un-
derstood (and usually is understood) as a condition for when an act (or event)
does harm rather than when a state of affairs is harmful. We should also note
the following plausible connection between doing harm and harmful states of
affairs: an act (or event) does harm only if it has a harmful effect.
1 In ordinary language we also say that people do harm. I will in this thesis understand the claim
“a harmed b” as an elliptic way of saying that a performed some act which did harm to b.
2 This is not a trivial claim, to be sure. Roughly the idea is that for both objects and events we
can construe states of affairs to work in their stead. An object x for example is harmful if and
only if the state of affairs “x exists” is harmful. Regarding events, one suggestion is that one
can for every occurring event e construe the state of affairs “e occurs”.
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2.1.2 Harm and well-being
With the distinction between harm as a relational property, doing harm, and
as a non-relational property, harmfulness, it might be tempting to think that
this is a distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic harm.3 While doing harm
is obviously extrinsic, we should not assume that harmfulness is necessarily
an intrinsic property. Poverty, for example, can be quite harmful. But, one of
the things which makes poverty harmful is plausibly what it prevents a person
from achieving, rather than what it is like to be poor. Poverty can of course be
intrinsically harmful but it can also, I suggest, be extrinsically harmful. Other
examples of extrinsic harmfulness are cases of deprivation. When a person is
deprived of some good, or the ability to achieve that good, then we might say
that that person is in a harmful state. However, this state does not seem to be
harmful because of any of its intrinsic features.
We should therefore not say that the distinction between doing harm and
harmfulness is just the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic harm be-
cause harmfulness can be an extrinsic property. However there is a distinction
to made here. In value theory a distinction is sometimes made between final
and instrumental value. Something has instrumental value if and only if it is
valuable because it has consequences which are finally valuable. To have final
value, however, is to be valuable as an end and not merely as a means to some-
thing else which is valuable.4 A way to distinguish between doing harm and
harmfulness would be to use this distinction between final and instrumental
rather than intrinsic and extrinsic. With the distinction between final and in-
strumental harm we can say that doing harm is harm in the instrumental sense
while harmfulness is harm in the final sense. To say that x is an instrumental
harm is to say that it leads to something which is a final harm. A final harm,
on the other hand, is not harmful because of its consequences but because of
its nature.5
This way of characterising the difference between final and instrumental
harmfulness leaves it open what, exactly, final harms are. Traditionally, final
harms have been thought of in terms of “interests”.6 Roughly, the traditional
analysis of final harms hold that they are “setbacks” to a person’s interests
while instrumental harms are the causes of such setbacks. The aim of this ter-
minology is to capture one central aspect of final harms: final harms matter
to the one who suffers them in the sense that they are bad for the person who
suffers them. This connection with “prudential value”, value-for, suggests that
we can think of final harms as negative components of a person’s well-being.
Well-being, as I will use the term, is what makes life good (or bad) for the
3 Bradley (2012) suggests this terminology to separate the two.
4 Regarding the difference between final and intrinsic value, see Korsgaard (1983) and Rabi-
nowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000).
5 “Nature” should of course not be understood as being limited to a thing’s intrinsic properties.
6 See for example Bayles (1976) and Feinberg (1986, 1987).
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person whose life it is.7 We do not need to take a stand here on what exactly
well-being is, whether it is pleasure, preference satisfaction or something else.
Here I am more concerned with the formal properties of harm and to a lesser
extent the substantial ones about what it is that makes life go better or worse.
The traditional view of final harms as setbacks to interests assumes one par-
ticular view of well-being but an analysis of harm should as far as possible be
compatible with different views on what well-being is.8
In short, instrumental harms are harms in virtue of their consequences while
final harms gain their status in virtue of their nature. When we say of some
act that it is harmful we typically mean that it is harmful because of its con-
sequences. That is, acts are usually not harmful in the final sense but only in
the instrumental sense. The qualifier “usually” is needed here however. Some
acts, such as extremely offensive or insulting acts could be considered harmful
in the final sense. Whether such examples should be classified as final harms
is a question which I will not attempt to answer in this thesis, it will have to
be settled by a theory of well-being. We can however note that the following
claim seems plausible in the light of the connection between harmfulness and
well-being: a state of affairs is harmful in the final sense if and only if it is bad
for someone in the final sense.
The Counterfactual Condition is of course compatible with the distinction
final-instrumental harm, but it should be emphasised that the Counterfactual
Condition applies only to doing harm and not harmfulness.9 Only applying the
condition to doing harm and not harmfulness, is by no means a weakness but
rather a strength. It enables a defender of the Counterfactual Condition to say,
for example, that while the young girl’s choice not to postpone her pregnancy
does not harm her child, it is still bad for the child to have a bad start in life.
7 It is important to distinguish well-being, or prudential value, from other forms of value such
as aesthetic or ethical value. To say that something promotes a person’s well-being is not nec-
essarily to say that it is good ethically, or aesthetically. Similarly, a life which is good for me,
a life where I have high well-being, might be an aesthetically bad life. See also Sumner (1996,
pp. 20–6).
8 It would be appropriate to say something about what I take a plausible theory of well-being
to be. There are mainly two constraints which, on my view, a theory of well-being will have to
satisfy in order to qualify as initially plausible. First, the theory should imply that it is possible
to be mistaken about one’s own well-being. Though the first-person perspective might give
one a privileged position epistemically, a person is not infallible in her judgements about her
own well-being. Second, what contributes to a particular person’s well-being is, to some extent,
person-relative. That is, it is possible that a particular thing is good for me but not for you. This
constraint does of course not rule out that there are objective facts about well-being but it does,
for example, rule out a view which identifies well-being with intrinsic impersonal value (this
view is briefly discussed in chapter three). These two constraints only rule out very crude views
about well-being and should not be very controversial. Filling in the details is however not a
task for this thesis.
9 Insofar as the distinction is made, philosophers who discuss the Counterfactual Condition in-
tend it to apply only to instrumental harm. See Feinberg (1986, pp. 148–9) and Bradley (2012).
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Likewise, one can say in the case of the Specks that no one harmed their child
but that it is bad for the child to be born with neurofibromatosis.10
2.1.3 Partial and total harm
When discussing harm it is common to distinguish between a partial or pro-
tanto sense and a total or all things considered sense. In the partial sense harm
is used to convey that an act or decision has consequences which are to some
extent harmful while the total sense is used when we say that an act or decision
has consequences which are on the whole harmful.
To illustrate this distinction, consider the following case:
Surgery. Black saves White’s life by amputating White’s leg. White suffers
intense pain but had Black not amputated the leg then White would have died.
Removing a limb, even by surgical means, is something which under normal
circumstances would be considered a paradigmatic example of doing harm.
But, in this case circumstances are not normal because the amputation is nec-
essary in the circumstances for saving White’s life. One way to view this situ-
ation is to say that while amputating harms White it is only a partial harm. It is
something which, taken by itself, harms White. However, because amputating
saves White’s life it is not to do harm in the total sense.
The relation between these two senses of harm seems to be fairly straight-
forward: harming in the total sense is a function of harming and benefiting in
the partial sense. In the case of amputation, for example, we weigh the partial
harm of loosing a limb against the partial benefits (if there are any) of loosing
a limb. If the partial harms outweigh the partial benefits, then we say that the
amputation harmed the person in the total sense. Otherwise, it only harms her
in the partial sense.
The Counterfactual Condition tends to be viewed as a condition for total
rather than partial harm.11 In Surgery, for example, philosophers who have
discussed the Counterfactual Condition take it to imply that amputating does
not harm White because not amputating would be all-things-considered worse
for White. They would not deny, or would not have to deny at least, that am-
putating harms White in some sense but they would claim that this is not the
sense of harm which the Counterfactual Condition is supposed to apply to.
2.1.3.1 The morally relevant sense of harm
The distinction between partial and total harm invites the question whether it
is the total or the partial sense which we should be analysing. Defenders of the
Counterfactual Condition usually claim that it is the total and not the partial
10 If this seems puzzling, see below regarding the morally relevant sense of harm.
11 See Bayles (1976, p. 293), Feinberg (1986, p. 147), Norcross (2005, p. 150) and Bradley
(2012).
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sense which is the morally relevant sense of harm, and we need therefore to
take a closer look at what this claim might mean and whether it is plausible.
One thing one could mean by “morally relevant sense of harm” is that some
harm-attributions do not have the right kind of subject. We might want to draw
a distinction between harming persons and harming other things, such as the
environment, works of art etc. Because well-being is central to the concept
of harm it might be argued that things which cannot properly be said to have
well-being might yet be harmed in an extended sense.12 The idea would be that
this sense of harm, harm to non-persons, is not morally relevant in the sense
that we do not have to take such harms into account in moral deliberation. I
mention this possibility mostly to put it aside. It is obvious that even if there
is a morally relevant difference between harming, say, the environment and
harming a person, this difference is independent of the total-partial distinction.
A better approach is to claim that to draw the distinction between morally
relevant and irrelevant harms we need to consider how harm relates to nor-
mative principles. Here a natural suggestion is that to analyse harm in the
morally relevant sense is to analyse harm as it occurs in normative contexts
like the Harm Principle. The claim that it is harm in the total sense which is
morally relevant then amounts to the claim that we should understand norma-
tive principles like the Harm Principle as referring to harm in the total sense.
It should be emphasised how important the claim that the Counterfactual
Condition captures the morally relevant sense is for the argument against the
Harm Principle. To see this, consider the following reductio of the Counter-
factual Condition:
(1) If the Counterfactual Condition is true, then it is not the case that there is
harm done in the case of the young girl.
(2) There is harm done in the case of the young girl.
(3) Therefore, the Counterfactual Condition is false.
Premise (1) should not be controversial, and (2) is simply the common sense
verdict when faced with same-number cases. The way we ordinarily use
“harm” does not stop us from saying that the girl would harm her child if she
does not wait. One way to argue against the Counterfactual Condition is then
to use the fact that it conflicts with ordinary harm-attributions as a reason for
rejecting it as part of an analysis of harm.13
The obvious reply from the defender of the Counterfactual Condition is to
appeal to the distinction between harm in a morally relevant sense and harm
12 See Feinberg (1980) for a discussion of what kinds of things can be harmed. Even though
Feinberg frames his discussion in terms of “interests” his discussion applies to harm as well.
13 Harman (2004) seems to suggest an argument along these lines: “I claim that causing pain,
early death, bodily damage, and deformation is harming. We do not need a complete analysis
of what it is to harm, in order to reach this conclusion; we can hold that these are clear cases of
harm” (Harman 2004, p. 92).
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in a “wider” sense: in (1) harm is used in the morally relevant sense while in
(2) it is used in the wider sense.
How does one substantiate the claim that it is the total sense rather than the
partial which is morally relevant? Sumner (1996) has discussed this problem
for a related concept: welfare. Sumner’s view is that when analysing a con-
cept like welfare we strive for two things: descriptive adequacy and normative
adequacy. The first of these is achieved if the analysis fits ordinary discourse,
the way “welfare” is used in ordinary language. The second aim, that of nor-
mative adequacy, is achieved if the analysis makes a specific normative prin-
ciple which refers to welfare plausible. Sumner’s view is that we should give
some priority here to descriptive adequacy and especially to the “pre-analytic
core” of a concept. What this means is that there are certain parts of ordinary
discourse, the core, which it is more important for an analysis of welfare to
be faithful to than other areas. However, Sumner grants that there might be
several competing analyses which satisfy descriptive adequacy equally well.
Here is where normative adequacy enters: “when the evidence provided by
our ordinary experience is indeterminate or inconsistent, then there is a time
for shaping a theory of welfare to fit some favoured normative niche” (Sumner
1996, p. 19).
The idea that there is a pre-analytic core to a concept which should play an
important role when analysing a concept can be compared with what Smith
(1994) refers to as the “platitudes” regarding a concept. Smith’s view is that
when analysing a concept there are a number of propositions involving the
concept which have a “prima facie a priori status”. According to Smith, these
platitudes are central to the concept in two ways. First, the platitudes are cen-
tral to mastering the concept. A person who masters a concept treats these
propositions as true; she is at the very least disposed to accept them as true.
Second, an analysis “should give us knowledge of all of the relevant platitudes
[...] that is, the maximal consistent set of platitudes constitutive of mastery of
the term” (Smith 1994, p. 31).
Sumner and Smith share the idea that when analysing a concept there are
certain propositions which we should pay special attention to. What is char-
acteristic of these propositions is that they are constitutive of the meaning of
the concept: a person who uses the same term but in a way which is inconsis-
tent with these propositions is talking about something else than a person who
uses the term in accordance with them.14 In what follows I will use Sumner’s
terminology of “pre-analytic core” but this is merely a matter of convenience.
If we apply this to harm we can say that to substantiate the claim that it
is the total sense of harm which is morally relevant one would have to show
that the total sense is central to the pre-analytic harm-discourse, especially
that part of the discourse which pertains to The Harm Principle or similar
normative principles. Alternatively, one could argue that the pre-analytic core
14 Jackson (1991, pp. 31–42) emphasises the role platitudes have to fix the discourse.
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and the relevant part of the harm-discourse is indeterminate with respect to
the total-partial distinction. In that case, we can choose whichever best fits
the normative role we have in mind for harm. We should therefore try to for-
mulate, as precisely as we can, what the pre-analytic core of “doing harm”
is.
I have already mentioned two candidates for membership in the pre-analytic
core: an act (or event) does harm only if it has a harmful effect and a state of
affairs is harmful in the final sense only if it is bad for someone in the final
sense. These two putative platitudes about doing harm can be captured some-
what more stringently by what I will call the “basic structure” of harm:
a harms b only if
(1) a performs an act, φ ,
(2) b is in a state S which is bad for b in the final sense.
(3) φ is responsible for S’s obtaining.
These three claims seem very plausible. The first condition should be trivial,
provided that we confine the analysis to acts. This condition serves to dis-
tinguish an analysis of when an agent harms someone from a more general
analysis of when natural events do harm as well as distinguishing mere bodily
movements from actions proper. The second condition captures the idea that
doing harm requires a certain kind of effect as was spelled out above. The
third condition seems necessary since the harmful state must in some relevant
sense be attributable to a’s φ -ing. The mere fact that there is a harmful effect
and that someone performs an act is of course not enough for the act to do
harm; the act must be related in the right way to the harmful effect in order for
the act to do harm.15
It should be emphasised that I intend these conditions to leave a lot of room
for further analysis. For example, regarding (1) it is a further issue whether
omissions are acts in the relevant sense as well as what distinguishes acts from
mere bodily movements. In (2) there is no need to settle the exact boundaries
of which states are bad for b in the final sense, that should be left to a theory of
well-being, and in (3) we can leave it open exactly what it takes for an act to be
responsible for a certain effect in the intended sense. For a complete analysis
we would have to settle these issues but in order to capture any platitudes
about doing harm we should not beg any questions regarding these notions. I
will therefore, for the moment, leave it open how (1)-(3) are to be understood
more precisely.
In addition to the basic structure we could also add a list of paradigmatic
instances of doing harm such as killing, torture and so on. However, all such
15 Why not simply say that φ causes S to obtain? The reason is that it seems plausible that the
relevant relation is some kind of dependence relation (S’s obtaining depends on φ ’s occurring),
but is not clear whether all dependence relations are causal. In the light of this it seems plausible
to hold that an act can be responsible for things which it does not cause. I will discuss the causal
view of responsibility in chapter five.
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paradigmatic examples would need a ceteris paribus clause attached to them
because, as we saw in Surgery, what would be a clear case of doing harm in
one context is not a clear case in other contexts. Even death, which might seem
like a paradigmatic example if ever there was one is, by many philosophers at
least, not taken to be a harm (or a “misfortune”) whenever it occurs.16 It is also
difficult to find other features which could be taken as a part of the core. Can-
didates such as that harming involves certain intentions or that it is a matter
of violating rights are such that we could reasonable disagree about whether
they are necessary for doing harm. In the case of intention, for example, it is
not clear whether we are simply confusing the relevance of intention to harm
with the moral importance of intending harm.17
This leaves room for normative considerations to play an influential role
when analysing harm. As a rule of thumb, I suggest that we can depart from
descriptive adequacy only if it can be motivated independently of achieving
greater normative adequacy. Simply trading descriptive for normative ade-
quacy threatens the analysis to be about something else rather than about
harm.
Let us now return to the claim that it is the total sense of harm which is
the morally relevant sense. It should be clear, I hope, that this claim cannot
be decided either way by merely looking at the pre-analytic core. Both the
partial and the total sense are compatible with there being a close connection
between harm and well-being. A case like Surgery suggests that it is the total
sense which is the morally relevant one but we also use harm in the partial
sense. For example, it would not be unreasonable to say that Black harms
White in the Surgery case if one adds that there are compensating benefits
associated with inflicting that harm. Whether it should be accepted depends
to a large extent on what normative role one has in mind.18 For our present
purposes, it should be noted that the Harm Principle could be understood in
either partial or total terms. Reading it as referring to total, or partial, harm
does not make it absurd on its face. We should therefore accept that the tools
at our disposal, the pre-analytic core and the Harm Principle, underdetermine
whether it is the total or the partial sense which is the morally relevant sense
of harm.
16 See for example Feldman (1991), Nagel (1991), Feit (2002) and Bradley (2009).
17 Bradley (2012) argues that separating intuitions about what one ought to do from intuitions
about harm is important if we are to avoid “moralistic fallacies” of this kind.
18 Kagan (1998, pp. 86–8) suggests a similar approach to the question which sense of harm is
morally relevant. He distinguishes between “global” and “local” harm and indicates that both
can be used to indicate harm in a morally relevant sense.
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2.2 Objections to the Counterfactual Condition
The basic intuition behind the Counterfactual Condition is that harm should
be analysed in comparative terms. The intuition is that, as Parfit puts it, “[i]f
what we are doing will not be worse for some other person, [...] we are not,
in a morally relevant sense, harming this person” (Parfit 1984, p. 374). This
seems quite plausible. We do not only think, as I suggested above, that to do
harm is to make some person suffer a state of affairs which is bad for her.
It also seems plausible that to do harm is to make a person’s life go worse.
Doing harm, it seems, is not only a matter of making people badly off, in
some respect. Doing harm also has a “contributive character” in that it is to
make someone’s life go worse.19
This intuition is however ambiguous because we have not specified what the
relevant comparison is regarding “worse for”. Worse than what? According to
the Counterfactual Condition, an act harms a person if and only if the person is
worse off than she would have been had the act not been performed but there
are many comparisons which could be made, and hence many analyses of
harm which satisfy the intuition but which give drastically different results.20
Something needs to be said in favour of adopting a counterfactual comparison
and not some other.
One suggestion which satisfies the underlying intuition is the Temporal
View. On this view to harm a person is to make that person worse off than
she was before the harm came about. More precisely:
The Temporal View: An act φ harms a person a if and only if φ causes a to be
worse off at time t than she was before t.21
There are mainly two counterexamples to this view. The first is how the Tem-
poral View is to account for cases where an act makes a person worse off
than she was, but better off than she would have been had the act not been
performed.22 Consider a variation of the amputation case. If Black does not
amputate White’s leg then White will die while if Black amputates then White
will live, but will be slightly worse off than she was prior to the amputation.23
19 The connection, if there is any, between the badness of a state of affairs for a person and the
difference, the contribution, that state of affairs makes to a person’s life, will be further explored
in chapter four.
20 The Counterfactual Condition is sometimes formulated in terms of “could” rather than
“would”. This difference is significant when there are more than two alternatives for an agent to
choose from. In what follows I will only consider simple cases where there are only two alter-
natives and formulating the Counterfactual Condition in terms of “could” rather than “would”
will therefore not have any effect on what I will argue in this chapter.
21 This view has many critics but few defenders. See however Perry (2003).
22 This argument is advanced by for example Norcross (2005).
23 If this seems unlikely, we can assume that White has some kind of infection in her leg which
she does not suffer from now, but which will in the future result in her death.
46
The temporal condition implies that Black would harm White by amputating,
but this seems counter-intuitive.
In defence of the Temporal View it could be argued that we should read
it as a condition for partial harm rather than total harm. Perhaps we should
say that an act harms someone, partially, only if the act makes that person
worse off in some respect than she was. This will not do however. In order for
this reply to work we need to identify some respect in the amputation-case in
which amputating makes the person better off than she was. Otherwise, the
Temporal View still seems to imply that amputating would harm the person
all things considered. The most straightforward way would be to say that it is
the fact that amputation saves the person’s life which accounts for this but it is
unclear whether a defender of the Temporal View can say this. When saving
someone’s life it seems very strained to say that we are making that person
better off than she was.
The second counterexample to the Temporal View is when a person is pre-
vented from receiving a benefit. As we have just seen, the Temporal View
seems to have difficulties with accounting for putative harms which involve a
prevention of something good. Many such cases are however clear examples
of harm. For example, if Black conspires in order to prevent White from get-
ting a prize which White would otherwise have been qualified for then it seems
clear that Black harms White (supposing that it would be good for White were
she to get the prize of course).24
A way for the Temporal View to reply to the objection could be to appeal
to a view where it is worse for a person to have a smaller chance of receiving
a benefit. It could then be claimed that preventing a person from receiving a
benefit is to lessen that person’s chances of receiving that particular benefit.
Preventions of benefits would then count as doing harm since they lessen a
person’s chances at receiving a particular benefit.25 To illustrate, consider a
child who is prevented from receiving a normal education. As this child gets
older it gets harder and harder for her to learn how to read, for example. In
this case it seems plausible to say that preventing the child from getting a
normal education lessens the child’s chances of ever learning how to read
since it is easier to learn such things when you are young. On the reply under
consideration, having a smaller chance of learning how to read is worse for the
child and preventing her from receiving a normal education makes her worse
off in the temporal sense.
While it seems plausible that there are cases like the one just described it
is not the case that all preventions of benefits can be dealt with in this fash-
ion. Some preventions of benefits leave a person’s chances of receiving the
benefit constant, or may perhaps even increase them, if the benefit in ques-
24 For further examples of this kind, see Feinberg (1986, p. 149), Holtug (2002, p. 368) and
Hanser (2008, p. 429).
25 See Thomson (2011, pp. 444–5). It should be noted that Thomson rejects the Temporal View
but for other reasons than ones having to do with failures to benefit.
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tion is not something which, as with learning to read, gets more difficult to
receive over time. Consider Black’s conspiring against White again. Suppose
that the prize is “employee of the month” and that it is a policy to award it
to a different employee every month. Then it is not the case that by prevent-
ing White from becoming employee of the month this month Black thereby
lessens White’s chances of becoming employee of the month. Quite the con-
trary, White’s chances of getting the prize over the next months will be greater
since the number of available candidates will become smaller and smaller.
The fact that preventions of benefits are not even putative harms on the
Temporal View gives us decisive reasons to reject it. Many such examples are
clear instances of harm and the Counterfactual Condition looks more plausi-
ble in this respect. Indeed, not only preventions of benefits but also failures
to benefit are harms on this view. Whether this makes the view too wide is
something I will now turn to.
2.2.1 Failures to benefit
A common objection against the Counterfactual Condition is that it makes
mere failures to benefit into harms.26 Suppose I am asked to donate a kidney
to my neighbour. If I refuse she will live a decent life while if I comply with
the neighbour’s request then she would be much better off. In this case it seems
absurd to say that I would harm my neighbour if I refuse. Compare this with a
case where I steal a kidney from a perfectly healthy person making her worse
off than she would have been had I not stolen the kidney. The result in both
cases is that someone ends up with one kidney less than she would otherwise
have had. The Counterfactual Condition is therefore fulfilled. But there seems
to be an important difference between the two. In the first case I do not harm
anyone while the second seems to be a paradigmatic example of doing harm.
There are however a number of things which can be said in defence of the
Counterfactual Condition here.
We have already seen that with respect to certain preventions of benefits,
such as preventing a person to develop her full potential, it is not counter-
intuitive to say that the person has been harmed by being prevented from re-
ceiving the benefit. In defence of the Counterfactual Condition it could then
be claimed that in cases like the one where I do not donate a kidney to my
neighbour our intuitions are not very reliable because there are other features
of these cases which make our intuitions unreliable. The defender of the Coun-
terfactual Condition could therefore claim that we should depart from descrip-
tive adequacy in the kidney case because our judgement that not donating a
kidney is not to do harm is not a reliable one.
If we compare the case where I do not donate a kidney with the case where
I prevent a person from developing her full potential, one difference is that
26 See for example Shiffrin (1999, p. 121), Harman (2004, p. 98), Hanser (2008, p. 428) and
Bradley (2012).
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in the first case I refrain from doing something while in the latter I actively
prevent something which would have occurred in the normal course of events.
Our tendency to make different judgements about these cases can perhaps be
explained by our tendency to think that there is a morally relevant difference
between acts and omissions, even if we would reject this view were we to
consider it in a more critical fashion. In defence of the Counterfactual Condi-
tion it could then be claimed that our intuitions in cases of failings to benefit
are usually influenced by a tendency to make a distinction between acts and
omission, but that this distinction is not a relevant one.27
Even if one grants the claim that the distinction is irrelevant to an analysis
of harm, and that our intuitions are influenced by a tendency to affirm the dis-
tinction, this argument seems questionable. If our intuitions about harm and
harming are influenced in this way one would expect that our judgement re-
garding the kidney case would change when we come to realise this. However,
it is not so clear that the counter-intuitiveness of saying that I harm my neigh-
bour when I fail to donate a kidney disappears when I realise that this is just
because it is a case involving an omission. A more plausible diagnosis of the
difference in our intuitions here is that there is some other feature of the two
cases which accounts for our tendency to make different judgements about
them which may be relevant to an analysis of harm.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that this strategy would work for all cases where
the Counterfactual Condition implies that a person does harm by failing to
benefit someone. In the kidney-example there is something to be said in favour
of the claim that I would harm my neighbour by not donating a kidney because
it would be to deprive my neighbour of a benefit, and depriving a person of
a benefit is at least sometimes to harm that person. But, the Counterfactual
Condition implies that I would harm my neighbour even in cases where I fail
to do what is best for my neighbour. For example, suppose that my neighbour
would be better off if I donate a kidney, but that she would be even better off if
I donate a lung, then the Counterfactual Condition implies that I would harm
my neighbour by donating a kidney. But this seems absurd. Perhaps I should
donate a lung, but it seems very counter-intuitive to say that I would harm my
neighbour by merely parting with a kidney.
As this example shows, the Counterfactual Condition clashes with the sec-
ond condition in the basic structure; that an act does harm only if it has a
harmful effect. The Counterfactual Condition also clashes with the condition
that an act does harm only if the act is responsible for a harmful effect. Ac-
cording to the Counterfactual Condition, all that is relevant is that a certain
counterfactual claim is true in order for an act to do harm. According to the
Counterfactual Condition, if an act makes a person worse off than she would
otherwise have been then the act does harm, even if this is because of a mere
coincidence.28 The Counterfactual Condition is therefore very far removed
27 See Kagan (1989, ch. 3) who argues against the relevance of the distinction.
28 I discuss this problem for the Counterfactual Condition at greater length below.
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from the ordinary concept of harm and does not do very well with respect to
descriptive adequacy. However, as was noted above, departures from descrip-
tive adequacy are sometimes acceptable, especially when such departures can
be independently motivated. Paying attention to the distinction between doing
and allowing can, in some cases, motivate these departures from descriptive
adequacy but it will not work in all cases.
Could it be argued that the Counterfactual Condition should be accepted,
despite its counter-intuitive implications, because of its normative adequacy?
First, as I argued above we should be careful with simply trading descriptive
for normative adequacy. The pre-analytic core of a concept especially should
be respected as far as possible. Second, as the non-identity problem and the
no-difference view shows, it is clear that the Counterfactual Condition is not
normatively adequate because it fails to make normative principle which refer
to harm, such as the Harm Principle, plausible. We should therefore conclude
that the Counterfactual Condition is not a plausible analysis of harm as it
occurs in the Harm Principle.
2.2.2 Reformulating the Counterfactual Condition
These objections against the Counterfactual Condition suggest that it is too
strong. There is, however, a weaker version of the condition which might be
more plausible. As I will argue, this weaker version of the Counterfactual
Condition avoids the objections raised above while still capturing the plausible
claim that to harm someone is to make that person’s life go worse.
According to the weaker version, the Counterfactual Condition is only a
necessary condition for doing harm:
The Weak Counterfactual Condition: an act harms a person only if that person
is worse off than she would have been had the act not been performed.
The Weak Counterfactual Condition avoids the objections raised at the end of
the previous section because it is only a necessary condition. It is, for example,
compatible with the basic structure.
The weak version is what at least some proponents of the stronger version
seem to have in mind. For example, in Feinberg’s analysis of when a harms
b he includes the Weak Counterfactual Condition but apart from this it also
includes as a necessary condition that “[a]’s action is the cause of an adverse
effect on [b]’s self-interest (a “state of harm”)” (Feinberg 1986, p.148). Re-
garding the distinction between a “state of harm” and doing harm Feinberg
writes that
there is a sense in which “state of harm” is the more fundamental concept, since
there can be no act of harming unless a state of harm is its product, whereas
we can have a state of harm without there being any prior act of harming as its
cause. (Feinberg 1986, p. 148).
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In the analysis that follows Feinberg makes it clear that the Weak Counterfac-
tual Condition is not a condition for when a particular state is a state of harm
but when an act performed by an agent harms someone. What I take Feinberg
to be referring to here is the distinction between doing harm and harmful states
(or events). Feinberg’s distinction between “states of harm” and “harming” is
the same distinction which was made above between doing harm and harmful
states of affairs (or events).
This also sheds some light on the role of the Counterfactual Condition in
an analysis of harm. It is not, as some seem to have thought,29 a condition for
when a state of affairs is a “state of harm”. As was noted when I introduced
the basic structure of an analysis of harm, a complete analysis should include
a condition to the effect that an act does harm to a person only if the act has
a harmful effect. However, the Counterfactual Condition as only a necessary
condition for when an act does harm is compatible with this part of the basic
structure and, furthermore, does not imply anything about how such harmful
effects should be analysed. Furthermore, I argued above that a plausible nec-
essary condition for when an act does harm is that the harmful effect must be
“attributable” to the act. The Weak Counterfactual Condition is distinct from
this condition as well.
A benefit of weakening the Counterfactual Condition is that it us to dis-
tinguishing the Counterfactual Condition from questions about responsibil-
ity. Because the Weak Counterfactual Condition is compatible with any view
about when a harmful effect is attributable to an act it is possible to hold
that some acts are responsible for harmful effects without doing harm. In the
Surgery-case for example, one could say that performing the amputation has a
harmful effect but, because the Weak Counterfactual Condition is not satisfied,
amputating does no harm.
Note also that weakening the Counterfactual Condition is that it does not
have any relevant impact on the non-identity problem or the no-difference
view. The Weak Counterfactual Condition is not satisfied in the cases consid-
ered in chapter one (the young girl and Depletion) and it is therefore suffi-
cient to rule out that there is any harm done in these cases. Regarding the no-
difference view and the case of the Two Medical Programmes the condition
rules out that there can be any harm done by cancelling programme B (the
same-number programme). It allows, but does not entail, that there is harm
done by cancelling programme A. It seems plausible however that any further
conditions would also be satisfied. There is, for example, an intuitively recog-
nisable harmful state of affairs (the handicap the children would have if the
programme is cancelled) and our choice seems, prima facie, to be responsible
for whether this effect comes about.
29 For example, Hanser (2008, p. 423) attributes to Feinberg the view that the Counterfactual
Condition is a condition for when a state is a “state of harm”. This seems to be a mistake since
Feinberg clearly distinguishes between “doing harm” and “harmed conditions” or “states of
harm”.
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It therefore seems fruitful to see the Weak Counterfactual Condition as an
addition to the basic structure. Placing the Weak Counterfactual Condition in
relation to the basic structure we can say that if we suppose that the basic
structure is necessary, what is missing for conditions (1)-(3) to be jointly suf-
ficient according to the proponent of the Weak Counterfactual Condition is
that φ -ing makes b worse off than she would otherwise have been.
This more sophisticated view seems to have the resources to respond to
some of the objections from failures to benefit. In cases where a person would
have been better off were an act to be performed, but there is no harmful
effect, one would not be harming this person by failing to perform the act. For
example, not further increasing the well-being of a person who already is very
well off would not be an instance of harming (depending, of course, on how
“harmful effect” is spelled out).
The Counterfactual Condition as only a necessary condition is therefore
more promising than as necessary and sufficient. However, the weaker version
encounters problems of its own which, I will argue, give us reason to reject it
and look for a more plausible analysis of harm.30
2.2.3 Irrelevant consequences
The Weak Counterfactual Condition can be accused of including considera-
tions which are irrelevant to whether an act harms someone. Woodward raises
this objection with the following example:31
Victor Frankl seems to suggests that, as a result of his imprisonment in a Nazi
concentration camp, he developed certain resources of character, insights into
the human condition, and capacities for appreciation that he would not other-
wise have had. Let us suppose, not implausibly, that Frankl’s mistreatment by
the Nazi’s was a necessary condition for the richness of his later life, and that,
had the Nazis behaved differently toward him, his life would have been, on
balance, less full and good. [...] It is Frankl, and not the Nazis, to whom credit
and responsibility for his later life are due. (Woodward 1986, p. 809).
In this example the Weak Counterfactual Condition is not fulfilled. Frankl is
not worse off than he would have been had the Nazis acted differently, and the
obviously counter-intuitive conclusion is that the Nazis did not harm Frankl.
It also seems inappropriate, as Woodward points out, to take the benefits of
Frankl’s later life into account when determining whether the Nazis harmed
Frankl.
The Weak Counterfactual Condition is, as I mentioned above, a condition
for total harm and one way to defend the condition could be to rely on the dis-
tinction between partial and total harm. It seems plausible to claim that with
30 These objections are, of course, also objections to the stronger version of the condition.
31 A similar objection is raised by Hanser (1990, p. 60).
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respect to some aspects, Frankl is worse off than he would otherwise have
been, though he on the whole is not worse off. In Woodward’s example, the
conclusion drawn from the Weak Counterfactual Condition is that the Nazis
did not harm Frankl in the total sense. But, on behalf of the Weak Counter-
factual Condition it could be replied that this does of course not rule out that
the they harmed him in a partial sense. Furthermore, a defender of the Weak
Counterfactual Condition can point to a tendency not to distinguish between
partial and total harm in ordinary language as explaining why it might seem
counter-intuitive to say that the Nazis did not harm Frankl.32
This defence seems to be a small comfort however since it is still counter-
intuitive to say that the Nazis did not harm Frankl all things considered. A
point which could be raised here in defence of the Weak Counterfactual Con-
dition is that our intuitions in the Frankl-case are influenced by our tendency to
condemn the Nazis actions from a moral point of view. However, such moral
condemnation should be distinguished from the claim that in the morally rel-
evant sense the Nazis did not harm Frankl. It could then be argued that what
the Nazis did was wrong, even though for other reasons than that they harmed
Frankl in the total sense.
A more troubling aspect of Woodward’s objection for the Weak Counterfac-
tual Condition is that it seems to take irrelevant considerations into account.
The benefits of Frankl’s later life is not something we would consider as rele-
vant when evaluating whether the Nazis harmed Frankl. Of course, a defender
of the Weak Counterfactual Condition can point to cases where we have the
opposite intuition.33 Suppose that Frankl suffers from post-traumatic stress
because of what the Nazis did to him. This is certainly something which we
are inclined to blame the Nazis for but it is not clear what the relevant differ-
ence between this case and Woodward’s is. This reply would however be to
change the subject. Whether the Nazis are responsible (in the relevant sense)
for what happens to Frankl in his later years is one thing, but if the benefits he
would enjoy in his later life are such that he would not have enjoyed them had
the Nazis done otherwise then they are taken into account by the Weak Coun-
terfactual Condition regardless of what we say about the Nazis responsibility
for these benefits (and likewise for harms).
We can make this point in a more formal way. Suppose two events, e1 and
e2, would not have occurred had an act, φ , not been performed. Suppose fur-
32 Could the Weak Counterfactual Condition be modified further so that it is a condition for
partial harm? One way to do this would be to apply the condition to parts of a life rather than
a whole life. On this view, the Nazis harmed Frankl because Frankl was worse off during a
period of time than he would otherwise have been during that period. However, this would be a
poor analysis of partial harm because several partial harms and benefits can obtain at the same
time. For example, an analysis of partial harm should, it seems, entail that there is harm done
in the Surgery-case but it is doubtful that this would follow from an analysis of partial harm in
counterfactual terms.
33 See Smilansky (2007, ch. 1) for a nice illustration of how our intuitions tend to go both ways
in cases like the ones discussed here.
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ther that φ is only responsible in the relevant sense for e1. Now, whether φ
harms someone, according to the Counterfactual Condition, depends on the
impact of both events on a person’s well-being. But, whether φ does harm or
not would then depend on effects which it is not responsible for. This contra-
dicts the plausible claim that whether an act does harm depends only on the
effects of this act. If the appropriate link between an act and a harmful state
of affairs is missing, i.e., if the act is not responsible for the state’s obtaining,
then the act cannot do harm in virtue of the state of affairs’ obtaining.34
In defence of the Weak Counterfactual Condition it could be claimed that
it is a mistake to assume that counterfactual dependence and responsibility do
not go hand in hand. To assume that the events above would not have occurred
had the act not been performed is just to assume that the act is responsible for
those events. While this reply makes the act responsible for both effects, it
involves a considerable broadening of the ordinary notion of responsibility.
What this reply amounts to is that, in Woodward’s example, the Nazis are
responsible for the benefits Frankl received in his later years.
The best reply, it seems, for a defender of the Weak Counterfactual Condi-
tion here is to be revisionistic and argue that we should accept this broadening
of our ordinary notion of harm and responsibility. If we do, then it seems we
could also argue against Woodward’s example on the grounds that it relies on
a mistaken view about responsibility. Understanding responsibility as counter-
factual dependence does capture something central to responsibility, namely
that we are responsible for the difference our acts make. I will not attempt to
answer the question whether we should accept this broadening of our ordinary
notion of responsibility, but we will have reason to revisit this topic in chapter
five. For now I will merely note that the best option for a defender of the Weak
Counterfactual Condition seems to be the revisionistic path.
Summing up, while Woodward’s example does not damn the Weak
Counterfactual Condition it shows that there are certain costs attached. First,
it would require us to give up the intuitive judgement that the Nazis harmed
Frankl all things considered. Second, the Weak Counterfactual Condition
pushes one to adopt a revisionistic account of responsibility. If an event
would not have occurred had a certain act not been performed then the Weak
Counterfactual Condition takes this into account when determining harm,
even if we intuitively would not say that the act is responsible for the effect.
34 A problem for this restriction, it has been argued, concerns collectives of acts. The restriction
seems to rule out that mere participation in a collective act can be to do harm even though
one’s individual contribution does not harm. See for example Eggleston (2000). Similarly, Parfit
(1984, p. 70) argues that we should not commit the mistake of saying that if an act is right
(wrong) because of its effects, then “the only relevant effects are the effects of this particular
act”. However, Petersson (2004) has argued, based on Lewis (2000), that there is no need to
appeal to mere participation in collective cases and that the restriction should be accepted. I
will here assume that mere participation does not matter, but that the notion of an act’s effects
should be broadened. I discuss this matter further below and in chapter five.
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2.2.4 Overdetermination and pre-emption
The most common, and most serious, objections to the Weak Counterfactual
Condition are cases where the effects of an act are overdetermined or pre-
emptied by another act. Consider the following cases:
Pre-emption. Black poisons White. Before the poison has any effect Orange
kills White. Had Orange not killed White, then the poison would have killed
White just a moment later.
Overdetermination. Black and Orange, independently of each other and at the
exact same time, shoot White. Each shot is sufficient to kill White.
In Pre-Emption, the full effects of Black’s act are interrupted by Orange’s
act. The effects of Black’s poisoning are pre-emptied by Orange’s act and
White would therefore not have been better off had Black not acted as she
did, so Black does not harm White. However, if the details of the case are
filled out it could be argued that White would not have been better off had
Orange not acted as she did, since if Orange had not killed White then White
would have died anyway from the poison. The unintuitive conclusion is that
if the Counterfactual Condition is a necessary condition for doing harm then
neither Black nor Orange harms White. Overdetermination works in a similar
way. Here White would not have been better off had Black (or Orange) not
acted as she did, so again neither Black nor Orange harms White.
Before considering whether the Weak Counterfactual Condition can be
saved from these counterexamples, let us consider what a successful solution
to Pre-Emption and Overdetermination would be. In Overdetermination the
intuitive verdict is that both Black and Orange harm White. Someone, at
least, harms White and it would be arbitrary to pick out just one of Black and
Orange. In Pre-Emption the intuitive verdict is that Orange harms White.
While Black may have done something impermissible we cannot plausibly
say that she harmed White because the full consequences of her act do not
obtain.
One reply which can be made to Pre-Emption is to claim that White is worse
off: if Orange had not killed White then White would have been better off until
the effects of Black’s poisoning come about. From the perspective of White’s
entire life Orange’s act does therefore make White worse off.35 This reply is
hardly satisfying because it is plausible that the magnitude of the harm, the
degree by which White is worse off, is the same as the degree of harm Orange
does to White. What this reply amounts to is that while Orange harms White,
it is not a very serious harm. This problem becomes more acute if we let the
effects of Orange’s act occur just before the effects of Black’s poisoning so
that the time between these two events is very small.
It might be objected that this is, on reflection, not as unintuitive as it seems.
From a purely prudential perspective it would perhaps not matter so much to
35 See Feinberg (1986, pp. 152–3).
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White if she dies by Black’s or Orange’s hand if the time between the two
events is small.36 We should not, the objection continues, confuse intuitions
about harm and intuitions about morality. Orange’s (and Black’s) act may be
impermissible, or wrong, even though Orange only harms White to a lesser
extent than we intuitively think.
This defence does not look very plausible either. Consider the following
case from Norcross (2005, p. 166): Black either breaks White’s legs or she
kills White. If Black chooses to only break White’s legs then the Weak Coun-
terfactual Condition would rule out that Black harms White, but this is of
course deeply counter-intuitive. Granted, one might think that one should al-
ways choose the lesser of two evils, but as before, this seems to be a normative
consideration. A defender of the Weak Counterfactual Condition might try to
stick to his guns and emphasise that in the morally relevant sense there is no
harm in breaking White’s legs here. But this suggests that the morally relevant
sense of the Weak Counterfactual Condition is so far removed from ordinary
uses that it is unclear why one would insist on using harm as a morally rele-
vant notion at all. It should also be noted that the replies just considered only
purport to solve Pre-Emption. If the Weak Counterfactual Condition is to be
able to reply to Overdetermination in a convincing way then we need a better
reply.37
2.2.4.1 Collective harm
A trivial observation regarding Overdetermination is that if neither Black nor
Orange had shot then White would have been better off. Since both are re-
quired to act in a certain way for White’s death not to occur, perhaps one
should say that Black and Orange together harm White.
It is crucial to this approach to Overdetermination to spell out in what sense
Black and Orange can be said to act together. A first suggestion is that they
act together in the sense that they perform a collective act. The suggestion
would then be that neither Black nor Orange harm White individually but that
“they”, Black and Orange, harm White.
As Overdetermination is set up the only sense in which “they”, Black and
Orange, act seems to be a very weak sense: there are two acts, Black’s and
36 Bradley (2012) makes this point.
37 Note also that appealing to recent developments in the theory of causation will not do to
save the Counterfactual Condition. Lewis (2000) suggests an analysis of causation in terms of
counterfactual dependence which, he claims, can deal with Overdetermination. On this view,
c causes e if and only if e would not have occurred, or would not have occurred in the same
way, had c not occurred. Assuming this view one could say that had Black not fired his gun
then White would not have died in the same way as she actually did. The problem for the Weak
Counterfactual Condition is that White would not be better off dying a slightly different way.
Death by Black is just as bad for White as death by Black and Orange. As I will argue in chapter
five, it seems plausible to analyse the third condition in the basic structure, the responsibility
condition, in terms of counterfactual dependence. However, the Counterfactual Condition does
not follow from such an analysis.
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Orange’s, and we can form the “collective” act by simply taking these acts to-
gether. The standard view of collective action is however more narrow than
this. Intuitively, there is a difference between collective actions and cases
where two individual actions contribute to a common outcome. For exam-
ple, there is a difference between a case where you and I, together, write a
paper and a case where you write the first half and I write the second half. A
common suggestion is that in the former case there is a kind of collective in-
tention or joint commitment; something which makes the individual acts into
a group activity which distinguishes them from a number of mere individual
acts.38
The current suggestion therefore requires a very wide notion of collec-
tive action for it to work as a solution to Overdetermination. This claim,
call it “unlimited group composition”, has been defended by Tännsjö (1989).
Tännsjö suggests that whether we can, or perhaps should, ascribe agency to
a group of people depends on “whether we think we have reasons for mak-
ing moral assessments of the behaviour of groups” (Tännsjö 1989, p.227).
Tännsjö notes that if any two acts could in principle constitute a collective
action then this would have some unintuitive consequences. However, he adds
that even though the collective act consisting of “me writing this chapter and
Brutus’ killing Caesar” is allowed it does not follow that there is a point to
evaluating that collective act. The claim is only that “there are no ontologi-
cal or methodological reasons against such a classification” (Tännsjö 1989, p.
227).
Unlimited group composition is a strong claim. True, there is a sense of
“collective act” in which very disjoint acts constitute a collective but there
seems to be a difference between Black and Orange’s acts on the one hand
and my writing this chapter and Brutus murder of Caesar on the other. What
is lacking, it seems, is something which distinguishes Black’s and Orange’s
acts as a collective action in a morally relevant sense while me writing this
chapter and Brutus’ killing Caesar is not.39 Without any such difference it
would not be warranted to draw any particular conclusions, even prima facie,
about the moral status of a collective act which satisfies the Counterfactual
Condition. The fact that we can view Black’s and Orange’s acts as forming
a collective act in the wide sense is not sufficient reason for saying that they
acted together in any way that matters. This is not to deny, of course, that we
can blame (or praise) acts for their contribution to effects which they are not
by themselves sufficient or even necessary for. Nor is it to deny that some
groups are more disjoint than others. What we should deny is that Black and
Orange constitute a group in the same sense and that they perform a collective
38 See for example Bratman (1992) and Gilbert (2006).
39 We could make this challenge more difficult by making Black’s and Orange’s acts even more
disjoint. Suppose that instead of shooting White, Black had in 1654 installed a deadly trap
which goes off just when Orange’s bullet hits White, and so on. In this way we could make the
two collectives more similar and thereby make it more difficult to find any relevant difference.
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act. Pace Tännsjö, there seem to be reasons against classifying certain sums of
individual acts as group acts based on the degree of cooperation, organisation
and so forth.
A further difficulty for the collective-act approach to Overdetermination is
the assumption that had the collective act, Black’s and Orange’s, not been per-
formed then neither Black nor Orange would have performed their individual
act. But, this is not typically the case for collective acts. For a collective act not
to be performed it is sufficient that one of the acts constituting the collective
act is not performed. For example, we (you and I) do not paint a house if I do
an you do not. Therefore, the collective act “Black and Orange kills White” is
unperformed when Black does not shoot but Orange does (and vice versa).
Finally, it might be suggested that we should view White’s death as a syn-
ergy effect which emerges from the combination of Black and Orange’s act
and that White’s death cannot be attributed to anything but the collective act.
But, White’s death is clearly not a synergy effect. Black and Orange’s acts are
individually sufficient for White’s death, so how can White’s death be some-
thing which only emerges from both their acts? As before, we do not have to
deny that groups can act, or be responsible, or synergy effects which are not
attributable to any particular act. What we should deny, however, is that the
collective-act approach is a plausible way to approach Overdetermination.
We should therefore conclude that two acts can overdetermine a state of af-
fairs’ obtaining without there being any collective agency. For the collective-
act approach to work as a general solution to Overdetermination we therefore
have to understand the intuition that “they”, Black and Orange in the example
above, do harm in a sense which does not rely on Black and Orange perform-
ing a collective act.
One suggestion would be that the Weak Counterfactual Condition should
be applied to sets of acts and to say that an act does harm only if it is a mem-
ber of a set which satisfies the condition. However, as the case with me and
Brutus shows, not any set will do. A natural suggestion is that the Weak Coun-
terfactual Condition should only be applied to minimal sets. For example, “me
writing this chapter and Brutus’ killing Caesar” is not a minimal set because
Brutus’ act alone satisfies the condition. In the case of Black and Orange how-
ever neither act form a minimal set which White’s death is counterfactually
dependent on. Together, however, they form a set which is minimal in the
intended sense and which satisfies the Weak Counterfactual Condition.
More specifically, we can reformulate the Weak Counterfactual Condition
in the following way:
The Collective Counterfactual Condition: an act, φ , harms a person, b, only if
φ is a member of a minimal set M such that b is worse off than she would have
been had none of the members of M occurred.40
40 See Parfit (1984, p. 71) and Feit (2013).
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In ordinary cases, the Collective Counterfactual Condition will have the same
implications as the weakened condition. That is, in cases where the minimal
set consists only of φ the new version implies the same thing as the older ver-
sion. Furthermore, in the same-number cases considered in the previous chap-
ter there is no minimal set such that someone is worse off than they would
have been had none of the members of the set occurred. This new version
does therefore not solve the non-identity problem and the argument against
the Harm Principle still stands. An independent reason for formulating the
Counterfactual Condition in collective terms is that we might be able to solve
cases where a number of acts together have a harmful effect but where no indi-
vidual act is sufficient for the effect. For example, suppose ten clever assassins
each put a single drop of poison in White’s drink. Suppose also that for the
poison to have any effect there has to be at least ten drops of poison in White’s
drink. On the Collective Counterfactual Condition, the ten assassins would do
harm because they form a minimal set which is such that White is worse off
than she would have been had neither of the set’s members occurred.
It is a feature of the Collective Counterfactual Condition, unlike the
collective-act view discussed above, that we do not need to claim that
Black and Orange perform a collective act. According to the collective
Counterfactual Condition, Black’s and Orange’s acts do harm because they
are members of a collective such that had none of the collective’s members
occurred, a harmful state of affairs (White’s death) would not have occurred.
However, formulating the Counterfactual Condition in terms of minimal
sets is not enough. Consider the following case:
The Death Squads. Brown is choosing which death squad to join, A or B. These
two groups will then attempt to catch members of The Resistance and execute
them. Brown knows that as long as a death squad has at least ten members it
will be successful and that group A will catch and execute 1000 people while
group B will catch and execute 10 people. If a squad has fewer than ten mem-
bers then it will fail to catch any members of The Resistance. Brown also knows
that group A has ten members and group B has nine.41
Suppose that Brown wants to minimise the harm he does. It then seems clear
that he should not join group B because that would push the group to the
critical ten-member mark. So he should join group A. The Collective Counter-
factual Condition implies the opposite however. If Brown joins group A then
he will be a part of a minimal set consisting of him and any one of the other
members of A which is such that had these acts not been performed then the
1000 deaths would not occur. That is, he would do a lot of harm. If he joins B
he would do significantly less harm. According to the Collective Counterfac-
tual Condition, then, Brown should join group B if he wants to minimise the
amount of harm he does.
41 This example is an adaptation of Parfit’s “Rescue Mission”. See Parfit (1984, pp. 67–8).
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It could be argued that the difference in the degree of harm which Brown
would do makes a critical difference in this example. By adding a condition
to the effect that the degree of harm a person does depends on the size of the
group he joins one could claim that Brown’s contribution is smaller if he joins
A than if he joins B because A has more members than B. However, note that
group A, the one with ten members, would catch and kill more members than
group B. The Collective Counterfactual Condition would therefore still imply
that Brown should join B rather than A.
The question of the degree of harm Brown would do in this case raises
a further problem for the Collective Counterfactual Condition. Consider what
the view implies regarding Pre-Emption. In this case the smallest group which
satisfies the condition consists of Black and Orange. According to this view,
Black would harm White in Pre-Emption even though the effects of his act are
never realised (because they are pre-emptied by Orange’s act). But, this is a
rather problematic conclusion because it includes not only acts which actually
have a harmful effect but also “backup” acts which would have a harmful
effect, had only the circumstances been different.
In defence of the Collective Counterfactual Condition it could be claimed
that it is not a good objection that the condition is too wide because it is only
a necessary condition for doing harm. Further conditions could be added to
rule out that Black harms White in Pre-Emption for example. However, it is
unclear what these further conditions would be. According to the Collective
Counterfactual Condition, if Orange harms White in Pre-Emption because he
is a member of a set which satisfies the condition, then surely Black should
as well. Both acts are equally members of the set, so there is no possibility of
making a distinction on that ground. Furthermore, if it were to be suggested
that Black does not harm White, or does less harm to White than Orange, be-
cause Black’s act is not related in the right way to White’s death, then we seem
to have abandoned the collective approach to Overdetermination. If Black’s
harming White hinges on whether there is the right kind of relation between
Black’s act and White’s death then there simply is no need to appeal to a Col-
lective Counterfactual Condition in the first place.
We should therefore conclude that the Counterfactual Condition is badly
situated to answer the objection from Pre-Emption and Overdetermination.
The Weak Counterfactual Condition implies that neither Black nor Orange
harms White. However, it is clear that at least someone harms White. The
suggestion that Black and Orange harm White together, but not individually,
also fails because it requires an implausible view of collective agency which
does away with the distinction between a collective act and a number of in-
dividual acts. Applying the Counterfactual Condition to (minimal) collectives
also fails. According to this version of the condition there would not be a dif-
ference between joining group A or B in the example of the Death Squads, but
there clearly is a difference in this case.
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2.3 Summary
The conclusion to draw from this discussion is that the Counterfactual Con-
dition is not plausible as a condition for harm in the morally relevant sense.
First, in order to defend the Counterfactual Condition against Woodward’s ob-
jection one would have to commit to a revisionistic view of harm. This is a
cost which gives us some reason to see if competing accounts of harm can
avoid. Second, the fact that the condition implies that there is no harm done in
Overdetermination, or that there might be harm done but not so much in Pre-
Emption, gives us strong reasons to reject it as even a necessary condition.
This leaves us with the task of formulating a better alternative. Apart from
being faithful to the “pre-analytic core” of harm such an alternative must also
save the Harm Principle from the non-identity problem. If there is no better
alternative, then the conclusions to draw are rather far-reaching. Suppose that
the best analysis includes the Weak Counterfactual Condition. Then it seems
that we have to accept some very unintuitive claims about harm, especially
with respect to Overdetermination and Pre-Emption. However, it is also an
alternative to reject harm as a morally relevant concept. In comparison, this
latter alternative would in fact seem more plausible. The consequence, then,
of rejecting the Weak Counterfactual Condition is that if there is no better
analysis of harm which does not include this condition then we should proba-
bly abandon not only the Harm Principle but also the more general view that
doing harm is something morally relevant.
61

3. The Non-Comparative View
In the previous chapter I argued that the Counterfactual Condition is not plau-
sible as a necessary nor as a sufficient condition for doing harm. The argument
from chapter one against the Harm Principle therefore fails. However, I also
claimed that this conclusion is not enough to save the Harm Principle because
we still lack an analysis of harm which (i) solves the non-identity problem,
(ii) is consistent with the no-difference view and (iii) is intuitively acceptable.
In this chapter I will consider the suggestion that a “non-comparative” anal-
ysis of harm achieves these aims. To do harm, according to this view is not a
matter of making people worse off but rather to cause people to suffer injuries
or other harmful states. This view seems close at hand if we consider what
I called “the basic structure” of an analysis of harm. According to the basic
structure, to do harm is to make a person be in a harmful state; a state which is
non-instrumentally bad for the person who suffers it. Non-comparative analy-
ses of harm emphasise this point. For example, Harris (1990) writes:
I want to say that to be harmed is to be put in a condition that is harmful.
A condition that is harmful [...] is one in which the individual is disabled or
suffering in some way or in which their interests or rights are frustrated. [...] I
would want to claim that a harmed condition obtains whenever someone is in
a disabling or hurtful condition, even though that condition is only marginally
disabling and even though it is not possible for that particular individual to
avoid the condition in question. (Harris 1990, p. 97).
To do harm, according to Harris, is simply to be responsible for having caused
someone to be in a certain “harmful condition”. A condition is harmful, fur-
thermore, not in virtue of making the person worse off but in virtue of it having
the property of being “disabling” or “hurtful”.
Shiffrin (1999) has suggested a similar view. According to Shiffrin, we can
“identify harms with certain absolute, noncomparative conditions” (Shiffrin
1999, p. 123) and to do harm is to impose such conditions on a person. Shiffrin
goes on to suggest that what unifies the items on this list, what their “harm-
fulness” consists in, is the following:
On my view, harm involves conditions that generate a significant chasm or
conflict between one’s will and one’s experience, one’s life more broadly
understood [...].
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To be harmed primarily involves the imposition of conditions from which the
person undergoing them is reasonably alienated or which are strongly at odds
with the conditions she would rationally will. (Shiffrin 1999, pp. 123–4).
On Shiffrin’s view, to be harmed does not involve any comparison with what
would otherwise be the case. To be harmed is rather to suffer a state of a
certain kind, a harmful state, and to do harm is simply to cause such states to
obtain.
It is not entirely clear whether the views expressed by Harris and Shiffrin
are “non-comparative” in any strict sense of the word. For example, Harris’
appeals to “disabling” or “hurtful” conditions, but it might be asked whether
these notions do not involve a comparison of some kind. Whether a condi-
tion is disabling, for example, seems intuitively to involve a comparison of
some kind, perhaps with a “normal” condition. Also, as I noted in the previous
chapter, harms have a contributive character in the sense that they contribute
to a person’s overall well-being. We do not merely think that harms are bad
for people, we also think that they make life go worse. However, if a “non-
comparative” analysis of harm is not supposed to involve any comparison at
all then the view expressed by Harris and Shiffrin cannot properly account for
this property. If a particular harm contributes to a person’s well-being in the
sense that that harm makes that person’s life go worse (in that respect) then
harm-attributions do involve some comparison. Doing harm is therefore not
strictly non-comparative.
A more plausible way of describing the Non-Comparative View is to say
that harm involves some comparison, but it is not a comparison with what
would otherwise have been the case which is the relevant one. Rather, we
should compare with a “baseline situation” which serves as an independent
standard for whether an act does harm. The idea, according to this view, is
that to harm someone is to make the person worse off in some sense, but not
necessarily worse off than the person would otherwise have been. It is still
warranted, I think, to call this view “non-comparative” because the way in
which harms make life go worse is just the way in which bad things make life
go worse. That is, the non-comparative element, that to do harm is to cause a
person to suffer a state of affairs which is bad in itself for the person, is pri-
mary. The core of this approach can be formulated in the following way:
The Non-Comparative View: an act φ harms a person b only if b is worse off
than she would be in a baseline situation, S.
The Non-Comparative View is often claimed to have important consequences
for population theory, especially for same-number cases like the non-identity
problem. If an act can harm a person even if that person would not have been
better off had the act not been performed, then same-number cases could be
treated just as same-people cases. Therefore, the non-identity problem would
evaporate. The young girl should postpone her pregnancy because if she does
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not then she would give her child a bad start in life which, it might be claimed,
would be bad for the child. That is, she would harm her child if she does not
wait. This view also promises to be consistent with the no-difference view.
The two medical programmes A and B would both prevent states which are,
intuitively, bad for people so they would both prevent harms.
A common objection which might seem to strike at the Non-Comparative
View regardless of how the baseline is characterised is that it does not capture
the intuition that preventions of benefits are harms.1 Suppose that a person is
in a condition which is better for her than the baseline and that we can either
allow this person to become even better off or to prevent her from becoming
better off. It would seem that the Non-Comparative View implies that prevent-
ing this person from becoming even better off cannot be to harm her. But, this
seems counter-intuitive. As was noted when discussing the Temporal View
in the previous chapter, preventing a person’s condition from improving is at
least sometimes to harm that person.
Another general objection to the Non-Comparative View is that according
to this view it is possible to improve a person’s condition as much as one can
and still harm that person. Suppose White is paralysed from the neck down,
and that Black finds a way of improving White’s condition so that she is only
paralysed from the waist down. White is still in a condition which is bad for
her, so Black harms White (and is responsible for the new condition) even
though White is significantly better off.2
These general objections are not sufficient to refute the Non-Comparative
View however. The Non-Comparative View, as I have formulated it, only
states a necessary condition for doing harm. It does not follow from the Non-
Comparative View that no preventions of benefits are harms. For example,
preventing a person from becoming better off could be to harm that person
according to the Non-Comparative View if the state which the person is in is
worse for her than the baseline. Of course, not all preventions of benefits are
harms on the Non-Comparative View but as was noted in the previous chapter,
it is not a plausible view that all preventions of benefits are harms (recall the
kidney-example). Our intuitions here go both ways and it would be premature
to rule out the Non-Comparative View simply because it implies that some
preventions of benefits are not harms.
Both these considerations suggest that the force of this objection will de-
pend on where the baseline is set. We therefore have to take a closer look at
specific non-comparative views and see whether they are plausible.
1 See for example Holtug (2002, p. 368), Hanser (2008, p. 430) and Bradley (2012).
2 See Thomson (2011). Thomson argues that it is a general problem for the Non-Comparative
View that some non-comparatively bad states are, intuitively, not harms. However, as I have
described the Non-Comparative View Thomson’s argument does not work as a general coun-
terexample because the Non-Comparative View only states a necessary condition, not a suffi-
cient condition.
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First there is one point about the nature of harm which should be empha-
sised. What is distinctive about the Non-Comparative View is that to do harm
is to make a person be in a bad state. The suggestion is furthermore that the
way these bad states contribute to a person’s well-being, their contributive
character, is captured by a comparison with a baseline rather than what would
otherwise have been the case. The point of introducing the baseline is there-
fore to capture the contributive character of harm. As I will argue below, how-
ever, this is a point on which most of the non-comparative views found in the
literature fail.
3.1 The rational will
As we saw above, Shiffrin suggests that to do harm is to cause a person
to be in a condition which “primarily involves the imposition of conditions
from which the person undergoing them is reasonably alienated or which are
strongly at odds with the conditions she would rationally will” (Shiffrin 1999,
p. 124). Disabilities, injuries, illness, pain and death are all harms on this view,
she claims, because “[t]hey forcibly impose experiential conditions that are af-
firmatively contrary to one’s will” (ibid.). One way of understanding Shiffrin
here is as proposing a form of baseline where the baseline is characterised in
terms of what one would rationally will. On this way of reading Shiffrin her
view is that to be harmed is to be worse off than one would be in a condition
which one would rationally will.
With this view, Shiffrin claims, we can argue that it is possible to harm a
person by bringing her into existence, as in the case with the young girl for
example. The girl harms her child because she imposes a condition on the
child which is contrary to what the child would rationally will. Shiffrin’s view
also promises to be consistent with the no-difference view. Because her view
is formulated in terms of what would be rationally willed it does not seem
to involve any comparison with what would otherwise have been the case. If
the conditions which we could prevent in the two medical programmes are
contrary to what would be rationally willed then it makes no difference that
one programme is a same-people case and the other a same-number case.
It is however not clear whether Shiffrin’s view delivers what it promises
with respect to the non-identity problem or the no-difference view. Consider
the young girl for example. If she does not wait she will impose, according
to Shiffrin, a condition which is contrary to what that child would rationally
will. However, considering the fact that there is no alternative which is better
for the child it seems, pace Shiffrin, that it would not be irrational of the child
to prefer existing with the condition rather than not existing. Since there is
no alternative which is better for this child, it does not seem irrational for the
child to will that she exist with a bad start rather than not exist at all. It is
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therefore far from clear that imposing the condition is against what the child
would rationally will.
Shiffrin might reply that whether a condition is contrary to what a person
would rationally will does not depend on the relational features of the condi-
tion. If that is the case then the fact mentioned above, that there is no better
alternative for the young girl’s child, becomes irrelevant. However, this seems
to be an overly harsh restriction on rationality. Surely whether it is rational for
me to go to the dentist and undergo a somewhat unpleasant experience there,
for example, can depend on what would be the case if I were not to go to the
dentist.3
A further problem for Shiffrin’s view concerns the relation between harm
and prudential value. As I argued in the previous chapter, it seems plausible
that doing harm requires an effect which is bad for someone. The problem
for Shiffrin is that what one would rationally will and well-being can easily
come apart; there is simply no necessary connection between these two. What
a person would rationally will is not a plausible way to determine whether
something is bad for that person because people can have all sorts of odd wills
and wants while still remaining rational. For example, it could be rational
for me to prefer not to go to the dentist, perhaps because I believe that the
experience will be very unpleasant and the expected benefit very small, even
though as a matter of fact it would be quite good for me overall. This lack
of connection between what one would rationally will and well-being also
means that Shiffrin’s view fails to capture the contributive character of harm.
The fact that a state of affairs is contrary to what one would rationally will
does not imply that it is worse for the person to be in such a state. In fact, a
state which is contrary to one’s rational will can be quite good.
It is possible that Shiffrin has a more substantial view of rationality in mind.
The emphasis she places on a person’s agency, will and experience suggests
more of a Kantian view where “rationality” is not merely understood as co-
herence among beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes. To rationally
will something should, perhaps, be understood more as “authentic endorse-
ment”, or something along those lines.
Understanding Shiffrin’s view in this way would however not be much of
an improvement. For example, this revised view seems just as vulnerable to
counterexamples. Consider a person who endorse oppression or suffering, per-
haps because the person believes that she deserves it. We would not say of that
person that her endorsement rules out that she is harmed by the oppression or
suffering, especially not if she falsely believes that she deserves it. Also, as
I argued in the previous chapter, when analysing harm and the way in which
harms make life go worse we should not make substantial assumptions about
3 At one point, Shiffrin claims that “it may be permissible and rational for a person to agree to
undergo a harm to receive a benefit, yet it may not be permissible for another party to impose the
harm” (Shiffrin 1999, p. 130). It is difficult to see however how such an asymmetrical treatment
of doing harm to oneself and doing harm to others can be justified on her view.
67
well-being. However, this is just what Shiffrin has to do if her view is to have
a connection with well-being.
3.1.1 Value and value for
So far I have assumed that the Non-Comparative View sets out to analyse harm
in terms of what is bad for persons. That is, harms are things (in the broadest
sense of the term) which contribute in a negative way to a person’s overall
well-being. An alternative approach, which might be what non-comparativists
like Shiffrin have in mind, is to say that we should analyse harm in terms of
badness simpliciter. The view would in that case be similar to the view once
held by Moore:
In what sense can a thing be good for me? It is obvious, if we reflect, that the
only thing which can belong to me [...] is something which is good, and not the
fact that it is good. When therefore, I talk of anything I get as ’my own good,’
I must mean either that the thing I get is good, or that my possessing it is good.
[...] In short, when I talk of a thing as ’my own good’ all that I can mean is that
something which will be exclusively mine, as my own pleasure is mine [...]
is also good absolutely; or rather that my possession of it is good absolutely.
(Moore 1993, p. 150).
Reconstructing the Non-Comparative View along these lines might be what
Shiffrin has in mind when she identifies harms with certain “evils”. Harms
would on this view merely be a particular kind of bad events or states, namely
those that are possessed or realised by people such as pain, death etc. An
episode of pain presupposes that someone suffers the pain and it is therefore a
harm rather than just something which is bad in itself. Harms can on this view
be contrasted with bad events or states that do not presuppose any person
suffering them such as the destruction of beautiful landscapes or inequality.4
Identifying prudential value, value-for, with impersonal value seems to be
a mistake however. There is no contradiction in saying that a state of affairs
could be bad for a person but, intrinsically or finally it is neutral or even good.
As has been argued by Sumner (1996), Moore’s view seems to get things the
wrong way around: “The theory tells us that prudential value depends on eth-
ical [absolute] value: certain conditions make our lives go better because we
have a moral reason to bring them about. However, if there is an explanatory
relation between ethical and prudential value it seems more likely to run in
the opposite direction” (Sumner 1996, p. 51). Sumner’s claim is perhaps un-
necessarily strong for our purposes. We need not claim that prudential value
“explains” ethical value, but it seems correct to insist that there are states
which make a life better, or good, while being neutral or even bad from an im-
personal point of view. For example, suppose Black and White are applying
4 Whether there in fact are any bad events which are not also bad for people, in Moore’s sense,
is not something one needs to take a stand on here.
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for the same job. They would benefit to the same degree were they to get it but
White has slightly better qualifications than Black. Suppose therefore that it
would be best, impersonally, if White got the job. That fact does not invalidate
the claim that it would be good for Black were he to actually get it. On the
view just considered, however, it seems as if we would have to say that it is
not actually good for Black to get the job, it might even harm him! But this is
obviously quite absurd.
3.2 Rights
A different approach to the Non-Comparative View is taken by Woodward
(1986). Woodward’s view is that the relevant comparison for whether some-
one has been harmed is with an “(unattainable) baseline situation where [the
person] exists and these violations of her rights do not occur” (Woodward
1986, p. 817). This difference between the actual state of a person and the pos-
sible baseline state is a difference which “represents a loss which, arguably,
one can coherently think of as happening to [the person]” (ibid.).
Applied to the non-identity problem, Woodward’s view is then that whether
the young girl harms her child by not postponing her pregnancy is a matter of
whether the child would have been better off had she lived a life where none
of her rights were violated. Furthermore, the degree of the harm corresponds
to the difference in well-being between these two states.
This view raises more questions than it answers. For example, if rights are a
fundamental source of normativity, that is, they generate obligations (perhaps
only pro tanto or prima facie) then it is unclear why harms are morally relevant
at all. If it has already been established, as Woodward seems to think, that we
violate some right in cases like the young girl, what does it add to say that
we also can do harm in such cases? On this view, harm seems to come out as
redundant. It should also be noted that as a way of solving the non-identity
problem, Woodward’s view of harm merely begs the question. The problem
with cases like the young girl is to explain why there is a strong reason for
her to wait. By saying that the girl would harm her child because she would
violate some right possessed by that child is just to assume that there is a
strong reason for the girl to wait. Woodward gives no account of how the
girl’s choice would violate a right possessed by the child.
One way in which harms can be morally relevant in a system of rights is of
course by postulating a right not to be harmed. The young girl would violate
a right possessed by her child if she does not wait because this choice would
harm her child. As should be clear, this is not something Woodward can plau-
sibly claim. If harm is to be analysed in terms of rights then this presupposes
that we understand the very notion we are trying to analyse.
Woodward is however a bit unclear as to how central the comparative ele-
ment is on his view. For example, he claims that
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we think of a person as harmed [...] whenever an action is performed which
violates some right possessed by or obligation owed to that person. [...] We
thus find it natural to think of the choice of the Risky Policy as harming the
nuclear people [...] even though the overall effect of that policy is to leave the
nuclear people no worse off than they would be under any possible alternative
policy. (Woodward 1986, p. 818).
In this passage, the comparative element drops out and he seems to suggest
that harm can be fully analysed in terms of rights violations. However, even
without the comparative element Woodward’s view seems to be a case of
putting the cart before the horse. In the passage above, Woodward assumes
a set of rights or obligations which are then used to understand harm. But,
it is these very rights and obligations which we are interested in providing a
ground for in the first place.5 A more plausible view is to understand rights
partly in terms of harm rather than the other way around.
3.2.1 Desert
One way to improve on Woodward’s view would be by bringing in the notion
of desert. Saying that a person has a right to something sometimes means that
that person is entitled to it. Furthermore, the notion of entitlement is closely
related to desert; to say that someone deserves something is sometimes to say
that that person is entitled to it. If we also suppose that people can deserve
to have a certain amount of well-being then we can reformulate Woodward’s
view in terms of desert: a person has been harmed only if she does not get the
amount of well-being she deserves.
This rough characterisation still leaves the view open to many possible in-
terpretations.6 First, we might mean that a person has been harmed only if
she is not as well off as she would be if she got what she deserved. On this
interpretation, any discrepancy between a person’s actual well-being and her
deserved well-being amounts to harm even if the person is better off than she
deserves to be. This does not seem like a plausible interpretation because it
implies that making someone better off than they deserve would be to harm
them. If we take desert to be a morally relevant notion then we might perhaps
say that it is not appropriate, in some sense, to make people better off than
they deserve but such considerations do not seem to be related to harm in any
way.
5 See Holtug (2002, pp. 380–5). Holtug argues that to “moralise” the concept of harm is to
make it redundant. By analysing harm in terms of some more fundamental normative concept
one is providing an alternative account to the Harm Principle and therefore, in a way, doing
away with harm.
6 See Feldman (1997) who argues for a “desert-adjusted hedonism”. For a comment on Feldman
and the many ways to understand the idea that people can deserve a certain well-being, see
Persson (1997).
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On the second way of interpreting the desert-view we might say that a per-
son has been harmed only if she is worse off than she deserves to be. This
avoids the problem just mentioned with people being harmed because they
are better off than they deserve to be. However, there are several reasons for
thinking that this is not a plausible analysis of harm in the morally relevant
sense. First, if desert-levels can vary over time then we could harm a person
by raising her desert-level. If a person were to become more deserving, by
doing good for example, then that person would harm herself by doing good.
This seems implausible. Certainly, it would be “appropriate”, in a sense, if she
were also to become better off in terms off well-being but we would not say
that she has harmed herself by doing something which raised her desert-level
but not her well-being.7
Second, desert and harm seem to be different with respect to their different
types of values. As I argued above, it is important to distinguish prudential
value, good and bad for, from impersonal value, good and bad simpliciter.
Harms are bad-for people, not impersonally bad. Desert, on the other hand,
seems to be concerned with value simpliciter. It is good that a person gets what
she deserves, not necessarily good-for that person. Likewise, that a person
does not get what she deserves may be, but is not necessarily, bad for that
person. If the desert-view was correct then we should not find this discrepancy
plausible since on the desert-view if a person does not get what she deserves
then this is bad for the person (since it constitutes a harm) and bad simpliciter
because a person does not get what she deserves.
For example, suppose Yellow is a very talented football player. This talent
contributes significantly to making his life well worth living. He enjoys the
respect of his peers, the admiration of his fans and so on. Let us also assume
that his talent makes him better off than he deserves to be. We might then say
that it is inappropriate that he is so well off, and that it might even be better
if he was worse off. But it seems very implausible to say that it would not be
worse for him if he were to become worse off, or that it would not harm him.
This suggests that desert and harm come apart and that we should not analyse
the latter in terms of the former.
Third, the desert-view only solves cases like the young girl and Depletion
if the desert-level is set rather high. If the deserved level of well-being is set
low then the view becomes very permissive and would find no objection in the
young girl’s choice not to postpone her pregnancy. On the other hand, setting
the deserved level high makes the view elitistic because creating a person with
a life well worth living, but just below the deserved level, would be to harm
that person. That is, there would be a reason against creating people even
7 It might be objected that desert-levels cannot vary over time. People deserve a certain amount
of well-being merely in virtue of being people. This reply, it should be noted, departs somewhat
from how we usually think of desert. Past actions, for example, are intuitively a ground for
assessing what a person deserves. Fortunately, we do not need to resolve this issue since there
are further reasons for rejecting the desert-view which are independent of this issue.
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though they would have lives well worth living.8 It is therefore crucial for
the desert-view to strike this balance just right, but it is unclear how bright the
prospects are for this project. Of course, that it is difficult to specify the desert-
level does not show that it cannot be done. However, it raises the question of
the explanatory value of the desert-view. The task for the Non-Comparative
View was to specify in what sense harms make people worse off. Until we are
told more precisely where to place the desert-level the view only amounts to
replacing the concept we are trying to analyse, harm, with an at least as poorly
understood concept, desert. This new concept, desert, seems to work merely
as a placeholder for the right comparison unless the correct desert-level can
be specified with at least some precision.
Tying harm to desert in this manner is therefore not a plausible approach.
Desert and harm are largely independent of each other. There are of course
interesting questions regarding the relation between the two notions, such as
whether a person can deserve to be harmed, but these issues no not make it
plausible that harm should be analysed in terms of desert.
3.3 Health
Harm, as was noted in the introduction to this chapter, is related to concepts
such as disability and impairment. An influential analysis of disability and im-
pairment involves the notion of a “normal” state. Whether a condition such as
blindness is a disability, for example, is on this view a question of whether it is
worse for a person to be in the condition rather than in a normal state.9 It might
be suggested that this analysis can be extended to harmful conditions in gen-
eral. Harman (2004, 2009) has suggested a version of the Non-Comparative
View along these lines. According to Harman:
An action harms a person if the action causes pain, early death, bodily damage,
or deformity to her, even if she would not have existed if the action had not
been performed. (Harman 2004, p. 93).
In one respect, Harman’s view is very similar to Shiffrin’s. Just as Shiffrin
she thinks that there are certain states such as bodily damage, deformity and
so on which are clear instances of harm. Unlike Shiffrin she makes explicit
8 The desert-view is similar to so-called “critical level” theories in population axiology. Ac-
cording to such theories there is a critical level of well-being, often placed above where life
becomes worth living, such that adding a person to a population only makes it better if the
person is better-off compared to the critical level. A common objection to these views is that
they imply that it could be better to create a small number of people with lives not worth living
than to create a large number of people with lives worth living but below the critical level. For
a critical discussion of critical level views in population axiology, see Arrhenius (2000, ch. 5).
9 This account is not uncontroversial, but it is often used. See for example Daniels (1981),
Buchanan (1984) and Buchanan et al. (2001).
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the claim that her view involves some comparison. According to Harman the
defenders of the Counterfactual Condition mistakenly assume that
the only available point of comparison is what things would have been like if
an action had not been performed. I propose that for persons, there is a point of
comparison that involves a healthy bodily state. [...] an action harms someone
if it causes the person to be in a state, or endure an event, that is worse than life
with a healthy bodily state. (Harman 2004, pp. 96–7).
Harman’s view also differs from the Counterfactual Condition, and the Non-
Comparative View as I have formulated it, in that she states a sufficient rather
than necessary condition for harming. This is because, as she makes clear, her
primary aim is to show that we can harm people in same-number cases and
not to develop a complete theory of harm. If causing the kind of state she lists
as harmful is a sufficient condition for doing harm then the solution to the
non-identity problem is rather straightforward: causing states of the kinds she
lists is to do harm and same-number cases are in this respect no different from
same-people cases. There is therefore no theoretical obstacle to appealing to
harm in these cases.
There are several problems with both her account of harm and her solution
to the non-identity problem. First, the assumption that all instances of pain,
early death, bodily damage and so on are harms is unwarranted. Typically this
is the case, but to conclude from the sensible observation that under normal
circumstances pain is a harm that it is always a harm is to ignore the unusual
cases. For example, a surgeon might cause bodily damage but we typically do
not think that the surgeon harms her patient. Being in one of these conditions
is therefore not sufficient for being harmed. A consequence of this is that her
solution to the non-identity problem fails. That solution relied on the claim
that being in a state of a certain kind is sufficient to be harmed, but that claim
seems questionable and Harman gives us no reason to believe it. Second, Har-
man’s focus on a healthy bodily state makes her view very narrow. If a person
is in a healthy bodily state, but is suffering mentally then that person would
not, it seems, be harmed according to Harman’s view.
In reply to this objection it could be suggested that we should modify Har-
man’s view. Health, it might be agreed, is too narrow but we can remedy
this deficit by formulating her view in terms of “normal functioning” instead.
Paradigmatic examples of harmful states such as disability, disease and defor-
mity are often analysed in terms of normal functioning. This suggestion would
then amount to the claim that what these paradigmatic examples have in com-
mon is that they are worse for their victims than a life with normal functioning
and that this is true of harms in general.10
10 Buchanan et al. (2001, ch. 3) seem to endorse a similar view. However, it is unclear whether
they claim that it is only disabilities which should be defined via what is “normal” or whether
this is true of harm as well. For a critical discussion of the significance of normality to disabili-
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However, we should reject this revised version of Harman’s view as well.
This view implies that some treatments which we would typically count as
beneficial to a person are in fact harmful. Suppose, for example, that we can
only partially cure a person’s blindness. Being partially blind, let us assume, is
better for the person than total blindness, but worse for the person than having
normal vision.11 According to the normal functioning view, and Harman’s
view, we would harm this person by partially curing her blindness. But this
seems quite implausible.
Furthermore, analysing harm in terms of normal functioning, or health, does
not capture the way in which a finally bad state of affairs makes life go worse
because there does not seem to be any close connection between a person’s
well-being and normal functioning. For example, suppose that being near-
sighted is worse for a person than having normal vision. Even though we
assume that this person’s life would go better if she had normal vision, it does
not seem to follow from that fact that she is in a harmful condition, and that her
lack of normal vision makes her life go worse in the relevant sense. Of course,
it makes her life go worse than it would go if she had normal vision, but this
simply does not seem to be relevant when it comes to the question whether
her near-sightedness is a harmful state. In order for the normal functioning
view to be a plausible analysis of harm one would have to make substantial
assumptions about well-being, namely that there is a connection between well-
being and normal functioning. But, an analysis of harm should not restrict the
available theories of well-being in this way.
3.4 Summary
None of the non-comparative views which I have considered in this chapter
are plausible as analyses of harm. There are two general lessons to draw from
these views however. First, as we saw with the Moorean view and the desert
view, harm should be analysed in terms of prudential value and not imper-
sonal value. To harm someone is to make that person’s life go worse in some
sense. Whether harms also have impersonal value is a further claim which is
independent of the relation harms bear to individual well-being. This should
not be much of a surprise, and not very controversial, but it is worth emphasis-
ing. Second, the contributive value of harm is not plausibly captured by using
a “baseline” as a comparison. At least, none of the baselines we have con-
sidered in this chapter are plausible without making substantial assumptions
about well-being.
ties, and to harm, see Kahane & Savulescu (2008, 2012). They argue that normality, perceived
as either biological normality or statistical normality, is not intrinsically relevant to disability
or harm though the latter can be relevant derivatively.
11 Thomson (2011, p. 441) raises this objection as a general argument against the Non-
Comparative View.
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4. The contributive value of harm
When analysing harm it is important to distinguish between harm in the final
sense and in the instrumental sense. To rehearse this distinction, final harms
are states of affairs which are bad for people because of their nature while
instrumental harms are states or events which are harmful because of their ef-
fects. In chapter two it was suggested that acts, in so far as they are harmful,
are typically instrumentally harmful and that a plausible analysis of instru-
mental harm should be in terms of final harm. I also introduced three con-
ditions which belong to a pre-analytic core and which an analysis of harm
should preserve:
a harms b only if
(1) a performs an act, φ ,
(2) b is in a state S which is bad for b in the final sense.
(3) φ is responsible for S’s obtaining.
According to this basic structure, a necessary condition for doing harm is that
there is a state of a certain kind, viz., a state of affairs which is finally bad
for a person. It was suggested in chapter two that we can think of these states
of affairs as components of a person’s well-being. In the previous chapter I
argued that The Non-Comparative View preserves this claim but it fails to
capture the plausible claim that harming a person is to make that person’s life
go worse. This is also true of the basic structure. None of the conditions (1)-
(3) captures the the contributive character of harm. Accounting for this feature
of harm is the main task of this chapter.
A plausible starting point is to consider whether this can be done by revising
the second condition in the basic structure. If there is a connection between
negative well-being components, states which are bad for people, and the con-
tributive value of such components then one could capture the way in which
harms make life go worse by spelling out the contributive value of finally bad
states of affairs.
In this and the following two chapters I will make an attempt at analysing
harm by building on this basic structure. I will have very little to say about
(1). In the next chapter I will discuss how (3) can be further analysed in terms
of counterfactual dependence and in chapter six I will argue that we should
not add any further conditions to the basic structure pertaining to intentions,
foresight or consent. The focus of this chapter will be on (2) and in what way
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a state of affairs which is bad for a person in the final sense, a negative well-
being component, makes a difference to a person’s well-being.
According to the view I will argue for, the Same-World View, a state of
affairs has negative contributive value for a person if and only if that person’s
life-time well-being is lower when we take the state of affairs into account
than it is when we do not take the state of affairs into account. The details of
this view will be spelled out below. I will also argue that we should modify
the second condition in the basic structure. Depending on what the correct
theory of well-being is, it is possible that a state of affairs which is neutral,
or even good, for the person has negative contributive value. I will argue that
what matters to doing harm is not that there is a state of affairs which is bad
in the final sense for a person, but rather that there is a state of affairs which
has negative contributory value for a person. I will thus suggest that we should
replace (2) with:
(2*) b is in a state S such that b’s life is worse, taking S into account, than b’s
life not taking S into account.
By replacing (2) with (2*) in the basic structure, it is not necessarily the case
that acts are instrumentally harmful because they have effects which are fi-
nally bad for a person. I will argue that there are two routes by which one can
arrive at (2*) as a replacement for (2). First, one can claim that it is actually the
contributive value of a state of affairs which is relevant to harm, not the final
value. Second, if all finally bad states of affairs have some negative contribu-
tive value, and all finally good states of affairs have some positive contributory
value, then (2) implies (2*).
Finally, I will consider what the Same-World View about contributive value,
and (2*), suggests with respect to puzzling cases such as the value of existence
and the non-identity problem.
4.1 The Simple View
Let’s start with a simple idea. A classic analysis of the relation between good-
ness and betterness is that a state of affairs is good if and only if it is better
than its negation and a state of affairs is bad if and only if it is worse than
its negation.1 Perhaps this traditional view, suitably modified, can serve as a
basis for understanding the relation between negative well-being components
and their contributive value.
The traditional view is not a substantial theory of goodness. That is, it does
not tell us what actually is good and bad. The traditional view is rather a
1 An early formulation of the simple view is Brogan (1919). The claim that states of affairs are
the bearers of value is commonly assumed, see for example Chisholm (1968, pp. 22–3). For a
more pluralistic view about the bearers of value, see Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rasmussen (2000,
pp. 46–7).
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formal requirement which should be compatible with any substantial view
about goodness. This neutrality with respect to substantial theories can also
be applied to well-being and to the task of spelling out the contributory value
of a state of affairs for a person. What we are after is a way of expressing
the relation between bad-for and worse-for without making any assumptions
about what is bad for a person.2
The traditional view has, however, been subject to some serious criticism.
Chisholm & Sosa (1966) has argued that the traditional view is incompati-
ble with some very plausible axiologies. For example, according to hedonism
pleasure is the only intrinsic good and pain the only intrinsic bad. Now con-
sider the state of affairs “there are no unhappy egrets”. This state of affairs
seems to be better than its negation (“there are unhappy egrets”) assuming
hedonism. However, it is not good according to hedonism because it does not
involve any pleasure. It is, as they say, not a state of affairs which would “rate
any possible universe a plus” (Chisholm & Sosa 1966, p. 245).3 That the tradi-
tional view rules out this form of hedonism is a serious blow if the traditional
view is to be about the logic of value and has lead many philosophers to reject
the this view.4
As the objection is formulated, it targets an attempt to reduce good to bet-
ter rather than good for to better for. However, the objection could easily be
extended to the latter as well. Consider for example hedonism as a theory
about prudential value rather than impersonal value. That is, pleasure is the
sole good-for and pain the only bad-for. Now consider the state of affairs “b
is not in pain (at time t)”. According to hedonism, this state of affairs is not
good for b because it does not involve any pleasure, only the absence of pain.
That is, it does not rate b’s life a plus (or a minus) from a purely prudential
perspective according to hedonism. However, that “b is not in pain (at time t)”
is clearly better than its negation for b, so the traditional view implies that it
is good for b, assuming hedonism.
However, note that this objection to the traditional view only concerns the
right to left implication. That is, the state of affairs “b is not in pain (at time t)”
is better than its negation and is therefore, according to the traditional view,
2 In the literature it is common to make a tripartite distinction between theories of well-being
into hedonism, desire-satisficationism and objective-list theories. See for example Parfit (1984,
appendix I) and Sumner (1996, chs. 3–5). My examples will often be formulated in terms of
hedonism, but this is merely to simplify the exposition.
3 Chisholm (1968, p. 24) suggest a slightly different reason for saying that the state of affairs
“there are no unhappy egrets” is not good. Here Chisholm claims that the reason why “there
are no unhappy egrets” is not a bad state of affairs is because it does not entail any state of
affairs which is intrinsically bad. In contrast, the state of affairs “there are unhappy egrets” is
bad because it entails an, arguably, intrinsically bad state of affairs. This argument seems to
be question begging however. Since every proposition entails itself, it has to be assumed that
“there are no unhappy egrets” is not intrinsically good. But this claim is just what is at stake
here. Whether Chisholm’s criterion, if it should be understood as a criterion, is plausible is a
question I will not address here.
4 See Chisholm & Sosa (1966) and Åkvist (1968).
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good for b. But since we would not say that it is good we have to deny the
conditional “if a state of affairs is better than its negation then it is good”.
The left to right implication is however not affected by this counterexample.
We can agree that the absence of an episode of pain is not in itself good for
a person but still claim that everything that is good for a person is better than
its negation for the person. Furthermore, the present task is to formulate in
what sense a bad state of affairs, a final harm, makes a person’s life go worse.
Fulfilling this task only requires the weaker claim that if a state of affairs is
bad for a person then it is worse than its negation. By formulating a weaker
version of the traditional view in terms of prudential value, value-for, we get
a first attempt at capturing the contributive value of harm:
The Simple View: if S is finally bad for b then S is worse for b than ¬S.
The Simple View satisfies the neutrality requirement mentioned above. It does
not commit us to any particular theory of well-being. It also has some heuristic
uses. When testing a theory of well-being against our intuitions it is possible
to argue, via the Simple View, for a theory of well-being by showing that what
the theory says about what is bad for a person coheres with intuitions about
what is worse for a person. Likewise, one can argue against a theory of well-
being by showing that what the theory claims with respect to what is worse
for a person is incompatible with our intuitions about what is bad for a person.
For example, hedonism as an example again, the view that pleasure is good
for people but that the presence of pleasure is not better for people than the
absence of pleasure would be ruled out by this view.
As a conceptual claim about final prudential value the Simple View seems
plausible. It seems very plausible that, as the Simple View claims, all negative
well-being components are worse for people than their negation. However, as
a claim about the sense in which a bad state of affairs makes life go worse it
does not seem to be sufficient. In order to capture the contribution a state of
affairs makes to a person’s well-being it seems necessary to take the circum-
stances of that particular person’s life into account. For example, “being half-
blind” would (probably) make a negative contribution to the life of a person
with normal vision but could make a positive contribution to a blind person’s
life. The Simple View is therefore not a view about the contributive character
of harms. Rather, it is a view about how different well-being components re-
late to each other and not a view about how a negative well-being component
is related to contributive value. But this is something else than the contribution
of a state of affairs to how well a person’s life goes. What is missing is a claim
about the contribution a bad state of affairs makes to the value of a particular
life for a person.
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4.1.1 Subtraction and replacement
An alternative to the Simple View has been suggested by Arrhenius (2013,
pp. 29–35). On his view we should define intrinsic value in terms of neutral
value.5 With the notion of a neutral state of affairs it is then possible to formu-
late the relation to comparative prudential value in the following way:
The Neutrality View: If a state of affairs S is finally bad for b then S is worse
for b than a state of affairs which is neutral for b.
The Neutrality View does not seem to be a view about contributory value
either. As with the Simple View, the Neutrality View seems plausible as a
conceptual claim about the final value of well-being components but it does
not address the contributory value of negative well-being components. How-
ever, Arrhenius (2013, p. 34) suggests that we can analyse contributory value
in terms of neutrality in the following way:
Neutral Contribution: S is neutral relative to a certain life x if and only if x with
S has the same well-being as x without S.6
This claim seems to be on the right track. It relates the contributory value of
a state of affairs to a particular life while remaining neutral with respect to
substantial theories of well-being. That is, Neutral Contribution is compati-
ble with S being neutral relative to your life but not neutral relative to mine.
Furthermore, Neutral Contribution is also compatible with the view that S can
be neutral in itself but good (bad) relative to a particular life. As an exam-
ple, consider states of affairs which are not valuable in themselves but which
are preconditions for other states of affairs which are valuable in themselves.
Consciousness, according to hedonism at least, is a precondition for good and
bad states of affairs but is neutral in itself. However, consciousness can have
non-neutral contributive value according to Neutral Contribution.
Neutral Contribution is then plausibly seen as an analysis of neutral con-
tributive value. It does not, without further assumptions, tell us how negative
contribution should be understood and in what way a bad state of affairs makes
a life go worse. One way to extend the view to cover negative contribution
would be to analyse negative contribution in terms of neutral contribution:
Negative Contribution-1: S is bad relative to a life x if and only if x with S has
lower well-being than a life with a state of affairs which is neutral relative to x.
Alternatively, we can analyse negative contribution in a similar way as we
analysed neutral contribution:
5 Arrhenius’ view can be seen as an adaption of the analysis of intrinsic, impersonal value found
in Chisholm & Sosa (1966).
6 This claim corresponds to Arrhenius’ (***). He uses the term “welfare” instead of “well-
being” when formulating (***). This is merely a difference in terminology.
79
Negative Contribution-2: S is bad relative to a certain life x if and only if x with
S has lower well-being than x without S.
The main difference between the two seems to be that in Negative
Contribution-1 we replace the state of affairs S with a state of affairs which is
neutral and then compare these two possible lives with respect to how much
well-being they contain. In Negative Contribution-2 we subtract the state
of affairs from a life and then compare the two lives with respect to their
well-being.
A problem for subtraction is however that it is unclear exactly how we are to
understand the comparison of a life “without” a state of affairs. As I just noted,
one way to understand a life without a state of affairs is as merely subtracting
the state of affairs from that life. This seems conceivable when it comes to
some states, for example particular experiences of pleasure or pain. It is much
more unclear if we consider for example consciousness, or the state of affairs
that a particular person exists. If we are to only subtract the state of affairs that
a person is conscious, then the subtraction-strategy instructs us to compare a
life with consciousness and all the mental states it contains with a life without
consciousness but with the same mental states. But this is hardly conceivable.
This problem for the subtraction-strategy suggests that we should replace
rather then subtract. However, a similar objection can be raised against the
replacement strategy. For some states of affairs it is unclear what we should
replace these states of affairs with. For example, if we are to replace the state
of affairs “b exists”, what should we replace it with? This problem is not
very surprising because the replacement strategy involves subtraction. On the
replacement approach we are to consider a life with a state of affairs and
compare it with a life without that state of affairs but with a neutral state of
affairs instead. In so far as there is a problem involved with subtraction, it is a
problem which seems to strike against the replacement strategy as well.
However, there is one difference between the two strategies which suggests
that the replacement strategy is better positioned to solve this problem than
the subtraction strategy. The difference is that the subtraction strategy seems
to involve inconceivable scenarios, for example that a person has mental states
but is not conscious (because we “subtract” the state of affairs that she is
conscious).7 The replacement strategy, on the other hand, could perhaps be
spelled out in such a way so that we avoid this conclusion. In the next section
I will consider just such a take on the replacement strategy: the Similarity
View.
7 Not all subtractions need result in inconceivable scenarios of course but when it comes to
states of affairs like “b exists” or “b is conscious” this might be the case.
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4.2 The Similarity View
A suggestion which could be made at this juncture is that we can spell out the
“replacement-strategy” mentioned above by using the terminology of “pos-
sible worlds”. Possible worlds are common in philosophy and I intend my
use here to be non-committal with respect to how they should be understood
more precisely. As I will use the term, a possible world is a way in which the
world might be and which propositions may be true or false relative to. Saying
that a state of affairs obtains in a possible world is just to say that a certain
proposition is true relative to that world.
Using possible worlds we can understand the replacement strategy as saying
that when we replace a state of affairs we should look at the most similar
possible world where that state of affairs does not obtain. A finally bad state
of affairs, on this view, makes a particular life go worse because the world
where the state of affairs obtains is worse for the person than the most similar
possible world where it does not obtain. That is:
The Similarity View: if S is bad for b then the actual world where S obtains is
worse for b than the most similar possible world where S does not obtain.
A problem with the Similarity View concerns how to determine the closest
possible world where S does not obtain. McMahan (1988, pp. 46–7) has ar-
gued that in order to specify what would be the case were S not to obtain
we should employ so-called backtracking.8 McMahan’s idea, roughly put, is
that the most similar world where S is not the case is a world where neither
S nor “the entire causal sequence of which the immediate cause of [S] is a
part” (McMahan 1988, p. 47). For example, if the state of affairs S is someone
having a broken leg then we should look at the history of the actual world,
identify what caused this state of affairs, and then make the smallest possible
change which would result in that person not having a broken leg.
Using backtracking, the Similarity View would be very similar to, if not
equivalent with, the Counterfactual Condition. As a consequence, we would
not harm people by, for example, creating them with physical or mental im-
pairments. Consider the example of the young girl again. The putative harm
in this case is the child’s “bad start in life”. On the backtracking interpretation
of the Similarity View it seems that we should in this case compare with the
possible world where the girl decides to postpone her pregnancy because this
is, arguably, the smallest historical change which is sufficient for the state of
affairs “the child has a bad start in life” not to obtain. However, this is a pos-
sible world where the child does not exist and therefore, for the reasons given
in chapter two, it is not worse for the child to have a bad start in life.9
8 The term “backtracking” is from Lewis (1979).
9 See for example Bayles (1976, p. 296) and Thomson (2011, pp. 446–7). Thomson argues
that the Similarity View fails because of “reasons familiar to us from the failure of the simple
counterfactual analysis of causation” (p. 446). Here she seems to assume that the most similar
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However, it would be a mistake to use backtracking in this context. As a
claim about the contributive value of final harms, states of affairs which are
bad for people because of their nature, the backtracking interpretation of the
Similarity View allows for too large differences between the S world and the
¬S world. If the cause of S is necessary for other effects then to compare with
a world where the cause does not occur will of course be to compare with a
world where these other effects do not occur either. This is not what we want
when we ask whether a particular state of affairs is bad as an end for a person.
What we want from such an analysis is whether the state of affairs in question
makes a difference to someone’s well-being. With the backtracking interpre-
tation it will not always be possible to single out the difference S makes on its
own since the world we are comparing with differs in so many other respects.
This is not to deny that backtracking might be the proper way to evaluate or-
dinary counterfactuals. The claim is simply that we should not, in the present
context, employ an ordinary counterfactual but rather a “tailored” one where
it is specified which states of affairs we should keep fixed.10
In order to determine whether the Similarity View is a plausible way of
spelling out the contributive value of final harms we should therefore consider
how we might “tailor” the counterfactual more closely. This would involve
identifying those factors which we allow to vary and those which should be
kept fixed when determining what the most similar world is. One such factor
which seems clearly relevant to the similarity of two worlds is to what extent
they share the same states of affairs. For example, if Obama wins the presi-
dential election of 2008 in world w1 and w2, but not in w3, then w1 and w2
are more similar to each other than they are to w3, other things being equal.
A second factor which seems highly relevant is whether two worlds obey the
same laws. If two worlds differ only with respect to one state of affairs then
one of them will be very peculiar since the history in that world, what goes
on after the state of affairs obtained, is the same as it is in the world where
the state of affairs does not obtain. For example, if w1 and w3 only differ with
respect to the state of affairs “Obama wins the 2008 election” then it would
still be the case in both worlds, even the one in which he loses, that Obama is
president in 2009, that he introduces Obamacare and so on.
So far we have noted sameness of states of affairs prior to S’s obtaining
and laws as relevant to similarity. Saying that these two are relevant leaves
it open how they interact. Sameness of states of affairs prior to S’s obtaining
world is determined by backtracking, but as we will see that is not the only option available to
the Similarity View.
10 A further reason to think that the backtracking view is not plausible in this context is that
what the most similar world is in a case like the young girl might depend on the context of the
counterfactual. For example, if we are interested in what would have been the case had the girl’s
child not had a bad start, then it seems plausible to say that the most similar possible world is
one where the same child exists but with a different start in life. However, if we are interested
in what would have been the case had her child not had a bad start, then it seems plausible that
the most similar possible world need not be one where the same child exists.
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seems to be more important to the similarity of two worlds than sameness of
states of affairs after S’s obtaining. What the example with Obama illustrates
is that the most similar world where Obama does not win the 2008 election
is a world where the states of affairs prior to the election are the same but
where the states of affairs which obtain after the election are allowed to differ.
How these two factors, sameness of states of affairs prior to S’s obtaining and
sameness of laws, interact should they come into conflict is still unclear and
leaves a lot of room for interpretation.
One response to the consequence that the similarity relation leaves a lot of
room for interpretation is to endorse it. Bradley (2004) for example, says:
What counts as the most similar world to the actual world is not always a
determinate matter. It depends on what features of the actual world we want to
keep fixed, or on what similarity relation we are employing. [...] We cannot get
a determinate answer to the question ’what would have happened?’ until we
decide what must remain fixed and what may vary. (Bradley 2004, pp. 49–50).
Bradley seems here to be following Lewis (1986, p. 21) in claiming that which
departures we should accept depends on the context of the counterfactual and
what the purpose of evaluating it is. To take one of Lewis’ examples, if we are
asking what would be the case if kangaroos had no tails we generally ignore
worlds where kangaroos “float around like balloons”. In asking what would be
the case if kangaroos had no tails then we are not interested in worlds where
kangaroos have such, relative to our world, additional floating properties.
Regarding the contributive value of finally bad states of affairs, the question
what we should keep fixed and what should be allowed can partly, at least, be
answered by considering what would be gratuitous departures with respect to
the question ’is S bad for b?’. One thing which would constitute a gratuitous
departure would be any change to the components of b’s well-being which are
distinct from S. That is, all and only those states of affairs which are compo-
nents of b’s well-being in the S-world and which are distinct from S should
also obtain in the ¬S world. If we were to allow these to vary then the com-
parison between how well off b is in the S-world compared with the ¬S world
would not tell us the value of S for b, but the value of S and something else.
We now seem to have arrived at two plausible claims about the similarity
of worlds which the Similarity View should satisfy. But, there is an obvious
tension between these two claims. First, there is the claim just made that the
most similar world to the actual one where S does not obtain should be iden-
tical with respect to well-being components distinct from S. Otherwise, the
Similarity View would not be a view about the contributive value of S only.
This means that any well-being component obtaining after S in the actual
world should also obtain in the most similar world. Second, we should al-
low the most similar ¬S world to differ at times after S’s (non-) obtaining. As
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was noted when discussing backtracking however, worlds which “converge”
in this manner are very dissimilar because they would not obey the same laws.
Resolving this apparent conflict by giving up either claim is of course an
option but not a very plausible strategy. Giving up the claim that we should
allow the ¬S-world to differ from the actual at times after S is not plausible
because the laws of such a world would be very different from the actual
world. Giving up the claim that we should keep distinct components of b’s
well-being fixed also seems implausible because the Similarity View would
then not be a claim about the value S has for b in itself but rather the value of
S and something else for b.
4.2.1 Time as a factor
As we saw above, a problem for the Similarity View is that there is an apparent
conflict between on the one hand capturing the contributive value of S for b,
and not the value of S-and-something-else for b, and on the other hand the
claim that the most similar ¬S world to any given S world should be allowed
to differ from the S world. In order to resolve this conflict we should consider
an assumption which has so far been tacit in the discussion, namely that when
comparing the S world with the most similar ¬S world we are comparing how
well b’s life goes in the two worlds. An alternative to comparing whole lives is
to compare a part of b’s actual life with a part of b’s life in the most similar ¬S
world. The two restrictions seem to conflict when it comes to states of affairs
which obtain after S, but if we simply ignore what goes on after S in the actual
as well as the counterfactual world then that should not be an issue.
One straightforward way to amend the Similarity View would be to say that
we compare the part of b’s actual life up to and including the time t when S
obtains with how b’s life would have gone up to, but not including t, in the
most similar world where S does not obtain. This does solve the problem of
taking into account what goes on after S, although it is still not a plausible
condition of when a state of affairs is bad for a person. Rather, this seems to
give a sufficient condition for when a time is bad for a person. Many distinct
states of affairs obtain at t, and a life which includes t can differ from a life
which does not in many respects other than the obtaining of S.
One way to avoid this problem is to consider parts of a person’s life of equal
length:
The Time-Relative Similarity View: if a state of affairs S obtaining at time t is
finally bad for b then b’s life up to, and including, t is worse for b than b’s
life up to, and including, t in the most similar possible world where S does not
obtain.11
11 The time-variable ’t’ could of course stand for an interval rather than a point in time.
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On the Time-Relative Similarity View, the most similar ¬S world can differ
in all sorts of respects at times after t without affecting the contributive value
of S for b. Also note that although this view refers to time it does not imply
anything about when S is bad for b. It has been argued that a person can be
harmed by states of affairs which obtain after her death and that such posthu-
mous harms are bad for the person while she is alive.12 The Time-Relative
Similarity View is only a sufficient condition and does therefore not rule out
that posthumous harms can affect a person’s well-being at times before they
obtain. What the view commits one to is the claim that a world including a
posthumous harm, that is, a world up to and including the time when the harm
obtains, is worse for the person than the same time span in the most similar
world where it does not obtain.13
A problem for this view, and which strikes against the previous versions of
the Similarity View as well, are cases where a state of affairs obtains which is
prima facie bad for someone, but where there is a back-up which ensures that
the person would not have been better off had this state of affairs not obtained.
Consider the following example:
The Back-Up: Black and Orange have been hired to kill White. Black has been
instructed to shoot White while Orange has been instructed to detonate a bomb
which will kill White if and only if Black does not shoot. Black shoots and kills
White.14
In this case, had White not died from Black’s shot she would still have died
from the explosion triggered by Orange. It is therefore not the case that she
is worse off in the most similar possible world where her death, S, does not
obtain because it is not worse for White to be killed by Black than it is to be
killed by Orange. Therefore, the Time-Relative Similarity View implies that
White’s death cannot be bad for her.
12 See Pitcher (1984), Feinberg (1987, pp. 83–93) and Luper (2004) for example.
13 A more problematic case concerns states which are only good or bad for a person before they
obtain. For example, it could be claimed that the satisfaction of past preferences are good for
people even if the preference is not held when it is satisfied. According to this theory, a state
of affairs can be good for a person before it obtains but neutral for the person when it obtains
(because the person does not then have the relevant preferences). It is unclear, however, whether
this is a coherent preferentialist theory. If it is the satisfaction of preferences that matters then it
seems, prima facie at least, that a preference which is not held when its object obtains does not
count as satisfied, and does not make a person’s life any better. If it is the object of a preference
which carries the value, then there seems to be no reason to say that the object of a preference
is good for a person before the object obtains. See Rabinowicz & Österberg (1996) regarding
the distinction between “object” and “satisfaction” interpretations of preferentialism. See also
Bykvist (1998).
14 This case is obviously similar to the overdetermination-example discussed in chapter two.
The difference is that in chapter two we were concerned with the the question whether Black
and/or Orange harm White. Here we are concerned with whether White’s death is bad for her
according to the Time-Relative Similarity View.
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Bradley (2004, p. 54) has argued that this problem can be solved if we
consider the vagueness of what we are allowed to vary when determining
what the most similar possible world is like. Bradley suggests that, depending
on the context of evaluation, the most similar possible world can be one where
White does not die at all. For example, if we are asking “was White’s death due
to Black firing his gun bad for her, given that Orange would have detonated
the bomb had Black not fired his gun?” then the answer, according to Bradley,
must be no. However, if we are asking “was it bad for White to die when
she in fact did, rather than not?” then the question has been specified so that
we can rule out the worlds where Black shoots and the worlds where Orange
detonates the bomb as the most similar one.
A similar view is suggested by Feldman (1991) who argues that there are
many states of affairs involving White’s death and each of these should be
evaluated independently. For example, the states of affairs “White is killed
by Black” and “White dies at exactly time t” are perhaps not bad for White
but the state of affairs and “White dies” plausibly is. If “White dies” does
not obtain, then the most similar possible world is one where neither Black
nor Orange kill her. Since this state of affairs is worse for White, the Time-
Relative Similarity View does not rule out that it is a bad thing for White to
die in this situation.
Bradley and Feldman attempt to specify the most similar world in such a
way that neither Black nor Orange kill White in the most similar world. How-
ever, it is not clear that the specifications are sufficient for it to follow that
White’s death is bad for her if we consider other factors which are neces-
sary for White to be better off in the most similar world where neither Black
nor Orange act. The problem, it seems, is that we still have to replace the
state of affairs which is bad for White with something else, and unless the
replacement-state is specified enough to rule out that White does not die, or
suffers a fate worse than death, we cannot conclude that White’s death is bad
for her.
The obvious reply to this objection is perhaps that the only thing the objec-
tion shows is that we need to specify the circumstances of evaluating White’s
death more. On Bradley’s view, for example, we can perhaps specify the rel-
evant similarity relation further so that the closest world is one where neither
Black nor Orange act, and where she does not suffer a fate worse than death.
Similarly, on Feldman’s view one could perhaps also argue that there is a more
complicated state of affairs involving White’s death which is bad for her.
I will not pursue the Similarity View further. It is surprising, I think, that
a case like Back-Up is even a problem for a view about contributive value.
Intuitively, it seems to me, the fact that White would have died in a different
way had she not died by Black’s shot is irrelevant to whether White’s death
is bad for her and whether White’s death makes her life go worse. It is, of
course, relevant to whether it would have been better for White not to be killed
by Black but that is a different matter. It would not have been better for White
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not to be killed by Black, but that is because something bad happens to White,
she dies, and something equally bad would have happened had she not died.
Another reason not to pursue the Similarity View is that there is a more
straightforward and simpler approach which does not require a similarity rela-
tion nor the metaphysics of possible world. On this view, which I will suggest
below, one does not compare how well off a person is in different possible
worlds but simply looks at one world. To introduce possible worlds seems
to have brought more problems with it than it has solved and it would be
a significant advantage if we can do without the similarity relation and the
metaphysics of possible worlds.
4.3 Same-world comparisons
A persistent problem for the Similarity View is how to determine what the
most similar world looks like. As I argued above, the notion of “similarity”
involves a considerable amount of vagueness and it would be an advantage
if we could remove this vagueness. The Similarity View also faced the prob-
lem of taking irrelevant considerations into account. If the most similar world
where S does not obtain differs in other respects than with respect to S, then
the difference in value for a person between the S and the most similar ¬S
world would be the difference between S and these other respects, not just
the value of S. We also saw that putting restrictions on the non-S world, for
example with respect to time, did not completely remove this problem.
In order to formulate a view which avoids these problems we can start with
the observation that the most similar world to any world is, trivially, that world
itself. If we can spell out the contributive character of a particular state of
affairs by considering only the world where the state of affairs obtains, then
we would not have the problem of vagueness and irrelevant considerations.
However, this might seem like an impossible task since, if we are to build on
the Simple View, then the contributive character of a state of affairs involves a
comparison between the state of affairs and the “negation” of a state of affairs.
So it might seem that we have to compare with some other world, the non-S
world.
What I suggest is that we should reinterpret the Simple View in the follow-
ing way:
The Same-World View: if a state of affairs S is finally bad for b then b’s life,
taking S into account, is worse than b’s life not taking S into account.
On this view, that S is worse than not-S for b does not mean that the possible
world where S does not obtain is worse for b, but that b has less well-being
if we take S into account than if we do not. This view involves a same-world
comparison in the sense that we only look at the world where S obtains and
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then ask how well-off b is if we count S and how well off b is if we do not
count S. On the same-world view we do not replace S with some other state
of affairs, that which would be the case in the most similar possible world for
example. Instead, we merely “subtract” S by not taking it into account.
What exactly does it mean to “take S into account”? Here we need to intro-
duce the notion of a well-being function. A well-being function is an operation
which takes the well-being components that obtain in a life as input and gen-
erates the overall value of that life for the person as its output. To take a state
of affairs into account is then for the well-being function to take the state of
affairs as a value.
Put in a more formal way, let V be the set of all the well-being components
that obtain in b’s life. The value of b’s life for b is a function of V , f (V ), and
the same world view is then merely the claim that if a member of V , Si, is
bad for b then f (V )> f (V −Si).15 An example of a well-being function is to
simply add the value of each component so that the value of a life is the sum
total of all well-being components. However, this is not the only possibility.
One might prefer a function which takes the value of a life to be the average
value of each well-being component. The function need not even be “aggrega-
tive” in this way. For example, the view that the value of b’s life is the value
of the worst component, or the value of the best component, are also possible
well-being functions.
The Same-World View takes the theory of well-being components and the
well-being function as given. That is, it does not place any restriction on the
well-being components themselves nor on the well-being function. The Same-
World View is a claim about the contributive value of finally bad well-being
components, not about what the finally bad well-being components are. Ac-
cording to this view, all finally bad well-being components make life go worse
in the sense that a life is worse overall for a person taking the component into
account. It is therefore a restriction on the combination of theories of well-
being components and well-being functions.
One advantage of the Same-World View is that because there is no men-
tioning of possible worlds or similarity between possible worlds, we do not
have to determine what would be the case if S does not obtain. It is determi-
nate what b’s life is like, and what well-being components it includes, and it
is also determinate what b’s well-being is if we do not take a certain well-
being component into account. The Same-World View is also more plausible
than the Similarity View regarding overdetermination. In Back-Up, we can
say that White’s death is bad for her as long as our theory of well-being and
the well-being function imply that her life is worse for her, taking her death
into account, than it is not taking her death into account. So the fact that she
15 The well-being function can favourably be compared with the value-function in Broome
(2004, pp. 26–29). In Broome’s case the value of a population is represented as a function
of its members individual well-being while we are here letting an individual’s well-being be a
function of the good and bad things that befall her.
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would have died in the most similar possible world (if that is indeed the case)
is of no consequence for the contributive value of her death.
A further advantage of the Same-World View is that it is compatible with
pluralism about the bearers of well-being. The Simple View and the Similarity
View both assume that what has value for a person are propositions or states of
affairs. On the Same-World View, however, things from different ontological
categories can have final value for a person.
Note also that the Same-World View is a view about the contributive value
of a state of affairs for a person and not the instrumental value of a state of
affairs for a person. It is quite plausible that some counterfactual comparison
relevant to the instrumental value of a state of affairs, and that the instrumental
value of a state of affairs will for that reason depend on a counterfactual claim.
The advantage of the Same-World View is rather that we can avoid the prob-
lem of overdetermination for contributive value. What is problematic about
typical cases of overdetermination, like the one considered above, is whether
an effect can be “attributed” to either Black’s or Orange’s act. Overdetermina-
tion should not be a problem for a theory about whether White’s illness is bad
for her, nor for a theory about whether White’s illness makes her life worse.16
As I have formulated the Same-World View it seems to allow for an asym-
metry between good and bad states of affairs with respect to their contributive
value. On the Same-World View, it is not possible that a state of affairs which
is bad for a person does not have negative contributive value. That is, all bad
states of affairs makes a person’s life go worse. It is possible, however, that
a good state of affairs has negative contributive value. If it is false that S is
bad for b, then nothing about S’s contributive value for b follows. The Same-
World View is thus compatible with there being an asymmetry between good
and bad states of affairs with respect to their contributive value.
However, this asymmetry seems to be ruled out if we consider that the
Same-World View, if it is a plausible view about the contributive value of
finally bad states of affairs, then it is just as plausible to analyse the contribu-
tive value of finally good states of affairs in an analogous way. It seems quite
arbitrary to say that finally bad states of affairs make life go worse, but finally
good states of affairs need not make life go better. We should then extend the
Same-World View to good states of affairs as well: if a state of affairs is good
for b then b’s life, taking the state of affairs into account, is better than b’s life
not taking the state of affairs into account. A good state of affairs cannot, on
this extended view, make life go worse and cannot be a harmful state.17
16 In the next chapter I will consider the third condition in the basic structure, the responsibility
condition, and argue that this should be understood as counterfactual dependence. A counter-
factual comparison will therefore be relevant to the analysis of harm.
17 It also seems plausible to extend the view to neutral states of affairs: if a state of affairs is
neutral for b then b’s life, taking the state of affairs into account, is equally as good as b’s life
not taking the state of affairs into account. This extension of the Same-World View rules out
that neutral states of affairs can be harmful as well.
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The Same-World View also allows for so-called “organic wholes”. Accord-
ing to the principle of organic wholes, the intrinsic value of a whole need not
equal the sum of its parts.18 For example, a standard hedonistic theory which
incorporates organic wholes could say that pain is the only thing which is
intrinsically bad, but the whole of an episode of deserved pain is not intrin-
sically bad. On this imagined hedonistic view, if a person deserves pain then
the pain taken by itself makes the person’s life go worse. That is, the person’s
life is worse for her when we take this component into account. However,
the Same-World View is compatible with the view that the complex compo-
nent consisting of the pain and the fact that the person deserves to be in pain
makes the person’s life go better. Even though the two components are not
independent of each other, the complex one cannot obtain without the simple
one obtaining, they can nevertheless be evaluated independently. Taking the
complex component into account does not force us to take the simple one into
account.
The Same-World View sets up a close connection between the value of a
state of affairs for a person and the contributive value of that state of affairs.
For example, the view that pain is always bad for people, and that the value of
a life is the average value of each well-being component, is not consistent with
the Same-World View. An episode of pain can make a person’s life go better,
on this view, as long as it increases the average. According to the Same-World
View, however, all bad states of affairs are such that they make a person’s life
go worse.
This casts some doubt over the claim that all states of affairs which are bad
for a person makes that person’s life go worse. As a conceptual claim about
the relation between bad-for and contributory value the Same-World View
seems mistaken since whether it is true depends on what the true theory of
well-being is.
However, we need not reject the way contributory value is understood on
the Same-World View because of this example. While it is perhaps a mistake
to see the Same-World View as a claim about how good and bad-for relates to
contributory value, as a claim about how we should understand the contribu-
tory value of a state of affairs the view still has merit. That is, the following
claim is still plausible: if a state of affairs S has negative contributive value for
b then b’s life, taking S into account, is worse than b’s life not taking S into
account.
18 The term organic whole was coined by Moore (1993) who claimed that “the value of [a
whole] bears no regular proportion to the sum of the values of its parts” (Moore 1993, p. 79). It
is a controversial issue exactly how such organic unities, or wholes, should be understood and
whether they exist at all (see Carlson (1997)). Hurka (1998) distinguishes between a “holistic”
view, which he claims was Moore’s view on the matter, and a “conditional” view. On the holistic
view the value of a part retains its value when it enters an organic whole and the additional
value resides in the whole rather than in one of the whole’s parts. On the conditional view,
which Hurka ascribes to Korsgaard (1983), the value of a thing can change when it enters an
organic whole.
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Does this reinterpretation of the Same-World View undermine the argu-
ments against the Similarity View, or the Simple View? No, it does not.
The main objection to the Simple View was that it is only plausible as a
claim about final value, not about contributive value, because it does not take
into account the difference a state of affairs makes to a particular life. This
shortcoming of the Simple View is not remedied by switching to contributive
value.
The main objection to the Similarity View was that it did not identify the
contributive value of a state of affairs, S, but rather the contributory value of
S-and-something-else. The Similarity View seems more plausible as a view
about the overall value of a state of affairs, taking both final and instrumental
value into account, but not about the contributory value of a particular state of
affairs.
The Same-World View, I suggest, captures only the contributive value of a
state of affairs, i.e., the sense in which a state of affairs makes life go worse.
It might be suggested that when it comes to harm it is the contribution that
a state of affairs makes and not its final value for a person which is relevant.
That is, perhaps we should replace the second condition in the basic structure
with:
(2*): b is in a state S such that b’s life is worse, taking S into account, than b’s
life not taking S into account.
This would leave it open whether S is finally bad and would instead emphasise
the contribution of S to b’s well-being. One advantage of this suggestion is
that we would not have to defend any particular relation between bad-for and
worse-for. Now, a very persistent intuition regarding harm seems to be that to
do harm is to make someone’s life go worse (in some sense). This certainly
favours (2*). Furthermore, consider the example with organic wholes above.
If a bad state of affairs does not make a life go worse when we take it into
account, because it is a part of an organic whole, then it seems inappropriate
to say that the person has been harmed. Even though the state of affairs is
bad for the person when considered in isolation, what we care about when it
comes to harming seems to be the difference the state of affairs makes.
The difference between taking the contribution, rather than the value, of a
state of affairs as relevant to harm need not be very great. It seems plausible
that there is some correlation between the value of a state of affairs for a per-
son and the state’s contribution to the value of that person’s life. This would,
as we saw, rule out some combinations of well-being theories and well-being
functions. However, one need not defend the Same-World View as a truth
about the logic of prudential value. Instead, one could defend it as a substan-
tial claim about well-being and contributive value. Recall that the Same-World
View does not commit us to a simple, additive, well-being function. For exam-
ple, it is consistent with the Same-World View that some bad states of affairs
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make only a very small negative contribution, perhaps depending on when
they obtain in a life or on what other states of affairs obtain in a life. One
could therefore accept the principle of organic unities to a certain extent, for
example. What the Same-World View commits us to is the claim that all bad
states of affairs make some negative contribution. This is a much weaker and
quite plausible claim.
As we saw above, it is possible on the Same-World View to endorse an
asymmetry between good and bad states of affairs. That is, it is possible that
some good states make a negative contribution to a life. However, this seems
implausible. A more plausible view is that all good states make a positive
contribution and all neutral states make no contribution to how well a life
goes. With these assumptions we could make the stronger claim that a state of
affairs S is bad for a person if and only if b’s life is worse for b, taking S into
account, than not taking S into account.
There are then two independent routes by which we can arrive at (2*). First,
by claiming that it is the contribution a state of affairs makes to the value of
a life rather than the value of the state which matter to an analysis of harm.
The second route is to claim that the value of a state of affairs for a person is
the contribution which the state makes to the value of that person’s life. The
second condition in the basic structure, according to the second route, implies
(2*).
4.3.1 The absence of benefits
I have argued that the way in which harms make life go worse is captured
by the Same-World View and that we should replace the second condition in
the basic structure with (2*). Compared to the other views discussed in this
chapter (2*) seems to have a clear advantage. Unlike the Similarity View it
avoids the problem of overdetermination and effectively isolates the contribu-
tive value of a particular well-being component. As we saw earlier, the Simi-
larity View does not adequately capture the contributive value of a particular
state of affairs, S, because the most similar world should plausibly be allowed
to vary with respect to other states of affairs than S.
An advantage of the Similarity View, it might be argued, is that it gives a
better account of the contributive value of absences of benefits. If we replace
(2) with (2*) in the basic structure, then all harms necessarily involve a state of
affairs which makes a person’s life go worse. However, cases where a person is
prevented from receiving a benefit, or where a person is deprived of a benefit,
are often considered as examples of harm. Consider for example the following
three cases:
Prevented benefits: The quality of Red’s life would be better were she to be
employed but Magenta prevents this from happening.
Failure to benefit: Magenta could improve Red’s life by providing Red with
employment but Magenta does not do this.
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Deprived of benefits: Red has a full-time employment and her life is better for
it. Magenta reduces Red’s employment to a part-time position, lowering Red’s
quality of life. The part-time position still contributes positively to Red’s life.
In each of these examples there is a case to be made for saying that Magenta
harms Red, even though there does not seem to be a state of affairs which
makes Red’s life go worse. In each example, the ground for saying that Red
has been harmed is that she could have been better off, not that there is some-
thing about her actual condition which contributes in a negative way to her
well-being.
A possible reply to these examples is to agree that what Magenta does is
in all three cases morally objectionable, other things being equal, but deny
that this is because she harms Red. The tendency to say that Magenta harms
Red when she does not provide Red with employment, for example, is be-
cause we think that people in general should benefit other people, other things
being equal. The objection to Magenta’s choice in this case is therefore not
necessarily based on that Magenta harms Red but rather that Magenta should
benefit Red. Likewise, we could object to Magenta’s preventing Red from
being employed on the same grounds. Magenta should not prevent Red from
being employed because Red would benefit from being employed, not because
Magenta would harm Red by preventing Red from being employed.
The intuition that Magenta harms Red in the examples above can therefore
to an extent be explained away. Harm is sometimes used in a wider sense. It
seems plausible to say that Magenta “harms” Red if one by this means merely
that Magenta acts in an objectionable way towards Red, but that is “harm” in
a wider sense than the one which I am interested in.
Not all cases of prevention, failure or deprivation of benefits can be ex-
plained away in this way. For example, a common view is that death is bad for
a person only in so far as it prevents benefits. It would be a serious blow to the
Same-World View if it rules out this account of the badness of death.
One way in which death can be bad for a person is because death is in-
trinsically bad for a person. This is not a very popular view, and perhaps for
good reasons. One problem is that it cannot capture the plausible claim that
the value of death for a person depends on when it occurs. For example, it is
typically worse to die while young rather than while old, and in some cases it
is perhaps not even bad to die. In cases where a life contains nothing but pain,
for example, and there are no chances of relieving this pain in the future, then
death might be neutral or even good for a person.
A more popular view about the value of death is the deprivation-approach.19
According to the deprivation-approach, death is bad for a person because it
prevents the person from enjoying future goods. In order for the Same-World
View to be compatible with the deprivation-approach we therefore have to say
that preventing a person from receiving a benefit is to harm that person.
19 See for example Nagel (1991, ch. 1), Feldman (1991, 1992) and Bradley (2004).
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In some cases, we would say that a lack of something good is bad for a
person. A lack of food, shelter, fresh water, clean air, friends, education and
so on are such cases. Such examples suggest that we should say that negative
states of affairs can make a person’s life go better or worse, not only positive
ones. If such absences can make a person’s life go better or worse, then it is
possible to identify the state of affairs which makes Red’s life go worse in
the examples above, namely the state of affairs that Red does not have full-
time employment. Likewise, the Same-World View would also be compatible
with death being a case of deprivation. Suppose Magenta kills Red, thereby
preventing Red from enjoying some future good x, so that the state of affairs
“Red does not enjoy x” obtains. This state of affairs, I have suggested, does
indeed make Red’s life go worse because Red’s life is worse for Red when
this state of affairs is taken into account. It is also a state of affairs which
Magenta’s act is plausibly responsible for, though I will argue for that claim
in the next chapter. We can therefore say that Magenta harms Red because the
act of killing Red is responsible for a state of affairs which makes Red’s life
go worse, namely that “Red does not enjoy x”.20
A natural objection is that it is implausibly wide to hold that all absent
benefits have negative contributive value. For example, suppose Red’s life is
going very well. She has friends, her projects are successful, she is happy and
so on. Her life could be better however. She could be even more successful,
have even more valuable relations and be even happier. If the absences of a
benefit makes a life go worse because negative states of affairs make a life go
worse, then we would have to say that the state of affairs “Red is not more
successful” makes Red’s life go worse. But, it might be objected, it is not
plausible that a person who is very well off is harmed just because she isn’t
even better off.
However, in so far as we find the original examples of absences of benefits
plausible then we should not be moved by this objection. If we in the original
examples think that it makes Red’s life go worse that she misses out on possi-
ble good things, then I see no principled ground for saying that Red’s lack of
even more success and happiness does not make her life go worse.21
Furthermore, it does not follow that someone would harm Red just because
there is a state of affairs which makes her life go worse. Unless someone is
responsible for the state of affairs “Red is not more successful” then the only
thing that follows is that this state of affairs makes Red’s life go worse, not that
anyone has harmed her. As far as doing harm goes, many negative states of af-
20 It might be objected that this state of affairs can not make Red’s life go worse because Red
does not exist when it obtains. However, this is a general problem for the deprivation approach
to death and not a problem which is unique to the Same-World View.
21 Other views about the value of a state of affairs for a person have similar implications. For
example, according to the Similarity Views discussed above it is bad for a person that she does
not find Alladin’s lamp because in the most similar world where she finds it her life, we can
assume, goes better.
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fairs will therefore be rather uninteresting because they obtain independently
of what people do.22
To further strengthen this last point, suppose that someone were responsi-
ble for the fact that Red is not even more successful. Suppose that Magenta
consistently sabotages Red’s life so that she is not more successful. We then
have a case which is very similar to our original three examples and in so far
as we find these to be cases of doing harm then we should not object to saying
that Magenta harms Red in this case.
In conclusion, absences of benefits do at least sometimes make a person’s
life go worse. Some examples involving the absence of benefits are not cases
of doing harm. The tendency to think that there is harm done in such cases
can be explained by appealing to related concepts such as moral permissibil-
ity and so forth. Other examples of the absence of benefits, in the case of ab-
sences caused by death for example, are indeed harms and the negative states
of affairs which they refer to do make people’s life go worse.
4.3.2 The value of existence
The view that we should include absent benefits among the things which make
a person’s life go better or worse raises the question what we should say about
the value of existence and the value of a whole life for a person. If we say, as
I think we should, that the state of affairs “Red is not more successful” makes
Red’s life go worse, should we then also say that the state of affairs “Red does
not exist” makes her life go worse? On the face of it, the two states of affairs
are similar, though it is far less intuitive to say that the latter has contributive
value for Red. If Red does not exist, how can anything have value for her?
These puzzling problems also deserve special attention in relation to the
Same-World View. Can the state of affairs “b exists” be bad for b on this
view? Furthermore, what does the Same-World View imply regarding the kind
of harms considered in the first chapter, i.e., states of affairs which seem to be
bad for a person but where the person would not exist had the state of affairs
not obtained?
Let us consider the latter question first. It should be obvious that the fact
that a person would not have existed had a state of affairs not obtained is in no
way relevant to the contributive value of the state of affairs according to the
Same-World View. When we consider the the contributive value of a genetic
condition like neurofibromatosis, or something even worse, the relevant com-
parison on the Same-World View is not with a possible state of affairs where
the person in question does not exist. Likewise, whether having “a bad start in
life” makes a person’s life go worse is not a matter of considering how well
22 Bradley (2004, pp. 60–2) argues in a similar way that it is not necessarily rational to have a
negative attitude towards something just because it is bad for you. According to Bradley, it is
bad for a person that she does not find Alladin’s lamp but it is not something which anyone
should care much about.
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off the person would be in some different possible world. To have “a bad start
in life” makes a life go worse if the life is worse, taking that state of affairs
into account, than it is not taking that state of affairs into account. The fact that
the existence of a person is contingent on the obtaining of a particular state of
affairs is therefore no obstacle to the state of affairs being bad for that person.
Existence seems initially to be a more difficult matter. A common view
is that the state of affairs “b exists” cannot be good or bad for b because
that would require “b exists” to be better or worse than the state of affairs “b
does not exist”. However, if “b exists” is, say, better for b than “b does not
exist” then it seems to follow that “b does not exist” is worse for b than “b
exists.”23 But, it seems counter-intuitive to say that a non-existent person who
would have a life worth living, were she to exist, is worse off not existing. For
example, my merely possible third uncle, who does not in fact exist, is neither
better or worse off than he would be had he existed. Nothing has value for my
third uncle simply because he does not exist.24
On the other hand there is a case to be made for saying that existence can
have value for a person. It does at least seem as if we evaluate the value of
existence when we say that a life is “(not) worth living” or that someone is
“better off dead” for example. A way to accommodate such intuitions is to
claim that non-existence is neutral for a person, and that existence is good for
a person when it is better than non-existence.25
According to the Same-World View, both of these views rest on a mistake in
so far as they intend to address the question whether existence can have con-
tributive value for a person. Whether existence makes a life better or worse,
on the Same-World View, is a matter of whether a life is better taking exis-
tence into account than it is not taking it into account. That is, the value of
existence does not depend on a comparison with non-existence. If, however,
they are merely claims about the comparative value of existence as compared
with non-existence, then they do not address whether existence as such can
have contributive value for a person.
On the Same-World View, whether existence has contributive value for a
person, b, depends on if b’s life, taking the state of affairs “b exists” into ac-
count, is better or worse than the value of b’s life not taking this state of affairs
into account. Recall that the Same-World View does not place any restriction
on what a substantial theory of well-being should look like. To take the state of
affairs “b exists” into account is merely to treat it as a well-being component,
and to not take it into account is to not treat it as a well-being component. The
23 See McMahan (1988), Broome (2004) and Arrhenius (2013).
24 Several authors have suggested that existence can be better (or worse) for b in a world where
b exists while it also being the case that non-existence would not be worse (better) for b (see
Arrhenius & Rabinowicz (2010) and Johansson (2010)). This is controversial however because
we would then have to reject the “accessibility principle”, argued for by Bykvist (2007a), that
if S is better (worse) than S′ for b, then S would be better (worse) even if it obtained.
25 See for example Holtug (2001) and Roberts (2011).
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Same-World View does therefore not require us to make any dubious compar-
ison with how well-off b would be if b did not exist.
There is a further difference between the Same-World View and the two
views above which should be emphasised. It is commonly assumed that if ex-
istence is good for a person then it follows that non-existence is bad for a per-
son. This is so because, as we saw above, that existence is good is understood
in terms of a comparison with non-existence. However, on the Same-World
View this is not the case. On the Same-World View the value of the state of
affairs “b exists” depends on the difference this state of affairs makes when
we take it into account. It does not depend on whether it is better for b to exist
rather than not. The value of existence and non-existence should therefore be
considered separately.
Let us consider non-existence first. It seems very intuitive, given the Same-
World View, to say that non-existence is neutral for a person. Taking the fact
that a person does not exist into account does not seem to be better for the
person than if we do not take non-existence into account. A reason for making
this claim is that we are making the comparison “within” the same world,
so to speak. Whether we take the person’s non-existence into account or not
does not change the fact that the person does not exist, and nothing has value
for a person who does not exist simply because there is no one for which the
thing can have value. Of course, if the person were to exist then many things
would have value for this person. We can formulate this by saying that in those
possible worlds where this person exists, things have value for her. However,
in the possible worlds where she does not exist, nothing has value for her.
This suggests that while non-existence is not a well-being component in
its own right it can still make a difference to a person’s well-being in that it
can undermine the value of other states of affairs. A state of affairs which
has value for a person in worlds where she exists has neutral value for this
person in worlds where she does not exist. A person’s well-being therefore
depends on the person’s non-existence but it does not follow from this alone
that non-existence has value for this person. We can distinguish between what
a person’s well-being depends on and what constitutes a person’s well-being.
It seems plausible that well-being can depend on things which does not con-
stitute it. For example, on a hedonistic view a person’s well-being depends
on the fact that she has consciousness. Otherwise, she would not be able to
experience pleasure or pain in the first place. However, consciousness in itself
does not constitute a person’s well-being according to hedonism, only specific
types of experiences do.
Now consider the value of existence. Considering the reason for saying that
non-existence has neutral value for a person it seems plausible to say that
existence also has neutral value. When we take the fact that a person exists
into account we do not judge that person as better off than if we do not take
it into account. The reason is again that we are making comparisons within
the same world and not changing the fact whether the person exists. Existence
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does seem to make a difference, however, in the same way as non-existence
makes a difference. The fact that a person exists in a possible world enables
other states of affairs to have value for this person but it is not, in itself, good
or bad.
What about the plausible claims mentioned above, that a life can be worth
living and that some people can be better off dead? On the view suggested
here, such claims can be understood as being about the distribution of finally
good and bad things in a person’s life rather than about the final value of a
person’s existence. When we say that b has a life worth living what we mean
is not that b’s mere existence is good for b. Also, we need not claim, according
to the view suggested here, that non-existence would be better for b. What we
should say is that the good things in b’s life outweigh the bad things. This, it
seems to me, is the most straightforward and plausible account of such claims.
Finally, on the view just sketched, we can claim that existence and non-
existence are neutral for a person without having to say that non-existent peo-
ple, such as my third uncle, are well-off to some extent. Because existence is
a precondition for other things having value for my third uncle, and this con-
dition is not satisfied in his case, nothing (not even that he does not exist) has
value for him.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter I have considered the claim that a necessary condition for do-
ing harm is that there is a state of affairs which is finally bad for someone.
However, to do harm is also to make someone’s life go worse, in some sense.
The aim of this chapter has been to spell out the latter: in what sense does
bad states of affairs make a person’s life go worse? The view I favour is the
Same-World View:
The Same-World View: if a state of affairs S is bad for b then b’s life, taking S
into account, is worse than b’s life not taking S into account.
I have argued that it is possible to strengthen the Same-World View given that
we treat good and neutral states of affairs in the same way. If we do, then the
value of a state of affairs is the difference it makes to the value of a life. That
is, we could replace (2) in the basic structure with
(2*): b is in a state S such that b’s life is worse, taking S into account, than b’s
life not taking S into account.
A consequence of the Same-World View, I argued, is that a state of affairs can
make that person’s life go worse even though the person would not have ex-
isted had the state of affairs not obtained. This is because on the Same-World
View the relevant comparison is “within” a given possible world and not with
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some other possible world. This is relevant to the non-identity problem be-
cause it shows that the fact that the young girl’s child would not exist had the
girl postponed her pregnancy simply is not relevant to whether the child’s bad
start in life makes her life go worse. Likewise, whether neurofibromatosis is
makes the Specks’ third child’s life go worse is in no way dependent on the
fact that that child would not have existed had either of the two physicians not
been negligent. What is relevant is whether the children in question have lower
well-being when we take the bad start in life, or the neurological condition,
into account.
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5. Responsibility
In the previous chapter I argued for a view about the contributive value of
harm, the Same-World View, and that we should replace the second condition
in the basic structure with (2*). Keeping to the basic structure, we then have
the following partial analysis of harm:
a harms b only if
(1) a performs an act, φ ,
(2*): b is in a state S such that b’s life is worse, taking S into account, than b’s
life not taking S into account.
(3) φ is responsible for S’s obtaining.
In chapter two I suggested that (3) seems to be a necessary condition for do-
ing harm. For a person do harm it is not enough that the person performs an
act and that there is a harmful state of affairs. The harmful state of affairs, I
claimed, must also be related in the right way to the act. That is, the act must
be responsible for the effect.
In this chapter I will argue that we should analyse the third condition in
terms of counterfactual dependence. More precisely, I will argue that the third
condition should be understood in the following way:
(3*) if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained at all, or
would have obtained in a different way which would be salient in the circum-
stances.
According to this view, an act is responsible for a state of affairs just in case
the act makes a difference to whether the state obtains at all, or whether it
obtains in the same way. This captures nicely a central aspect of how we think
about the consequences of acts. If an act makes no difference whatsoever to
the obtaining of a state of affairs then this strongly suggests that the act is not
responsible for the state of affairs.
It is important to distinguish the kind of responsibility which I will be con-
cerned with in this chapter from responsibility in a broader sense. As I have
already indicated, “responsibility” as I will use the term is a relation between
an act and an effect such that the effect is a consequence of the act, or al-
ternatively, that the effect can be “attributed” to the act.1 Responsibility is
1 A terminological note: it is a debated issue whether “the effects” of an act are events, states
of affairs, or something else. In what follows I will use “effects” and “states of affairs” as
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sometimes used in a different sense. One sense of responsibility which differs
from the one I am interested in is when we ascribe responsibility to a person
merely to indicate that the person is under a special obligation. Parents, for ex-
ample, may have this kind of responsibility for their children. Responsibility
in this sense is clearly normative because it involves a claim about someone’s
duties. The sense of responsibility which I am interested in is in itself non-
moral though it might have moral relevance. Saying that φ is responsible for
S’s obtaining does not, as I will use the term, involve any claims about du-
ties, praise or blame. A further difference is that responsibility in this latter
sense is what is typically indicated when a person “takes” responsibility for
something or someone. This is not the sense of responsibility which I will be
concerned with in this chapter. Whether an act is responsible for an effect is
not something which the agent can make happen by “taking” responsibility.2
Though prima facie intuitive, analysing responsibility in terms of coun-
terfactual dependence faces some well-known problems. Most notably, such
analyses gives the wrong result in two familiar cases: Overdetermination and
Pre-Emption. I have already discussed these cases to some extent in earlier
chapters. There I argued that examples of this kind provide a good reason
for rejecting the Counterfactual Condition as a necessary condition for doing
harm. In this chapter, I will argue that the failure of the Counterfactual Condi-
tion does not force us to reject analysing responsibility in terms of counterfac-
tual dependence. That is, understanding the responsibility condition in terms
of counterfactual dependence does not entail the Counterfactual Condition
and the most plausible defence of counterfactual dependence against Overde-
termination and Pre-Emption does not lend any support to the Counterfactual
Condition.
Finally I will consider the claim that there is a simpler and more straight-
forward notion of responsibility which avoids the problems that plague coun-
terfactual dependence. A natural suggestion is that an act is responsible for a
state of affairs simply by causing that state of affairs to obtain. I will argue
that the advantages of this “causal view” are merely apparent and that there
are significant differences between causation and responsibility which provide
sufficient reason to reject the causal view.
interchangeable. This should not be seen as a heavy ontological commitment however. The
main reason for choosing states of affairs is that (2*) is formulated in terms of states. But, note
that one feature of (2*) is that it is compatible with other things than states of affairs having
negative contributory value. The choice of states of affairs as the favoured ontological category
is therefore one of convenience, not of necessity.
2 See Scanlon (1998, pp. 248–9). Scanlon distinguishes between “responsibility as attributabil-
ity” and “substantive responsibility”. The former corresponds to the sense of responsibility
which I am concerned with in this chapter and the latter corresponds to the broader notion of
responsibility.
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5.1 Counterfactual dependence
A common view about responsibility is that an act is responsible for a state
of affairs just when the act makes a difference to that state’s obtaining. If a
state of affairs would have obtained independently of an act then this strongly
suggests that the act is not responsible for the state’s obtaining. Taking this
plausible claim as our starting point we can formulate the following counter-
factual analysis of responsibility:
The Difference-Making View-1: an act, φ , is responsible for a state of affairs, S,
if and only if, if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained.3
The right-hand side of the Difference-Making View is usually understood in
terms of possible worlds, and I will follow suit in this respect. That is, S de-
pends counterfactually on φ if and only if the closest ¬φ world to the actual
world is a world where S does not obtain. For example, if I strike a match
(φ ) and there is an explosion (S) then my striking of the match is responsible
for the explosion if and only if there is no explosion (¬S) in the most similar
world where I do not strike the match (¬φ ).
A well-known problem for the Difference-Making View is that it yields the
wrong result in two cases which are familiar from chapter two:
Pre-Emption. Black poisons White. Before the poison has any effect Orange
kills White. Had Orange not killed White, then the poison would have killed
White just a moment later.
Overdetermination. Black and Orange, independently of each other and at the
exact same time, shoot White. Each shot is sufficient to kill White.
In chapter two it was claimed that a satisfactory solution to these two cases
should imply that someone harms White in Overdetermination and that at least
Orange, though perhaps not Black, harms White in Pre-Emption. A theory
of responsibility should give similar verdicts in these cases. It is clear that
someone is responsible for White’s death in Overdetermination and that at
least Orange, though perhaps not Black, is responsible for White’s death in
Pre-Emption.4
The Difference-Making View does not satisfy these two criteria because in
both cases, White’s death is not counterfactually dependent on either Black’s
3 The Difference-Making View has obvious similarities with counterfactual analyses of causa-
tion. See Lewis (1973a, 1979, 2000). The relation between a counterfactual analysis of respon-
sibility and causation will be discussed further below.
4 From a pre-theoretical point of view, would we say that Black is responsible for White’s death
in Pre-Emption? This seems far from obvious. After all, the effects of Black’s act never occur
so it would seem odd to hold Black responsible for White’s death. However, Black’s act seems
to be morally objectionable because of what it would lead to under “normal” circumstances. I
will pass over this controversy. For our purposes, we only need the weaker claim that Orange
is responsible for White’s death in order for Pre-Emption serve as a counterexample to the
Difference-Making View.
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or Orange’s acts. In Pre-Emption, White’s death is counterfactually dependent
on Orange’s act only if White’s death does not occur in the closest possible
world where Orange does not kill White. However, if Orange and Black act
independently of each other, then the world where Orange does not perform
his act is one where Black still performs his act. So White would still die,
though slightly later, in the closest possible world where Orange does not kill
White.5 Since the same reasoning can be applied to Black’s act, it follows that
neither Black’s nor Orange’s act is responsible for White’s death. The same
reasoning also leads to the conclusion that neither Black’s nor Orange’s acts
are responsible for White’s death in Overdetermination. However, it is clear
that at least Orange’s act is responsible for White’s death in Pre-Emption and
that either Black’s or Orange’s acts, or both, are responsible for White’s death
in Overdetermination.
A general approach to both Pre-Emption and Overdetermination starts with
the observation that Pre-Emption and Overdetermination are well known
problems for theories of causation as well. A plausible sufficient condition
for “c causes e” is that e depends counterfactually on c: had c not obtained
then e would not have obtained. Pre-Emption and Overdetermination, often
summed up under the heading of “redundant causation”, serve as serious
counterexamples to the claim that counterfactual dependence is necessary
as well as sufficient for causation because it implies that Orange does not
cause White’s death in Pre-Emption and that neither Black nor Orange
cause White’s death in Overdetermination.6 A way to approach the problem
would then be to consider the responses to such redundant causation and
see if they can be used to formulate a view about responsibility in terms of
counterfactual dependence.
5.1.1 Redundant causation
There are, broadly speaking, two ways to approach the problem of redundant
causation which are relevant here: an “individual” and a “collective” approach.
In terms of causation, the individual approach is that Black and Orange cause
White’s death on their own in Overdetermination while on the collective ap-
proach they cause White’s death together.7
I have discussed the collective approach in chapter two and will only briefly
restate why it is not a plausible view. For the collective approach to be plau-
sible, it has to be clarified in what sense Black and Orange act “together”.
One suggestion is that Black and Orange act together in the sense that they
5 The notion of the “closest” possible world is of course a bit unclear. I assume that the distance
between two worlds depends on their similarity, and that similarity (as I argued in the previous
chapter) should be understood in such a way that the most similar world where Black does not
act is one where Orange still acts, provided that they act independently.
6 See for example Lewis (1973a, 2000).
7 For an overview of the debate and a defence of the individual approach, see Schaffer (2003).
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perform a collective action. This collective act, it is then claimed, is respon-
sible for White’s death because White’s death depends counterfactually on
the performance of the collective act. However, this version of the collective
approach is not plausible because it would stretch the notion of “collective
act” in unacceptable ways. There is a difference between Black and Orange
together doing something and their acts contributing to the same outcome but
the “collective-act” reply to Overdetermination and Pre-Emption does away
with this distinction.
A further problem for this version of the collective approach is that it pre-
supposes that if a collective act is not performed then none of the individual
acts which constitute the collective act is performed. But this is not the case.
It is sufficient for the collective act “you and me painting the house” not to
be performed that I fail to do my part. You can paint as much as you like
and the collective act will still not be performed. This is especially troubling
in Overdetermination where it then seems that the collective act “Black and
Orange fire their guns” is not performed but that Black’s act is.
Alternatively, the collective approach could be understood as saying that
Black and Orange are both responsible for White’s death in overdetermina-
tion because White’s death depends counterfactually on their acts taken to-
gether. Black’s and Orange’s acts are members of a minimal set such that
White would not have died had none of the acts in this set been performed.
A problem for this version of the collective view are cases where there are
more than one minimal set which the effect depends counterfactually on. For
example, consider (again) the following case:
The Death Squads. Brown is choosing which death squad to join, A or B. These
two groups will then attempt to catch members of The Resistance and execute
them. Brown knows that as long as a death squad has at least ten members it
will be successful and that group A will catch and execute 1000 people while
group B will catch and execute 10 people. If a squad has fewer than ten mem-
bers then it will fail to catch any members of The Resistance. Brown also knows
that group A has ten members and group B has nine.
Suppose that Brown is only concerned with minimising the amount of harm
he would do. If he joins A then the set consisting of him and any one of the
other members of A form a minimal set such that the 1000 deaths would not
have obtained had none of this minimal set’s members joined A. So he would
be responsible for 1000 deaths were he to join A. If he were to join B, on the
other hand, then he would only be responsible for ten deaths. This leads to the
absurd conclusion that Brown should join B if he wants to minimise the harm
he does.
In chapter two I also argued that attempts to save the collective view by
saying that Brown would do less harm, but still some harm, if he were to join
group A fails. Even if the Brown’s responsibility for the 1000 deaths depends
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on the size of the group he joins it is still the case that Brown would do more
harm by joining B.
We should therefore consider the individual approach and see whether it
has the resources to yield more plausible answers to Pre-Emption, Overdeter-
mination and the Death Squads.
It might be claimed that the problem with redundant causation arises be-
cause we have, when framing the examples, presupposed that there is only
one effect involved, namely “White’s death”. However, this is to presuppose
a “coarse” individuation of effects where differences to when, where and how
an effect occurs does not affect the identity of the effect. The solution is to
adopt a view of effects where the identity of an effect is fragile. On this view,
very small differences with respect to when, where or how an effect occurs
affect whether it is the same effect. For example, we would not say that “my
death” denotes the same death whenever it occurs. I am bound to die some
day, but dying in a car accident tomorrow and dying of old age in 50 years
are clearly different deaths. Applied to Overdetermination, one could on this
view say that Black’s and Orange’s acts have different events as their effects:
“death by Black” and “death by Orange”.8
It is questionable however whether this is the correct way to describe the
case. Saying that Black’s and Orange’s acts have different effects does not sit
well with the description of the case as a situation where their acts are inde-
pendently sufficient for an effect. In Overdetermination especially there seems
to be just one effect: White’s death. While it is plausible that some changes as
to when, where and how an effect occurs can affect the identity of the effect,
it does not seem plausible that any such change will affect the identity of the
effect. In Overdetermination, for example, the difference between “death by
Black” and “death by Orange” is too insignificant to make them into differ-
ent effects. A further problem for this approach is that it identifies seemingly
irrelevant factors as relevant to event-identity. On the fine-grained approach
White’s actual death would be counterfactually dependent on many factors
of the environment. For example, had the wind been blowing differently then
Black’s (and Orange’s) bullets would have hit White in a slightly different
way. According to the Difference-Making View it would then follow that the
way the wind blows is also responsible for White’s death. But we would not
say that the exact way the wind blows is responsible for White’s death, nor
that it is relevant to the identity of White’s death.9
A more plausible approach to redundant causation is to adopt a coarse
individuation of effects but to distinguish between the different ways in
8 Note that it does not follow, on this approach, that Black and Orange make a difference
to White’s well-being since it is not worse for White if both “death by Black” and “death
by Orange” obtain. See also below where I compare the Counterfactual Condition with the
Difference-Making View.
9 This problem for the fine-grained version of the individual view is raised by Lewis (2000) and
Petersson (2004).
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which White’s death might obtain.10 Within theories of causality, the idea is
that Black causes White’s death in Overdetermination because White’s death
would not have occurred at all or would not have occurred in the same way
had Black not acted as she did. The counterfactual approach to responsibility
could then be modified in the same way:
The Difference-Making View-2: an act, φ , is responsible for a state of affairs, S,
if and only if, if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained, or,
S would not have obtained in the same way.
On this view effects are not fragile and the same effect can occur in different
ways. The condition is also weaker than the original counterfactual analysis
where c causes e if and only if e would not have occurred had c not occurred.
On the current view it is enough that e does not occur in the same way, had c
not occurred.
The Difference-Making View-2 is rather rough, mainly because the notion
of the “ways” in which an effect can occur is in need of clarification. The
most obvious problem is to characterise the identity-changing ways of an ef-
fect. In Overdetermination, for example, there seems to be only one effect
involved: White’s death. Had White only been hit by Orange’s bullet then she
would have died the same death. The difference in the way which White’s
death occurs does not make her death into a different effect according to this
new version of the Difference-Making View. But, this certainly calls out for
an explanation. However, for our present purposes we can safely ignore this
problem. The Difference-Making View-2 only requires that the effect either
does not occur at all, had the act not been performed, or that the effect does
not occur in the same way, and this disjunction is true of both Black’s and Or-
ange’s acts regardless of how the notion of “ways” is further clarified. I will
therefore leave it open exactly how to draw the distinction between identity-
changing and identity-preserving features of an effect.
A more serious problem for this view is to identify what the ways of
an effect are to begin with. Consider again White’s death. In order for
the Difference-Making View-2 to solve the problem of Overdetermination
we have to assume that dying from two bullets rather than one is either a
different death entirely or a way in which White’s death could occur. But,
there are further features of this particular death where it is perhaps less clear
whether they are ways of White’s death at all. For example, suppose that
White dies in the shade. Should we then say that dying in the shade is a way
in which White’s death occurs? If it is, then the individualistic approach
amounts to a much broader notion of responsibility than we commonly
acknowledge. Any act which makes a slight difference to the circumstances
in which White’s death occurs would, according to the Difference-Making
View-2, be responsible for White’s death.
10 See Paul (1998, 2000), Lewis (2000) and Schaffer (2003).
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Broadening the notion of responsibility in this way threatens to make the
individual approach implausibly wide. It would also make the Difference-
Making View-2 harder to distinguish from the collective approach in a case
like the Death Squads. If Brown makes a difference to the way in which the
members of The Resistance would die by joining the squad with ten members
then he would be responsible for their deaths according to this version of the
Difference-Making View.
A plausible suggestion at this point is that we could avoid these problems
for the individual approach if we could make a distinction between features of
White’s death on the one hand and features of the situation on the other. Dying
in the shade is intuitively not a way in which White’s death occurs but rather
a feature of the circumstances more broadly construed. One way to draw this
distinction is by saying that dying in the shade is not an intrinsic property
of White’s death and that it is therefore not a “way” in which White’s death
occurs. However, maintaining this distinction on such metaphysical grounds
seems to be difficult. For example, the time when White’s death occurs is
perhaps not an intrinsic property of White’s death but it should be considered
a way in which it occurs. Otherwise the Difference-Making View-2 would
not be able to handle cases of Pre-Emption.11 I will therefore not pursue this
option here.
Instead, I suggest that we adopt a more conventional approach. The differ-
ence between features of the circumstances and features of White’s death are,
I suggest, to be explained by their relative salience.
The view that it is conventional matters which distinguish causal conditions
and primary causes has a long tradition.12 One example is Mackie (1955) who
argues that a conventional approach is required to capture ordinary talk about
causation:
in determining responsibility we do not choose the causal field [i.e., the set of
conditions which are jointly sufficient for an effect] quite arbitrarily; our choice
is determined by our moral expectations, our views about what is normal and
proper (Mackie 1955, p. 145).
This view is also present in Mackie (1980) where he, in opposition to the
view of Hart & Honoré (1985), argues that “there is a single basic concept of
causing to which various frills are added” (Mackie 1980, p. 117). This basic
concept is of course his analysis of causation in terms of INUS-conditions.
The “frills” which can be added to this core are necessary in order to distin-
guish between primary causes and causal conditions for example. More re-
cently, Paul (1998) and Lewis (2000) both suggest similar views where causa-
11 See also Paul (1998) for further arguments against excluding so-called “hasteners”.
12 The view is often attributed to Mill who in A System of Logic (Bk. III, ch. 5, sect. 3) finds
no real distinction between causes and conditions. I will not enter into any historical debate
regarding how far back this view goes, though I think there is reason to go at least as far back
as Hume. See Mackie (1980, chs. 1–2).
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tion is analysed in terms of counterfactual dependence but where conventions
and salience can play a role to explain why we tend to treat some features of
White’s death as relevant and some not.
Among these views it is common to identify the primary cause of an effect
with the most salient cause in the circumstances. For example, if I light a
match and there is an explosion, then whether I caused the explosion depends
on whether my act was salient in the circumstances. If I struck the match
while at a gas-station then my act would be the primary cause since in such
circumstances the presence of inflammable gasses are quite normal. However,
if I struck the match while at home, and there was an explosion, then it would
be the presence of inflammable gasses rather than my act which would be
salient.
Note however that using salience in this way to distinguish between causes
and conditions does not help us explain why dying in the sun is not a way in
which White dies. In fact, the cause of “White dies in the sun” might be very
salient in the circumstances.13 If salience is to help us distinguish between the
ways of an effect such as White’s death on the one hand and features of the
situation on the other then it is the salience of these features, not the salience
of their causes, which is relevant.
We should therefore expect the relative salience of a feature to depend on
a number of factors, many which are conventional in nature. One such factor
is the one pointed out by Mackie in the quote above. Whether dying in the
shade is a way in which a particular death occurs or whether it is a feature
of the circumstances depends on whether dying in the shade is perceived as
normal or abnormal in the circumstances. Dying in the shade is under most
circumstances not a very salient feature because dying in the shade is typically
no more abnormal than dying in the sun.14
A further factor which contributes to the salience of a feature is the differ-
ence this feature makes to the effect in question. For example, dying a year
later than one would otherwise have done is more salient than dying a second
later because the former makes a greater difference to the death than the latter.
The salience of a feature can also depend on general causal correlations. If
there is a causal correlation between the way in which an effect occurs and
the effect itself, then this correlation contributes to the salience of the way in
question. For example, there is for normal human beings no general causal
correlation between being in the sun and dying. However, there is a general
causal correlation between being hit by a bullet and dying from a bullet.15
13 Suppose White dies at night, but someone has arranged a giant mirror in space which reflects
sunlight to White.
14 If I am allowed a fantastic example, a case where dying in the sun is not a normal feature of a
death is when the victim is a vampire.
15 General causal correlations are of course compatible with there being exceptions when it
comes to particular causal relations. For instance, it is a general causal correlation that smok-
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This lack of correlation makes dying in the sun a less salient feature than
dying from a bullet.
With the notion of salience we can formulate a third version of the
Difference-Making View:
The Difference-Making View-3: an act, φ , is responsible for a state of affairs,
S, if and only if, if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained
at all, or would have obtained in a different way which would be salient in the
circumstances.
With this view one can argue that Black is not responsible for White’s death
in Pre-Emption in the following way. Black’s poisoning does not make a dif-
ference to whether White’s death occurs, and it makes no difference to the
way in which White’s death occurs, so he cannot be responsible. Orange, on
the other hand, is responsible for White’s death because making White’s death
occur earlier is a salient feature in the circumstances. This verdict, as I claimed
above, is acceptable.
In Overdetermination we can in a similar way claim that both Black and
Orange make a salient difference to the way in which White’s death occurs.
Had Black not fired his gun then White would have died only from one bullet
rather than two, and the number of bullets which hit White is salient in these
circumstances.
It could be objected however that if, as I just suggested, Black and Orange
are responsible for White’s death in Overdetermination then we cannot at the
same time say that Brown would not be responsible for the 1000 deaths if he
joins group A in the Death Squads. If the difference Black and Orange make
in Overdetermination is salient, then the difference Brown makes in the Death
Squads should also be salient. This would make the Difference-Making View-
3 more similar to the collective version which I rejected above.
Suppose we grant that the two examples, the Death Squads and Overdeter-
mination, are sufficiently similar and that Brown would do harm if he were to
join group A in the Death Squads. The individual approach still has a distinct
advantage over the collective approach here because we can say that there is a
difference in the degree of responsibility between joining group A and group
B in the Death Squads. This becomes clear if we consider the salience of the
difference Brown’s choice makes. If he joins group A then the difference he
makes will not be very salient compared to the difference he would make were
he to join B. If he were to join B then he would make a difference to whether
the effect occurs at all, but if he joins A then he only makes a difference to the
way in which 1000 deaths occur. We can therefore claim that Brown would
do less harm by joining A because the difference he makes is smaller.
ing causes cancer. However, this general correlation can hold even if particular instances of
smoking does not lead to cancer.
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Note that I am not suggesting that Brown would only be responsible for the
difference he makes in these cases. Applied to Overdetermination that view
would have the unintuitive consequence of making neither Black nor Orange
responsible for White’s death, strictly speaking. What I am suggesting is that
responsibility is not an all or nothing matter but rather a matter of degrees. The
claim is that Brown would be less responsible for the outcome, 1000 deaths,
if he joins A than he would be for the outcome, ten deaths, if he joins B and
that the degree of harm he does should be adjusted accordingly.16
An explanation of this kind is not available to the collective approach. On
the collective approach there is no way of distinguishing between different
degrees of responsibility based on different degrees of contribution. If Brown
is responsible for 1000 deaths if he joins A because of his membership in a
set which has certain properties, then there is no ground for holding him more
or less responsible for that outcome than other members of this set, even if
there is a clear intuitive difference in the degree of individual contribution to
the outcome. The individual approach therefore has a clear advantage over the
collective approach in this respect, despite having similar consequences in a
case like the Death Squads.17
The Difference-Making View-3 captures the plausible claim that responsi-
bility is a matter of making a difference. It is also more plausible than the
collective approach regarding Overdetermination, Pre-Emption and the Death
Squads. Assuming this view, the third condition in the basic structure can
therefore be replaced with:
(3*) if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained at all, or
would have obtained in a different way which would be salient in the circum-
stances.
This analysis of responsibility is similar in some ways to the Counterfactual
Condition from chapters one and two. Before proceeding to discuss an alterna-
tive analysis of responsibility it is therefore necessary to consider the relation
between the Difference-Making View and the Counterfactual Condition.
16 See Roemer (1993) for an alternative theory of responsibility which allows for degrees. How-
ever, Roemer’s notion of responsibility differs slightly from mine and it is therefore unclear to
what extent my view conflicts with his.
17 See Schaffer (2003) for a similar argument. According to Schaffer, the collective approach
to Overdetermination fails because it “cannot offer a stable account of the causal contribution
of individual overdeterminers” (Schaffer 2003, p. 38). The problem, according to Schaffer,
is that the collective approach should grant that individual overdeterminers cause something.
Otherwise the approach would be, he claims, “vastly implausible”. However, with such an
account of the causal powers of individual overdeterminers the collective approach turns out to
be just a version of individualism.
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5.1.2 Counterfactual dependence and the Counterfactual
Condition
In chapter two I argued that we should reject the following condition:
The Weak Counterfactual Condition: An act harms a person only if that person
is worse off than she would have been had the act not been performed.
The main reason was that the Weak Counterfactual Condition rules out that
Black and Orange harm White in Overdetermination, and that Orange harms
White in Pre-Emption. But, if the Weak Counterfactual Condition can be de-
fended on similar grounds as those use to defend the Difference-Making View
then we would have to reconsider the rejection of the Weak Counterfactual
Condition.
First, it should be clear that the Weak Counterfactual Condition and the
Difference-Making View are two distinct views about the necessary condi-
tions for doing harm. Different-number cases can be used to illustrate the dif-
ference. Consider the case with the young girl. Suppose the girl does not wait,
that is, she has a child while young and the child gets a “bad start” in life. The
Counterfactual Condition, on any version which I considered in chapter two,
is clearly not satisfied in this case. The child is not worse off than she would
otherwise have been because her life is, despite the bad start, worth living.
However, it is equally clear that the child’s bad start in life is counterfactu-
ally dependent on the girl’s choice: if the girl were to postpone her pregnancy
then the bad start in life would not obtain. The Difference-Making view does
therefore not imply the Weak Counterfactual Condition.18
Turning to the question whether the Weak Counterfactual Condition can be
defended on similar grounds as I have defended the Difference-Making View
the answer must be “no”. It is plausible given the Difference-Making View
that Black and Orange are responsible for White’s death in Overdetermination
because the way in which White’s death occurs depends on their acts. But,
this dependence does not help the Counterfactual Condition. Even if it is true
that White’s death would not have occurred in the same way, had not Black
acted as she did, it is still the case that White’s death would have occurred.
It is therefore still false that White would have been better off had Black (or
Orange) not acted as he did. Even though White’s death would have occurred
in a different way had Black not acted as he did, this difference would not
make White any better off. The difference in the way in which White’s death
occurs does not mark a difference in the value of White’s death for White. This
shows that the individual approach is not available to the Weak Counterfactual
Condition as a solution to Pre-Emption and Overdetermination.
In very general terms, the problem for the Weak Counterfactual Condition
with respect to Overdetermination can be summed up as follows. Suppose
18 This point is also made by Hanser (1990).
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that we have a theory of responsibility which solves the problem of Overde-
termination and Pre-Emption. That is, the theory implies, among other things,
that Black and Orange are responsible for White’s death in Overdetermina-
tion. However, this theory of responsibility does not change the fact that it is
still false that White is worse off than she would have been had Black not done
what he did. Solving the problem of Overdetermination for the Counterfactual
Condition is therefore distinct from solving the same problem for responsibil-
ity, and successfully doing the latter will not, ipso facto, lead to successfully
doing the former.
5.2 Responsibility and causality
Responsibility, I have suggested, should be understood in terms of counter-
factual dependence. In doing so I have drawn on refinements to the simple
counterfactual analysis of causation and adapted those to an analysis of re-
sponsibility, for example, the idea that an act can be responsible for an ef-
fect if it makes a difference to the way a state of affairs would obtain. I also
claimed that general causal correlations are relevant to the notion of salience
which played a central part in distinguishing the individual from the collective
approach. It might be wondered however whether this analysis of responsibil-
ity is in fact parasitic on the analysis of causation in terms of counterfactual
dependence. That is, perhaps a less committing though just as plausible view
would be to say that an act φ is responsible for a state of affairs S if and only
if φ causes S to obtain. On this view, we can leave questions of causality to
metaphysics and go with an intuitive, common-sense understanding of causal-
ity. Call this view the Causal View.19
The main advantages with the Causal View are methodological. First, it
is a simple view. Leaving causality unanalysed allows for less complicated
analyses of harm. Second, on the Causal View we can, at least in the present
context, ignore problematic cases like Pre-Emption and Overdetermination.
This would allow us to focus on what is really problematic about, for example,
same-number cases like the young girls’ choice. What is problematic about the
Non-Identity Problem is not whether we are responsible for harmful effects in
the future but whether one can do harm to a person if one could not have made
that person better off. As the case of the young girl illustrates, everyone in the
19 See Hart & Honoré (1985). They argue that questions of responsibility in the law are ques-
tions of causality, and criticise the “minimalists” who “allot only a minor role to causal issues
in determining questions of legal responsibility, and who for the most part hold that the only
genuine causal issue is that of sine qua non” (Hart & Honoré 1985, p. lxvii). The Causal View
also seems to be assumed by Mackie (1955). More recently the Causal View has been en-
dorsed (though not explicitly defended) by Harman (2009). Braham & van Hees (2012, p. 605)
suggests a more modest view where causation is necessary for responsibility. As I will argue
shortly, we should not even accept this more modest claim.
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debate can agree that she causes her child to have “a bad start in life” but this
does not settle the question whether she harms her child.
Of course, the Causal View need not rule out an analysis of causation in
terms of counterfactual dependence. When we look for the causes of an effect
one natural way to do this is by considering what the effect depended on. This
dependency, furthermore, is usually thought of as counterfactual: an act causes
at least those effects which would not have occurred had the act not been
performed. It is therefore entirely possible to endorse the Causal View and a
counterfactual analysis of causation, in which case the difference between the
Causal View and the Difference-Making View would be small.
Because the Causal View is compatible with the Difference-Making View it
might be wondered whether there is anything substantial at stake here or if the
dispute is a mere terminological quibble. In order to bring out the distinctive
claim which the Causal View is committed to, let us first note that it is uncon-
troversial that causation and responsibility are both dependence-relations. To
say that c causes e is to say that e depends, in some way, on c. Likewise, to say
that an act is responsible for an effect is to say that the effect depends, in some
way, on the performance of the act. What is distinctive of the Causal View is
that according to this view it is the same dependence involved in both cau-
sation and responsibility. However, before accepting the Causal View’s claim
that these relations are the same, we should consider non-causal dependence-
relations and how they relate to responsibility.
For example, consider constitution. If x constitutes y, then y depends on x
in a non-causal way. Suppose now that the performance of an act constitutes
a harmful state of affairs. Examples where an act could constitute a harmful
state of affairs are various forms of discrimination and oppression. A par-
ticular act of discrimination, such as refusing a red-headed customer, could
on some views at least be a case of harming the customer.20 In such cases, the
negative “effect” (the fact that one is subjected to discrimination) is not caused
by any individual act but it is constituted by it, so according to the Causal View
discrimination as such seems to be relatively harmless. However, what is rel-
evant to responsibility in such a case seems to be whether the state of affairs
depends on the performance on the act. Whether this dependence is causal
or not is quite beside the point. The Causal View therefore seems to be too
narrow.21 What we should say is that responsibility is often, but not necessar-
ily, causal. Causality can also be relevant to responsibility in other ways. As
was suggested above for example, “salience” should be characterised partly in
terms of causal relations.
20 Alternatively, it could be suggested that the discrimination is not constituted by the act alone
but by a number of similar acts. In such cases, a particular instance of discrimination would
partly constitute a (possibly) harmful state of affairs.
21 This also shows that it is not a plausible option for a defender of the Causal View to claim that
causality should replace talk of responsibility, rather than serve as an analysis of responsibility.
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Insisting that the state must depend counterfactually on the performance of
the act might be accused of begging the question against the Causal View. It
would at any rate strengthen the case against the Causal View if there were
examples of properties which causality is typically thought to have but which
responsibility is typically thought to lack, or vice versa.22
Here there are two properties in particular worth noting.
First, singular causal relations are usually thought to bear some relation to
general causal relations, or laws. This is a feature of causal relations which
distinguishes them from other dependencies, such as mere correlation for ex-
ample. However, responsibility does not seem to require that the dependency
is general or law-like. Rather, what´matters to responsibility is that a particu-
lar effect depends on a particular act. Consider again constitution. That a state
of affairs is constituted by an act seems to be enough for us to say that the
act is responsible for the state of affairs. Whether this dependence is general,
and whether the state of affairs would depend on the act under other circum-
stances, is beside the point.
Second, causality is usually thought to be a transitive relation: if c causes e
and e causes f , then c causes f .23 Responsibility, however, is not transitive. An
example where responsibility appears to be transitive is the sequence of events
connecting Black’s pulling the trigger and White’s death. Black is responsible
for pulling the trigger, and the pulling of the trigger is responsible for the gun
firing and so on up to White’s death. In such cases, responsibility and causality
seem to coincide.
However, there are plausible counterexamples to the transitivity of respon-
sibility. One example are cases where one of the intermediate events is another
person’s act. Suppose that Purple is responsible for Black’s firing of the gun.
Perhaps he pointed out White’s whereabouts to Black, or perhaps he sold the
weapon to Black. Then we would, typically at least, hold Black and not Purple
responsible for White’s death. In this case it seems reasonable to say that Pur-
ple caused, or was at least a partial cause, of White’s death. But, even though
Purple is responsible, at least to an extent, for Black firing his gun and Black
is responsible for White’s death, we would not say that Purple is responsible
for White’s death.
That responsibility can fail to be transitive might seem to be a problem for
an analysis of responsibility in terms of counterfactual dependence as well.
Here there are two points to keep in mind. First, counterfactual dependence
22 There might of course be other restrictions on responsibility which are similar to popular
restrictions on causality. For example, causation is directed forwards in time (there is no back-
wards causation) and this is also true of responsibility, at least in the sense discussed here.
However, it is enough to show that causation and responsibility differ with respect to some
properties for the Causal View to fail.
23 The transitivity of causation is not completely uncontroversial, though it is a common desider-
atum for analyses of causation. See for example Hall (2000) and Paul (2000).
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is not transitive.24 Second, simple counterfactual dependence as a theory of
responsibility is clearly implausible. In order to solve cases like Overdeter-
mination and Pre-Emption we need a more refined theory, for example the
Difference-Making View-3. But, this more refined theory can fail to be transi-
tive for other reasons which do not have to do with the counterfactual. It does
not follow, for example, that if Purple makes a salient difference to the way
in which Black performs his act, then he also makes a salient difference to
White’s death.
Causation is therefore neither necessary nor sufficient for responsibility. It
is not necessary because, as the examples of non-causal dependence-relations
show, responsibility need not be “law-like” in the way which causal relations
are usually thought to be. Causation is not sufficient because causation is tran-
sitive while responsibility is not.25
5.3 Summary
I have argued that the third condition in the basic structure, the “responsibility
condition”, should be analysed in terms of counterfactual dependence:
(3*) if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained at all, or
would have obtained in a different way which is salient in the circumstances.
Analyses of responsibility in terms of counterfactual dependence faces sev-
eral well known problems, most notably Overdetermination and Pre-Emption.
I have argued that analysing responsibility in terms of counterfactual depen-
dence, more precisely (3*), has acceptable consequences in these cases. Ac-
cording to this view it is not the case that Black is responsible for White’s
death in Pre-Emption because the effects of his act are never realised. Orange,
on the other hand, is responsible for White’s death. This, I have claimed, is an
acceptable result. In Overdetermination we can claim that both Black and Or-
ange are responsible for White’s death because they make a difference to the
way in which White dies. The difference they make is also salient in the cir-
cumstances which explains why they are responsible while other agents, who
make non-salient differences to White’s death such as whether he dies in the
shade or not, are not responsible. I have also argued that though (3*) is similar
to the Counterfactual Condition from chapter two, it is nevertheless a distinct
view and that the Counterfactual Condition does not follow from taking (3*)
to be necessary and sufficient for responsibility.
24 See Lewis (1973b, pp. 32–35).
25 A different argument against the Causal View has been offered by Sartorio (2004). Sartorio
argues, in short, that when several acts are necessary for an outcome we should say that each
individual act is responsible for the outcome but that none of the acts cause the outcome.
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Finally, I argued that we should reject the otherwise simpler view that to be
responsible for a state of affairs simply is to cause it to obtain. I argued that
responsibility and causality differ because there are non-causal dependence
relations which are cases of responsibility and because causality is transitive
while responsibility is not.
This chapter concludes the characterisation of the basic structure of harm.
In the next chapter I will consider whether a complete analysis requires the
addition of further conditions or if we should claim that the conditions in
the basic structure are not only necessary but also jointly sufficient for doing
harm.
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6. Further conditions
In the last two chapters I have been developing an analysis of harm which
takes the basic structure as its starting point. The view I have been arguing for
so far can be summed up as follows:
a harms b only if
(1) a performs an act, φ ,
(2*) b is in a state S such that b’s life is worse, taking S into account, than b’s
life not taking S into account.
(3*) if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained at all, or
would have obtained in a different way which is salient in the circumstances.
So far I have only taken these three conditions to be necessary for doing harm.
In this chapter I will argue that we should endorse a Minimalist View about
harm which holds that (1), (2*) and (3*) are also jointly sufficient. This view
is “minimalist” in the sense that it includes the three conditions from the basic
structure but no further conditions.
The way I will proceed is as follows. First, according to the Minimalist
View, doing harm consist only in an act being performed, the obtaining of a
certain type of state of affairs (a “harmful state of affairs”) and the obtaining of
the proper relation between the act and the state of affairs. However, there are
cases which seem to suggest that this view is too wide and that the Minimalist
View has to be complemented with some further condition. I will argue that
while some examples suggest that we should make the analysis more narrow
by adding further conditions, doing so would not be an overall improvement
on the view (sections 1 and 2). The examples which seem to indicate a need
for further conditions only support the conclusion that there are factors other
than harm which may be important to the moral assessment of a person’s act,
but these further conditions should not be included in an analysis of harm.
Second, I will consider the objection that the Minimalist View is too far
removed from common sense in order to serve as an analysis of harm. I will
argue that while the Minimalist View departs from common sense in certain
respects, this can be explained if we consider that common sense usually does
not distinguish between different senses of harm (section 3). Because the Min-
imalist View is intended to be an analysis of harm in a rather specific sense it
is not a fault of the analysis that it does not capture other senses of harm.
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6.1 Intention and foresight
One suggestion is that we should include a condition pertaining to the agent’s
intentions. Consider, again, the following case from chapter two:
Surgery. Black saves White’s life by amputating White’s leg. White suffers
intense pain but had Black not amputated the leg then White would have died.
In cases like Surgery the Minimalist View seems to depart from common
sense. The pain which White suffers is plausibly something which makes
White’s life go worse, so it satisfies (2*). The pain is also a state of affairs
which is counterfactually dependent on the surgery being performed, so (3*)
is also satisfied. Black would therefore harm White by performing the ampu-
tation. But, according to common sense we would not typically say that Black
harms White in a case like surgery.
Another example where the Minimalist View departs from common sense
is where a state of affairs depends counterfactually on an act but where we
would not say that the act is responsible for the state. For example, every
person’s death depends counterfactually on his or her birth. But, we would
not say that parents are responsible for their children’s death by conceiving
them even though a child’s death would not have occurred had she not been
conceived.
Adding an intention-condition promises to lessen these counter-intuitive
implications by saying that an act is responsible for a state of affairs only
if the agent intends the state of affairs. In Surgery it could then be argued that
whether Black harms White depends on whether Black intends the pain or
if he intends to save White’s life. Suppose that Black only intended to cause
White pain but that, unknown to Black, he actually saved White’s life by per-
forming the amputation. In that case it seems more plausible to say that Black
harms White. However, this conclusion is not as plausible if the purpose of the
amputation is to save White’s life. Including an intent-condition would allow
us to explain the intuitive difference between these two versions of the Surgery
case. Similarly, a couple’s choice to have a child is only responsible for the
child’s death if the purpose of the decision is the child’s death. Normally this
is not the case.
Examples like these seem to favour adding an intent-condition to the Min-
imalist View. However, including an intent-condition would make the analy-
sis too narrow. For example, the current emission of greenhouse gasses con-
tributes to global warming and will most likely result in a lot of harm due
to flooding, malnutrition and disease. This, it seems, is a paradigmatic exam-
ple of harm being done to future generations. However, these states of affairs
are not the intended effects of the emissions but are merely unintended side-
effects. Including an intent-condition would however imply that the emission
of greenhouse gasses does not harm future generations. Perhaps it could be ar-
gued that global warming will not in fact harm future generations in a morally
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relevant sense but that it is nonetheless wrong for other reasons. The claim that
global warming would not harm future generations is perhaps only counter-
intuitive if it also follows that there is nothing morally objectionable about
global warming.
As I argued in chapter one regarding other person-affecting approaches to
the non-identity problem, this reply is not very promising. It might be the case
that some obligations to future generations are not “harm-based” but it does
not seem plausible that the harm global warming will bring about is not of
the morally relevant kind. After all, the effects of global warming on future
generations are paradigmatic examples of harm.
We should also be sceptical about the examples meant to support including
an intent-condition because these examples fail to show that intentions are
relevant to harm. In Surgery, for example, the reason it seems counter-intuitive
to say that there is harm done is because it is easy to think that if an act
does harm then there is a serious objection to performing it. However, recall
that my aim is to analyse harm as it occurs in the Harm Principle. Saying
that amputating would do harm only implies that there is a reason against
performing the amputation but nothing about the seriousness of this objection,
or whether the person performing the amputation should be blamed for what
she does, follows from the claim that there is a reason against performing the
amputation. As the Harm Principle was formulated, the only thing that follows
from that an act would do harm is that there is a reason against performing the
act. This is, it seems to me, compatible with our intuitions about a case like
Surgery. While it might be odd to say that one does harm by amputating, the
important claim is rather that it is permissible to perform the amputation and
that the person cannot be blamed for performing the amputation. Both these
claims are compatible with an analysis of harm which does not include an
intent-condition. What the Surgery case shows is, at most, that intentions are
morally relevant in some way but leaves it open exactly how.1
It might be granted that harm is done in cases like Surgery but that we
should add some condition in order to exclude cases where the effect is too
remotely connected with the act in order for the act to be responsible for it.
Adding to the Minimalist View that an act harms a person only if the state of
affairs which the act is responsible for is foreseen by the agent would exclude
such cases. This constraint might seem especially attractive since I have ar-
gued that responsibility should be analysed in terms of counterfactual depen-
dence. Without some constraint on this relation states of affairs which would
obtain in the far future could determine whether some choice made today does
harm. This, it could be argued, is unreasonable unless it is at least possible at
the present to estimate whether these effects in the far future will obtain or
not.
1 See for example Scanlon (2008). Scanlon suggests that intentions can be relevant either when
one tries to figure out the likely consequences of an act or for determining the “meaning” of an
act.
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Including a foresight-condition would seem to accomplish similar things
which the intent-condition was meant to accomplish while avoiding some of
the problems of the intent-condition. For example, the foresight condition does
not imply, as the intent-condition did, that there is no harm being done by
global warming. But, it still exclude cases where an effect is brought about
due to very unlikely circumstances or “freak accidents”.
However, if the point of including a foresight-condition is to narrow down
the scope of what an act is responsible for then it would not be enough. Take
the case of my death being counterfactually dependent on my birth. Parents
can surely foresee that their children will, sooner or later, die so the foresight
condition would be satisfied in this case. It might be objected that it is not
possible to foresee a person’s particular death, that person’s death as it will
actually occur, at the time of conception. This is sometime true2 but relying
on this reply would undo the advantage which the foresight-condition had
with respect to global warming. We cannot foresee the particular harms which
global warming will produce, only that global warming will produce harms of
a certain kind to someone in the future.
That the foresight-condition would still be too wide for common sense is of
course not a conclusive reason not to include it in an analysis of harm. What
it shows is that it does not do what its proponents want it to do. However, the
foresight-condition would also make the analysis of harm too narrow because
it would make doing harm dependent on the beliefs of the agent. What an
agent can foresee in a given situation depends on her beliefs about the situation
and the effects of her act. But, we tend to think that an act is responsible for
effects which could be foreseen given the facts rather than the agents’ beliefs
about the facts.3 For example, if Black points a gun at White and pulls the
trigger, then we would hold Black responsible for White’s death even if Black
believes that White would not die from a bullet because God (or some other
powerful entity) would never allow it. Black need not even have these odd
beliefs. We would typically hold Black responsible for the effects of firing a
loaded gun even in a case where Black lacks a belief about the effects of this
act. But the fact that Black in this case cannot foresee that White would die is
not a good reason for saying that Black is not responsible for White’s death,
nor that Black does not harm White.
A proponent of the foresight condition might suggest that the condition
should obviously be formulated in terms of what could reasonably be foreseen
in a given situation. She might agree that taking what people actually are able
to foresee would make the condition too narrow. However, it seems fair to ask
of the proponent of this revised version of the foresight-condition to spell out
2 It is possible to foresee a person’s death in cases where the person is born with a terminal
illness, for example.
3 Recall that the use of responsibility which is relevant here is not the one which is used when
we “hold a person” responsible. In my use of the term, acts (or more generally, events) are
responsible for effects in the sense that the effect can be attributed to the act.
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what “reasonable” means in this context. This will, probably, involve some
claims about what the agent should be able to foresee. On this version of the
foresight-condition, whether a state of affairs can be foreseen is not limited to
the epistemic situation of a particular agent. White’s death can reasonably be
foreseen if Black fires a loaded gun at her, even though Black does not have
immediate access to this fact, or other facts which would allow him to realise
this.
But, modifying the foresight condition in this way makes it unclear whether
the reference to what the agent can reasonably foresee matters at all. What the
foresight-condition amounts to on this revised version is that the effects must
be “foreseeable”, though not necessarily by the agent. The epistemic situation
of the agent seems to drop out almost entirely. Of course, this is not to say
that whether White’s death is foreseeable might depend on features of the
situation. However, whether Black should be able to foresee White’s death or
not can not depend on what Black’s actual beliefs about the situation are.
Perhaps this is just what the proponent of the revised foresight-condition
was after when formulating the condition. Nevertheless, the condition in its
revised form would still be too narrow. Consider the following example from
Jackson (1991, pp. 462–3):
Dangerous Drugs. Green, a physician, has to decide which drug to administer
to her patient. She has three drugs to choose from: A, B and C. After consulting
all the available evidence she knows for certain that A will result in a partial
cure. She also knows that one of B and C will result in a complete cure while the
other will result in the patient’s death, but she does not know which is which.
The general consensus regarding Dangerous Drugs is that objectively Green
ought to administer the drug which will result in a complete cure (B or C) and
subjectively she ought to administer A. It is then often claimed that the case
shows that what Green ought to do, full stop, is the same as what she ought
subjectively to do (administer drug A). It might therefore seem that this case
should only strengthen the case in favour of the foresight-condition since the
foresight-condition is also subjective in character. However, on closer exami-
nation we can see that the opposite is in fact the case. Consider what we would
say about Dangerous Drugs if we ask what Green ought to do if she wants to
minimise harm. If we add the foresight-condition to the Minimalist View we
can then say the following: Green’s choice to administer drug A would be re-
sponsible for the partial cure because it can reasonably be foreseen what the
effects of administering this drug will be. The choice to administer drug B
(or C) would not be responsible for the effects of this choice because it is not
possible to foresee whether administering drug B (or C) would result in a com-
plete cure or the patient’s death. If she were to administer drug B, say, and this
would result in the patient’s death, the foresight-condition would rule out that
Green has harmed her patient, but this seems clearly wrong. There should be
no doubt that Green would harm her patient if she administers the drug which
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leads to the patient’s death, even though she cannot reasonably foresee which
drug has this effect.
A more modest version of both the intent- and foresight-conditions would
be to say that, other things being equal, it is worse to do harm if one intends
(foresees) the harm than to merely do harm without intending (foreseeing) it.
However, note that this more modest version does not support the intuitions
which motivated the intent- and foresight-condition in the first place. The
more modest version implies that Black harms White in Surgery for exam-
ple and that parents routinely harm their children because they are responsible
for their children’s deaths.
Still, it might be argued that the modest version of the intent- or foresight-
condition captures the plausible claim that there is a morally relevant differ-
ence between a case where a bad state of affairs is intended (foreseen) and
one where it is not. But, this intuition only supports that intentions (foresight)
matters to right, wrong and permissibility, not the claim that the act where the
state of affairs is unintended is less harmful.
One example of a view which places a certain weight on intentions and
foresight is the so-called “doctrine of double effect”. According to this doc-
trine there is a morally relevant difference between intending harm as a means
to an end and merely foreseeing that doing harm is necessary to achieve an
end. In the former case there is a reason against doing harm while in the latter
it is permissible to do harm. Note however that the doctrine of double effect is
ultimately a claim about permissibility and the moral relevance of harm, not
about the relevance of intentions or foresight to an analysis of doing harm.4
Adding either the intent-condition or the foresight-condition in their modest
forms to the Minimalist View therefore seems like a rather desperate attempt
to make any difference in the moral status of an act depend on a difference in
the degree of harm done, something which we cannot assume to be true.
6.2 Consent
Another condition which has been suggested is that an act harms a person only
if the person has not given her consent to the act being performed.5 Consider
the Surgery case once again. It might seem plausible to say that performing
the amputation would not be to do harm because the patient would consent
to the amputation being performed. Cases of self-inflicted injuries or misfor-
4 There are further differences between the doctrine of double effect as it is usually understood
and the the two conditions which I have been arguing against in this chapter. For example, the
doctrine is usually only thought to apply if the intended end is good. The intent-condition places
no such restrictions on the value of the end. According to the intent-condition, if an effect is not
intended then an act which is responsible for the effect does not no harm. See also McIntyre
(2001) and Scanlon (2008).
5 See for example Feinberg (1987, pp. 35, 215).
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tunes might also be a reason to include this condition. Some people have the
intuition that there is a difference between a smoker who gets lung cancer be-
cause of her habit and a non-smoker who gets lung cancer as a consequence of
working in a an environment where smoking is allowed. This intuition could
be explained by the relevance of consent to harming. The smoker does not
harm herself because she exposes herself to smoke willingly, i.e., she has
given her consent. In the latter case it could be claimed that the person is
harmed because being exposed to smoke, and the related risk of lung cancer,
is not something she has given her consent to. Finally, certain cases of bad
luck also support including a consent condition. If an act is expected to have
a beneficial effect but misfires, and a person suffers a harmful effect as a re-
sult, then it might be claimed that the act does no harm. In such cases where
the harmful effect is simply due to bad luck then a consent condition would
rule out that there has been harm done because of the victim’s consent to the
performance of the act.
There are several ways to formulate such a consent-condition. Here it is
common to distinguish between actual and hypothetical consent. In terms of
actual consent, the condition says that an act does not harm a person if the
person has, as a matter of fact, given her consent to the act being performed.
The hypothetical version, on the other hand, says that an act does not harm a
person if the person would, under some suitable circumstances, give her con-
sent to the act being performed. Of these two the hypothetical version seems
far more plausible. It is for example unclear why actual consent would mat-
ter because people may be badly misinformed about what the consequences
of an act would be. Also, the actual version makes a distinction where there
does not seem to be a difference. The actual version implies, for example,
that there is a difference between performing life saving surgery on an uncon-
scious patient and a conscious one but this seems to be quite irrelevant. The
hypothetical view is not vulnerable to such counterexamples and is therefore
more plausible than the actual view.6
A condition in terms of hypothetical consent would however make the anal-
ysis too narrow. Consider what the hypothetical consent-condition would im-
ply with respect to the non-identity problem for example. In the non-identity
problem it is assumed that future people would have lives that are well worth
living. Given this, would they consent to being brought into existence, even
if this meant being born with a “bad start in life”? Because the alternative is
6 What about actual, informed consent? That is, should we say that it is actual consent that
matters, but only when it is informed? This version of the consent-condition would be slightly
more plausible than the simple actual version, but not much. The main problem for this version
of the condition is that people can consent, or withhold their consent, for irrelevant reasons. For
example, a worker in an environment where smoking is allowed might be well informed and
might wish that smoking was not allowed but might still give her consent because she wants to
remain employed. In such cases, consent is given but for reasons which are clearly irrelevant to
whether the person has been harmed.
125
non-existence these people would have strong reasons based on self-interest
for giving their consent. It might be objected that they would also have reasons
based on moral principles for not giving their consent. However, if their ob-
jection is based on a moral principle which does not allow them to be brought
into existence then their consent becomes redundant. In that case it is the prin-
ciple, not their consent, which does the work since the moral principle would
apply to us as well.
It might be suggested that the absence of consent is not necessary for harm
but that it only modifies the degree of harm: a person who consents (or would
consent) to an act suffers a lesser harm than a person who does not, other
things being equal. It should be noted right away that this new version can
not be used to capture the intuitions mentioned above, but some still find it
plausible that there is a connection between harm and consent.7 For example,
this view could perhaps still account for the intuition that, in general, self-
imposed harms carry less moral weight than harm done to other people.
In the previous section I argued against including similar versions of the
intent- and foresight-condition and the same point can be made against this
version of the consent condition. Because this new version of the consent-
condition does not capture the intuitions above, adding the new version to the
Minimalist View seems to be an unwarranted attempt to include in an analysis
of harm every consideration which seems to be relevant to the permissibility
of an act.
We should also be sceptical about the intuitions which seem to support in-
cluding a consent condition in the first place. It is not evident that they sup-
port the claim that consent, whether hypothetical or actual, matters in itself
or whether consent is merely indicative of there being further relevant factors.
For example, people tend to act with an eye to their own well-being and to
avoid harm. In so far as a person perceives a situation correctly we can there-
fore expect her to consent to acts which will not harm her, at least all things
considered. This alternative explanation of the intuitions which appear to sup-
port a consent-condition also strikes against the hypothetical version of the
consent-condition. The reason we should not take ill-informed consent into
account has nothing to do with the consent as such. Rather, the reason it is
in practice a good idea to take informed consent into account is because in-
formed consent indicates that there are further factors which are relevant to
whether an act is permissible or not without being such a factor itself.
6.3 Without further conditions
So far I have argued that we should not add any conditions pertaining to inten-
tions, foresight or consent to the Minimalist View. That is, we should accept
the Minimalist View of harm:
7 See for example Harman (1981, p. 293) and Shiffrin (1999, p. 130)).
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a harms b if and only if
(1) a performs an act, φ ,
(2*): b is in a state S such that b’s life is worse, taking S into account, than b’s
life not taking S into account.
(3*) if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained at all, or
would have obtained in a different way which is salient in the circumstances.
In chapter one I introduced three desiderata which an analysis of harm should
satisfy. It should solve the non-identity problem, be compatible with the no-
difference view and be intuitively acceptable. The Minimalist View of harm
fares well with respect to the first two of these desiderata. First, in the case of
the young girl it follows that she would harm her child if she does not postpone
her pregnancy, provided that “a bad start in life” satisfies (2*). This proviso
is clearly fulfilled because we should understand “a bad start in life” to mean
at least that the life is worse for the person, taking the bad start into account,
than not taking the bad start into account.
Second, the analysis is consistent with the no-difference view. The two
medical programmes would be equally worthwhile because they would both
prevent an equal amount of harm, again provided that the handicaps which
the programmes would prevent satisfy (2*). Note however that because the
handicaps in the example are supposed to be qualitatively identical there is no
reason to think that one condition would satisfy (2*) while the other would
not. That is, either both prevent harm or neither does. This is perfectly consis-
tent with the no-difference view and merely reveals that the exact implications
of the analysis will depend on what theory of well-being is “plugged in”.
Regarding the third desideratum, that an analysis of harm should be intu-
itively acceptable, it must be granted that the Minimalist View amounts to a
wider notion of harm than is commonly accepted. The reasons for including
further conditions, and thereby making the analysis more narrow, are as I have
argued above not very compelling.
An objection at this point is that my view makes harm so far removed from
the ordinary usage of the term that it does not qualify as an analysis of harm in
any sense that matters. The conclusion that we should not add any further con-
ditions to (1)-(3*) does not in itself show that we should endorse the Minimal-
ist View, that is, that these conditions are necessary and jointly sufficient. An
alternative conclusion would be that harm is a heterogeneous concept which
it is not possible to give necessary and sufficient conditions for. The upshot of
this objection is that we should abandon harm as a morally relevant notion.
In the remainder of this chapter I will consider a version of this objection
which has been advanced by Bradley (2012). Bradley argues that harm is too
diverse a concept to be of any use in serious theorising and that it should be
replaced by more well-behaved concepts, such as intrinsic and extrinsic value.
In reply, I will argue that while my analysis departs from common sense, it
still serves as an acceptable analysis of harm in a specific sense, namely as the
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term occurs in the Harm Principle from chapter one. Because the Minimalist
View is not an analysis of harm in a wider sense it is not a failure of the
analysis that it does not capture intuitions about harm which only concern this
wider sense.
6.3.1 Bradley’s objection
Bradley (2012) argues that harm is a “Frankensteinian” concept which is too
diverse to be of any use in serious theorising. He argues for this conclusion by
listing a number of desiderata which an analysis of harm should satisfy. But,
because every available analysis fails to satisfy all of these desiderata, Bradley
concludes that
harm is a Frankensteinian jumble. Thus it is unsuitable for use in serious moral
theorizing. It should be replaced by other more well-behaved concepts, such as
the axiological concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic badness. (Bradley 2012, p.
391).
In order for the Minimalist View to be acceptable, we therefore have to con-
sider how it fares with respect to Bradley’s desiderata and whether the desider-
ata are reasonable in the first place. As we will see below, my analysis fares
well with respect to several of Bradley’s desiderata, but it stumbles on some.
However, I will argue that this is not sufficient to reject the analysis. We need
to keep in mind that the aim in this thesis is to analyse harm in a rather specific
sense. The purpose of the analysis, which can be identified with its normative
role in this case, has to be specified at the outset and an analysis is success-
ful in so far as the purpose can be achieved without departing too much from
ordinary usage.
Bradley suggests that an analysis of harm should satisfy a total of seven
desiderata: (i) extensional adequacy, (ii) axiological neutrality, (iii) ontolog-
ical neutrality, (iv) amorality, (v) unity, (vi) prudential importance and (vii)
normative importance. Of these seven, my analysis satisfies (ii)-(v) and I will
therefore only briefly indicate why that is the case.8 First, my analysis is axi-
ologically neutral because I have not made any substantive assumptions about
well-being (see chapter four). Second, while the Minimalist View I favour is
not ontologically neutral as it stands, it can easily be modified. I have for-
mulated the analysis in terms of acts and states of affairs but nothing hinges
on this choice. For example, (2*) could be formulated in terms of events, or
even a mix of ontological categories. Third, the analysis is “amoral” because
it does not entail that harming is morally wrong or objectionable, that doing
harm requires malicious intent nor that harm-claims entail a deontic judge-
ment. Fourth, the analysis is “unified” because it is not merely a list of typical
examples of harm.
8 For a complete description of these desiderata, see Bradley (2012, pp. 394–6).
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This leaves three desiderata: extensional adequacy, prudential importance
and normative importance.
Regarding extensional adequacy, Bradley claims that “the analysis must fit
the data. [...] If no analysis gets all the data right, we should favor the one that
does better by the data, all else equal” (Bradley 2012, p. 394). This desider-
atum seems obvious, and also seems to be the main point where my analysis
fails. For example, I have argued (see chapter four) that we should interpret the
second condition in such a way that absences of benefits satisfy the condition.
However, there are several things to note about extensional adequacy as a
desideratum. First, as Bradley seems to be aware, it would be to expect to
much of an analysis that it should fit the data perfectly. Rather, we should
strive for the best fit. That my analysis departs from the data in certain cases
does therefore not show by itself that it should be rejected. Second, there is
considerable disagreement about what the data are when it comes to harm. As
we have seen in previous chapters, there is disagreement about whether failing
to benefit a person for example, is to do harm.
Another source of disagreement is the distinction between partial and total
harm. Cases where an act makes a person better off all things considered but
where the act involves some misfortune are also cases where people tend to
disagree about whether the act does harm or not. If there is no agreed set of
data then we should not insist that an analysis should fit the data.
Furthermore, the examples above which seem to suggest that the Minimal-
ist View departs significantly from common sense are not decisive. As I men-
tioned in chapter two, it is important to distinguish between total and partial
harm. The former concerns the total state of affairs, how things are for a per-
son all things considered. The latter merely concerns how a certain effect, or
a certain act, affects a person. Judgements about partial harms are not judge-
ments about how things are for a person all things considered. The claim that
life-saving surgery, for example, is a form of harm is clearly only plausible as
a claim about partial harms. In saying that the surgery harms the patient one
is certainly not saying that the surgery was morally forbidden, one is merely
saying that there was something about the surgery which was bad for the pa-
tient and that this should be taken into account when doing a moral evalua-
tion. While the account is revisionary, it does not contradict common sense
because common sense usually overlooks a distinction which is relevant on
this account.
The fact that there is little agreement about the data might seem to under-
mine the project of giving an analysis of harm in the first place. However,
we can still analyse harm in more specific senses. The aim of this thesis has
been to give an analysis of harm which makes the Harm Principle plausible,
especially with respect to same-number cases and the non-identity problem.
Whether it succeeds or fails should therefore be judged by how well it captures
harm in this sense, not some other.
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Judging whether an analysis satisfies extensional adequacy independently
of its normative role is for the reasons just given problematic. We should there-
fore take a closer look at Bradley’s last two desiderata – prudential and nor-
mative importance – before deciding whether the Minimalist View passes as
an extensionally adequate analysis.
Regarding prudential importance Bradley claims that “harm is something
worth caring about in prudential deliberation. Harm is the sort of thing we
should try to avoid; if we have an analysis of harm such that one might rea-
sonably be indifferent concerning whether an event of the sort in the definiens
takes place or not, we should reject the analysis” (Bradley 2012, p. 395). My
analysis has an obvious connection with reasonable prudential concerns be-
cause it is formulated partly in terms of well-being. All harms, on my view,
make a person’s life go worse and reasonable prudential concern clearly in-
volves concern for one’s own well-being.
On the other hand, it might be argued that an act could “harm” a person
according to my analysis but the victim could be indifferent, or even glad, that
the act was performed. For example, making a person experience some lesser
pain in order for that person to avoid greater future pain, or to secure great
future benefits, would on my analysis be to do harm. But, the “victim” in such
a case can be quite satisfied with experiencing the lesser pain.
In defence of my view it can be pointed out that it still makes sense to
care about the lesser pain. It still seems reasonable to regret that one has to
undergo the lesser pain, and one can reasonably resent that one has to undergo
it in order to avoid the greater pain or secure the future benefit. If given a
choice between the lesser pain as a means to a greater benefit and the greater
benefit without the lesser pain, then it is certainly reasonable to prefer the
latter. Harm, on my analysis, is therefore something which it makes sense to
care about in prudential deliberation, even though it may not matter quite as
much as Bradley seems to require.
Finally, regarding normative importance, Bradley claims that
the analysis should entail that harm is the sort of thing that it makes sense
for there to be deontological restrictions about. If an analysis of harm, when
plugged into Mill’s harm principle or one of Frances Kamm’s deontological
principles, makes the principle absurd on its face, then it is not what we are
looking for. (Bradley 2012, p. 396).
My analysis would indeed make some deontological principles absurd, or at
least very implausible. For example, a principle which stated that it is forbid-
den to do harm would be quite absurd given my analysis because it would
make too many acts forbidden. Another example, though it does not qualify
as a deontological principle perhaps, is the Hippocratic oath. Taking an oath
to do no harm would, given my analysis, be quite absurd because it would be
nearly impossible to keep it.
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However, this desideratum seems to be too strong. Recall that the analysis
of harm which I have been arguing for is an analysis of partial harm, not to-
tal harm. The deontological principles which turn out to be very implausible
given my analysis are, I propose, those principles which appeal to harm in a
total sense. Indeed, it seems that any analysis of harm in the partial sense will
make a deontological principle which forbids doing harm absurd. The Hippo-
cratic oath, for example, would be quite implausible if “harm” is understood in
the partial sense. But this cannot be a good reason for disqualifying analyses
of partial harm across the board. A weaker deontological constraint, such as
the Harm Principle which was introduced in chapter one, would not be absurd
on its face given my analysis.
A further reason for thinking that Bradley’s desideratum is inadequate as it
stands is that normative principles which refer to harm are not “data” which
the analysis should account for. As I argued in chapter two, an analysis of harm
should be judged by its descriptive adequacy and its normative adequacy. So
far I am in agreement with Bradley. Descriptive adequacy is, obviously, impor-
tant because if an analysis of harm is not able to account for many harm-claims
in ordinary talk then we seem to have made harm into a technical term with
little or no connection to ordinary use. However, as I argued above, whether
an analysis is descriptively adequate cannot be judged independently of its
normative role. Normative and descriptive adequacy go hand in hand and we
cannot determine whether an analysis succeeds descriptively unless the nor-
mative role has been specified. Normative, or theoretical as the case may be,
adequacy is achieved when the analysis serves its purpose. That is, when it fits
the role it is intended to have.
For these reasons, Bradley’s desideratum concerning normative importance
is too demanding. A more plausible way to formulate the desideratum is that
an analysis of harm should be such that it would not be absurd to claim that
harm is the sort of thing which matters morally in some way. The normative
role of my analysis is fairly specific. I set out to analyse harm as it occurs in
the Harm Principle. This is to analyse harm in a specific sense. For example,
it is an analysis of harm in the partial sense as opposed to the total sense. It
is therefore limited in its application and should not be taken as an analysis
of harm as it occurs in other contexts, such as the Hippocratic oath. To draw
the conclusion that this limitation disqualifies it as an analysis of one sense of
harm would be a mistake.
6.3.1.1 Does harm matter?
In short, my reply to Bradley’s objection is that the Minimalist View for should
be understood as an analysis of harm in a certain sense, namely as it occurs in
the Harm Principle. There are certainly other senses of harm, such as the one
used in the Hippocratic oath, but harm in this sense has not been the target of
my analysis. Bradley’s desiderata are in this respect too demanding.
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This reply raises a further worry however. By narrowing the scope of the
analysis it might be wondered whether we have not effectively devalued harm
and if there is any reason to appeal to this narrow sense of harm in serious
theorising. Put in another way, if the Minimalist View is an analysis of harm
in a specific sense, why should we care about this specific sense? This is not
so much a worry about whether the analysis is acceptable or not but whether
there is any particular theoretical gain to be had by appealing to harm in this
narrow sense. Perhaps we are better off focussing on well-being, or as Bradley
suggests, intrinsic and extrinsic value.
Well-being and different kinds of value are obviously very important to my
analysis and the answer to many substantive questions hinges on what the
correct theory of well-being is, for example whether absences of benefits are
harms. But, this fact does not make the analysis redundant or uninteresting.
The analysis contributes to our pre-theoretical understanding of harm by dis-
tinguishing different components which harm and harming depend on, such
as well-being and responsibility, without taking a stand on how these com-
ponents should be understood more precisely.9 Understanding well-being is
obviously very important but well-being cannot replace harm.
Of course, even supposing that the analysis contributes to our
pre-theoretical understanding of harm does not show that harm has any
significant role to play in for example ethics. We do not “have to” appeal to
harm merely because we can. If there is no distinct advantage of appealing to
harm – if there is no distinct role for it to play – in addition to other common
ethical concepts then we have some reason because of parsimony to get rid of
harm. In the following chapters I will argue that there is such an advantage to
be had.
6.4 Summary
In this chapter I have argued that we should not add any further conditions
pertaining to intentions, foresight or consent to the basic structure. Certain ex-
amples seem to suggest that the analysis would be more plausible by adding
any of these conditions but I argued that this is merely apparent. On closer
examination, these further conditions would make the analysis too narrow. I
also argued that the examples which seem to support including any of these
conditions can be explained in other ways. Our tendency to think that inten-
tions, foresight or consent matters to an analysis of harm can be explained by
a more general tendency to think that these three notions are relevant to the
moral evaluation of an act. However, we should not conclude that they are
therefore relevant to an analysis of harm.
9 It is a mark of a successful analysis, it seems to me, that the need to appeal to the analysandum
seems to disappear. That the need for using harm seems to disappear should be taken as an
indication that the analysis has been fairly successful.
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By not adding any further conditions to the basic structure we are left with
the following Minimalist View of harm:
a harms b if and only if
(1) a performs an act, φ ,
(2*) b is in a state S such that b’s life is worse, taking S into account, than b’s
life not taking S into account.
(3*) if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained at all, or
would have obtained in a different way which is salient in the circumstances.
I argued that the Minimalist View fare well with respect to two desiderata from
chapter one: it solves the non-identity problem and it is compatible with the
no-difference view. Regarding the third desideratum, that the analysis should
be intuitively acceptable, I argued that while the Minimalist View departs from
common sense in some cases, this departure can be explained by appealing to
the distinction between partial and total harm.
Finally, I considered a number of desiderata which a plausible analysis of
harm should satisfy according to Bradley. The Minimalist View fares well
with respect to the majority of these desiderata. Regarding the two desiderata
which seemed to be especially troubling for the Minimalist View, extensional
adequacy and normative importance, I argued that whether an analysis satis-
fies extensional adequacy cannot be judged independently its intended norma-
tive role. Because the Minimalist View is an analysis of harm as it occurs in
the Harm Principle it is therefore not a fault of the analysis that it does not
capture other uses of “harm”.
My reply to Bradley’s objection left us with a problem however. If the Min-
imalist View is an analysis of harm in a specific sense, should we appeal to
harm in this sense when doing ethics? The task of the next two chapters I will
argue that there is.
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7. The asymmetry
In this thesis I have been arguing for a Minimalist View of harm. To harm
someone, according to this view, is to perform an act which is responsible
for a state of affairs (or an event) which makes someone’s life go worse. The
Minimalist View of harm is an analysis of harm in a certain sense, namely as
it occurs in the Harm Principle:
The Harm Principle: if an act would harm someone then this is a reason against
performing that act.
In conjunction with this normative principle, the Minimalist View allows us
to say that the young girl’s choice not to wait would harm her child and that
this is a reason for her to wait. Likewise, the Minimalist View is compatible
with the no-difference view because it treats same-number cases in the same
way as same-people cases.
What I have argued for so far is then merely that the non-identity problem
does not rule out the Harm Principle as a relevant normative principle in popu-
lation ethics. It could be argued that while it is true that one can do harm even
in same-number cases, this does not show that it is the Harm Principle which
explains what one ought to do in such cases. An alternative solution to the
problem is to appeal to Q and say that people ought, other things being equal,
do what would be best. As far as the non-identity problem goes at least, we
do not need to appeal to harm in order to justify our intuition that it is morally
objectionable to create the person with lesser well-being. The worry, simply
put, is whether we need the Harm Principle.
Parfit argues along these lines for what he claims explains what we ought
to do in all same-number cases, Q:
If in either of two possible outcomes the same number of people would ever
live, it would be worse if those who live are worse off, or have a lower quality
of life, than those who would have lived. (Parfit 1984, p. 360)
Parfit claims that Q is superior to views that involve a “person-affecting” com-
ponent to the effect that our choice must be worse for someone in order to
be worse simpliciter. The reason why appealing to Q is superior to person-
affecting views, such as the Harm Principle, is that while Q has the same
implications as person-affecting views in same-people cases, person-affecting
views do not have plausible results in same-number cases. We should there-
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fore conclude, according to this argument, that we should appeal to Q rather
than person-affecting views. The same line could be pursued against the rele-
vance of the analysis of harm presented in this thesis. On my view, the Harm
Principle cannot account for the intuition that it is morally objectionable to
create a person with less well-being if there is no harm involved. Q is not re-
stricted in this way and gives the same result in non-identity cases regardless
of whether there is harm involved or not.
A possible reply to this argument is that one could appeal to both the Harm
Principle and Q. One could say that when harms are not involved then the
reason we ought to have the child who would be better off is because of Q.
When harms are involved we have an additional reason based on the Harm
Principle. The problem with this reply is that once one accepts the appeal to
Q as a solution to the non-identity problem then there seems to be no need
for any further moral principle in order to explain what one ought to do in
same-number cases. The Harm Principle becomes an explanatory fifth wheel.
We have not been presented with any reason to accept the Harm Principle as
an addition to Q, while we do have a reason to appeal to Q because it gives
the intuitively correct result in same-number cases in general.
In this chapter I will argue that views which are congenial with Q has
counter-intuitive consequences when we consider creating new people. A
common intuition, often called “the asymmetry”, is that there is a moral
difference between making people happy and creating happy people.1 In
section one I will clarify the content of this intuition and why it is significant.
In section two and three I will argue that attempts to explain the asymmetry
which are congenial with Q fail. Only appealing to Q therefore comes with
a significant cost because it would require revisions with respect to some of
our deeply held views about our obligations to future people.
7.1 Formulating the intuition
A common intuition is that our obligations to future people are asymmetrical
in the sense that, on the one hand, we ought not to bring a person into existence
if she would suffer intense pain throughout her whole life. On the other hand
it is not the case that we ought to bring a person into existence if she would
live a happy life. When it comes to having children, it seems to be morally
objectionable to have them if they would suffer but morally neutral to refrain
from having them if they would be happy.
Even though this asymmetry is rather intuitive many find it in need of a
justification. Normally, if an act would lead to someone being (very) happy
then this counts in favour of performing that act. Why is this not so when it
comes to creating future people? If there are no serious considerations against
1 Narveson famously expressed this intuition with the slogan “[w]e are in favor of making
people happy, but neutral about making happy people” (Narveson 1973, p. 80).
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creating a person who would live a happy life, should we not say that it is
morally required to create that person? That there is a morally relevant differ-
ence between making existing people happy and making future people happy
seems to be ad hoc. My aim in this chapter is to argue that typical approaches
to the asymmetry fail. In the next chapter I will argue that we can do a much
better job of justifying this intuition by giving a special role to harm in moral
theorising.
First, however, there are a couple of clarifications regarding the intuition
itself which should be made. First, the asymmetry is an intuition about future
people whose existence depends on our choices. A person whose existence
depends on the performance of an act will for the remainder of this chapter
be referred to as a “contingent person”. A person who will exist whether or
not an act is performed will be referred to as a “necessary person”.2 With this
terminology we can then say that the asymmetry is a view about benefits to
contingent future people. It is silent about benefits to necessary future people.
The asymmetry is therefore compatible with the claim that in a situation where
we can benefit some future person, and this future person will exist regardless
of what we do, then we ought to do what will benefit this person most.
It is also necessary to clarify the intuition itself and how the asymmetry
should be formulated. One way to formulate it is in terms of duties.3 The
asymmetry in terms of duties holds that there is no duty to create a person
whose life would be worth living, but there is a duty not to create a person
whose life would be not worth living. It is of course permissible to create
a person whose life would be worth living. What the asymmetry claims is
merely that it is not required by morality to create a person merely because
her life would be worth living.
This version seems unnecessarily strict however. We should not deny that
there can, in extreme circumstances, be a duty to create a person with a life
worth living. Suppose, for example, that an evil demon threatens to make ev-
ery existing and future person’s life not worth living unless we see to it that a
person with a life worth living is created. Here it would clearly be a mistake
to say that we do not have a duty to create a person.
In order for the asymmetry in terms of duties to be plausible its defend-
ers should therefore make the weaker claim that there typically is no duty to
create happy people. An example of this way of formulating the asymmetry
is suggested by Narveson (1967, p. 66). Narveson claims that there can be a
duty to create “happy people” but that in such cases what makes it a duty will
not be because of the act’s “direct effects” but rather its “indirect effects”. One
way to interpret Narveson here is as claiming that the duty to create a person
2 The terms “contingent” and “necessary” people are sometimes used in a wider sense where a
person is “contingent” relative to a set of possible worlds if and only if she exists in some but
not all of these worlds. A person is “necessary” relative to a set of possible worlds if and only
if she exists in all of them. See for example Österberg (1996, p. 100).
3 See for example Narveson (1967, pp. 65–6) and Elstein (2005, p. 49).
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who would have a life worth living can not be grounded in the fact that the
person would have a life worth living. Whether there is a duty to create such
a person depends only on how the act affects other people, not on how the act
affects the person being created.
While formulating the asymmetry in terms of duties may come with some
intuitive advantage, it is not precise enough. As Narveson’s manoeuvre with
“direct” and “indirect” effects suggests, we need finer distinctions than talk
of simple duties will allow to capture the asymmetry. The asymmetry is not
the intuition that it can never be a duty, under any circumstances, to create a
person with a life worth living. What the intuition is about is rather that it is
neutral to create people who would have lives worth living taking only their
well-being into account.
An alternative to the duties-formulation is to formulate the asymmetry in
terms of reasons. The idea is that if a person would be happy if she were to be
created then this is not a reason for, it does not count in favour of, creating her.
On the other hand, that a person would be unhappy if she were to be created
is a reason against creating her. Broome has captured this idea neatly:
If a person could be created, and would lead a good life if she was created, the
fact that her life would be good is not a reason for creating her [...] If a person’s
life would be bad, were she to be created, that is a reason against creating her; a
person’s existence is ethically neutral only if her life would be good. (Broome
1999, p. 228).
Formulating the intuition in terms of reasons captures the finer distinctions
which a formulations in terms of duties did not. Broome’s formulation is, for
example, compatible with there being a reason to create a person who would
live “a good life” if creating this person would bring great benefits to other
people.
The way I will understand the asymmetry is in many ways similar to
Broome’s formulation. More precisely, I will understand the asymmetry as
consisting of two claims about how what is good for future people relates to
what we have reason to do:
(I) If a contingent future person would have a life not worth living then this is
a reason against creating that person.
(II) If a contingent future person would have a life worth living then this is not
a reason in favour of creating that person.4
By a reason I mean a pro-tanto reason; that is, a consideration which counts in
favour of, or against, a certain act but which can be outweighed, or defeated,
by other reasons. By “a life worth living” I mean a life where the good things
in that life outweigh the bad things. By “a life not worth living” I mean a life
4 For similar formulations of the asymmetry, see McMahan (2009) and Roberts (2011). For an
early formulation of the asymmetry in terms of reasons, see McMahan (1981, p. 100).
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where the bad things outweigh the good things.5 We can think of these good
and bad things as well-being components: states of affairs, events or things
which affect how well a life is going for the person whose life it is. Finally, I
will assume that a person whose life is worth living has positive well-being.
Likewise, a person whose life is not worth living has negative well-being.
Formulating the asymmetry in terms of reasons does not mean that whether
we accept the asymmetry is of no consequence for our duties to future people.
By formulating the asymmetry in terms of reasons we are, however, allow-
ing for some differences regarding how reasons relate to duties. For example,
some people hold that if a person has a duty to perform an act, then the person
has most reason to perform that act.6 If one also holds this view about the
relation between reasons and duties, then we have a possible explanation of
why it is not the case that we have a duty to create people with lives worth
living, other things being equal. We need not, at this juncture, settle for a view
on the relation between reasons and oughts. The claim that the well-being a
contingent future person would have is not a reason to create her, i.e., does
not count in favour of creating her, is sufficiently intuitive to be worth explor-
ing though I will return to the relation between reasons and duties in the next
chapter.
7.1.1 Strong and weak asymmetry
A distinction is sometimes made between weak and strong asymmetry.7 Ac-
cording to strong asymmetry, the fact that a contingent future person would
have a life worth living is no reason to create that person. The asymmetry as
I defined it above is therefore a version of strong asymmetry. According to
weak asymmetry, on the other hand, the fact that a contingent future person
would have a life worth living gives us some reason to create that person. Ac-
cording to weak asymmetry, reasons from benefits to contingent future people
provide reasons but they should be discounted; they carry less moral weight
than other benefits. These reasons do not, it is then often claimed, amount to
a duty to procreate.8
The weak version of the asymmetry, that we should discount the benefits to
contingent future people, is interesting in its own right but it is not a plausible
5 For completeness sake we should perhaps also say that a neutral life is a life where the good
and bad things are evenly matched, or if there is a complete lack of both. I will not consider
neutral lives in what follows however.
6 See for example Stroud (1998). According to Stroud, this claim captures the “the overriding-
ness” of morality.
7 See for example McMahan (2009) and Arrhenius (2000, p. 137).
8 This can be argued for in a number of ways. For instance, some think that it can be accounted
for by giving reasons to benefit a lesser weight than reasons against doing harm in general.
See for example Harman (2004). Another proponent of this view is W. D. Ross who says that
“non-maleficence is apprehended as a duty distinct from that of beneficence, and as a duty of
more stringent character” (Ross 2002, p. 21).
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replacement for the strong version of the asymmetry. For example, because the
weak version assigns some weight to benefits to contingent future people it al-
lows for certain trade-offs which the strong version does not. According to the
weak asymmetry, the well-being a future person would have provides us with
some reason to create her and therefore it seems to be a consequence of this
view that if the benefit is large enough then this reason could outweigh rea-
sons to provide smaller benefits to existing people, other things being equal.
In other words, on the weak version it is possible that instead of benefiting
existing people we ought to add more people to the world as long as they have
lives worth living. This seems counter-intuitive.9
The strong asymmetry, on the other hand, holds that there is an important
difference between benefiting existing people and creating contingent future
people who would have lives worth living. The fact that a contingent future
person would have a life worth living is not a reason to create them but the fact
that some non-contingent person (whether future or not) would benefit from
an act is a reason to perform that act. It does therefore not allow for trade-offs
in the same way as the weak asymmetry does. It is therefore worthwhile to see
if the strong asymmetry can be captured by views which are congenial with
Q.
7.2 Impersonal axiologies
There are several ways one can approach the asymmetry. One way is to at-
tempt to justify it on axiological grounds and claim that while adding a person
with a life worth living does not make the population better, adding a person
with a life not worth living makes the population worse.10 On an axiologi-
cal approach one assumes a connection between values and reasons and that
the reasons in question are matched by a difference in the intrinsic value of
9 See McMahan (2009). He lists four consequences of weak asymmetry which he finds “very
difficult to believe” and notes that strong asymmetry “may be the only view that captures our
strongest intuitions about the morality of procreation” (McMahan 2009, p. 67).
10 By a “population” I merely mean a collection of individuals and a distribution of well-being
among those individuals. On the axiological view, it makes sense to talk about the value of a
population, and to say that some are better than others. I will not make any assumptions about
what the value of a population depends on, though it seems very plausible that the distribution of
well-being is important in this respect. Note though that the axiological approach is compatible
with the view that the value of a population depends on other properties than just the amount
of well-being in that population. For example, it is compatible with the axiological approach to
say that an equal distribution of well-being makes a population better, other things being equal.
It is also important, on this view, to distinguish between the personal value of a life (how good a
certain way of life is for a person) and the “contributive value” of a life (the difference a certain
life makes to the impersonal value of a population). See Arrhenius (2000, p. 7) and Broome
(2004, p. 65). This distinction is analogous to the one made in chapter four where the value of
a state of affairs for a person was distinguished from the contribution the state of affairs makes
to a particular life.
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a population. On this approach, therefore, when one says that there is a rea-
son against creating people with lives not worth living one has to support this
claim with a theory of value which entails that adding such a person to a pop-
ulation makes it worse.
An immediate problem for the axiological approach is how to characterise
the addition of a person in a positive way. The way the axiological view inter-
prets the intuition is by saying that adding a person with positive well-being
does not make the world better, but it might well be asked what difference,
if any, it does. Saying that it makes the world worse to add a person with a
life worth living seems out of the question, so perhaps one should say that it
makes no difference. That is, perhaps we should interpret the asymmetry in
terms of equal value: adding a person with a life worth living to a population
does not make the population better or worse, its value stays the same.
Broome (2004) discusses (and rejects) an axiological attempt to save the
asymmetry along these lines. Broome suggests that there is a range of well-
being levels such that adding a person at one of these levels does not make
the world better or worse, adding a person below this range makes the world
worse and adding a person above this range makes the world better. According
to this intuition of neutrality, as Broome calls it, “adding a person to the world
is very often ethically neutral” (Broome 2004, p. 143).
In order for Broome’s view to support strong asymmetry we also need to
assume that the neutral range does not have an upper limit. If there were a
limit then adding a person above this limit to the world would make it better,
but this would of course contradict strong asymmetry. In what follows I will
therefore assume that the neutral range does not have an upper limit.
Broome (2004, pp. 146–7) argues that interpreting the intuition of neutrality
in terms of equal value is deeply problematic. Suppose that we have three
alternatives: (A) create no-one, (B) create a person who would have a well-
being of 10 or (C) create the same person but with a well-being of 5. Let us
also assume that 5 and 10 are within the neutral range and that our choice
will not affect anyone else in the population. Now, if neutrality is interpreted
in terms of equal value then it implies that A is equally as good as B and C.
However, B is clearly better than C because B is better for someone and at
least as good for everyone else.11 But, if B is better than C then A cannot be
equally as good as both B and C. To say that a person’s existence is “neutral”
can therefore not be interpreted in terms of equal value.
11 I here assume what I take to be a rather uncontroversial principle, at least for same-people
cases, which Broome refers to as “the principle of personal good” (Broome 2004, p. 58). Ac-
cording to this principle if A is better than B for someone and at least as good for everyone else,
then A is better than B. This principle rules out one possible way of defending the intuition,
namely the view that the value of a population only depends on the amount of suffering, or
negative well-being, it contains. However, this view is very counter-intuitive, as the fact that it
is incompatible with the principle of personal good illustrates.
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As Broome formulates the intuition, that adding a person within the neutral
range does not make the world better or worse, does however not entail that
neutrality should be understood as having equal value. Incomparability and
indeterminacy are two possibilities which we should consider.
That two things are incomparable is often defined simply by saying that
neither is better than the other and that they are not equally good. Typical ex-
amples of purported incomparability are things which exemplify radically dif-
ferent values, like in Sartre’s famous example where a student faces a choice
between fighting for his country and taking care of his old mother. Neutrality
understood as incomparability amounts to the view that, other things being
equal, a state of affairs S and the same state of affairs but with one additional
person with a life worth living, S′, are incomparable.12
To say that it is indeterminate what value-relation holds between two things
is to say that there is no fact of the matter whether one is better than the other
or whether they are equally good. This is the alternative Broome opts for and
his ground is that it seems plausible to hold that betterness is vague. That is,
there is a grey-area of things (in this case, populations) where there simply is
no fact of the matter which is better than which.
A problem for both views which Broome discusses, but which I will merely
mention, is that they seem to be poor interpretations of neutrality. On both
views, Broome argues, neutrality becomes “greedy” in a way that “is capable
of swallowing up badness or goodness and neutralizing it” (Broome 2004, p.
170). To see how this argument works we consider the following distributions
of well-being:13
A = (4,6,−)
B = (4,6,1)
C = (4,4,4)
Suppose that the addition of the person in B is neutral, so B is neither better,
worse nor equally as good as A. Broome also assumes, plausibly, that B is
worse than C. C has a higher total and average well-being and it is more
evenly distributed. Now consider A and C. C can not be worse than A because,
if it were, B would be worse than A. If C were worse than A then, because B
is worse than C and “worse than” is transitive, it would follow that B is worse
12 See for example Österberg (1996, p. 100–1) who suggests a view which implies that many
cases involving addition of people with lives worth living results in incomparability. Rabi-
nowicz (2009) argues in favour of this approach to the intuition of neutrality. It should be noted
however that Rabinowicz does not discuss the strong version of the intuition according to which
it is sufficient to add a person with any amount of positive well-being in order for S and S′ to
be incomparable. Brown (2011) seems to endorse the strong version of this view.
13 Distributions of well-being are here represented by vectors. A number represents that a par-
ticular person exists with that much well-being and a dash represents that a particular person
does not exist.
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than A. But this runs contrary to the assumption that the mere addition of one
person in B is neutral.
That C is not worse than A is unintuitive according to Broome. The dif-
ference between C and A is that in C one person is added, which is a neutral
thing, and one person loses some well-being (the second person in this exam-
ple) which is a bad thing. Now, Broome thinks that “the net effect of one bad
thing and one neutral thing should be bad. But according to our theory, it is
not bad; it is neutral” (Broome 2004, p. 170). So C should be worse than A,
according to this argument.14
A final objection to both incomparability and indeterminacy is that both
seem less plausible as interpretations of strong asymmetry. Recall that the
strong version of the asymmetry requires that there is no upper bound to the
neutral range. However, both views would still have to maintain that adding
a person below a certain level of well-being is not incomparable or indeter-
minate. This value asymmetry looks very suspicious. What is it about adding
people with a life worth living which makes it so different from adding people
with lives not worth living?
Consider the case of indeterminacy first. It seems plausible that there is a
finite range of well-being levels where our concept of betterness is vague. This
fact about our concept of betterness could possibly explain weak asymmetry:
there is a range of well-being levels where it is indeterminate whether adding
a person at these levels to a population makes the population better. How-
ever, the indeterminacy-approach seems much less plausible when it comes
to strong asymmetry. In order to capture strong asymmetry one would have
to claim that betterness is vague for a certain level of well-being (where the
neutral range begins) and for any level above. The only reason to think that the
concept would be vague for adding people with lives worth living seems to be
that it is the addition of people as such which makes two populations indeter-
minate with respect to betterness. But, this reason would of course undermine
the claim that adding people with lives not worth living makes a population
worse; adding such people should, on this view, also be indeterminate.15
14 A weakness in this argument has been pointed out by Rabinowicz (2009). Rabinowicz argues
that Broome’s greediness objection assumes that if something is of neutral value then it does not
count against other values. However, Rabinowicz claims, this is not how we should understand
the neutrality intuition. Rather, we should say that “adding people is (axiologically) neutral
simply means that it on its own makes the world neither better nor worse. This does not imply
that such changes don’t “count against other values” and that they can simply be ignored in the
total evaluation of outcomes” (Rabinowicz 2009, p. 399).
The point here is that Broome is not entirely consistent in his use of “neutral”. If neutrality is
to be understood as incomparability or indeterminacy then Broome’s claim that “the net effect
of one bad thing and one neutral thing should be bad” is false. Rather, if neutrality is understood
as incomparability then the net effect of a neutral and a bad thing should be incomparability.
15 The indeterminacy-approach to the asymmetry would also make the vagueness of betterness
very different from other examples of vagueness. Typically, if it is vague whether x is more F
than y then x and y are both within a grey area where it is indeterminate whether one is more
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A similar argument can be given against incomparability. Interpreting the
strong asymmetry in terms of incomparability amounts to the claim that there
is a difference with respect to comparability between adding a person with
a life worth living to a population and adding a person with a life not worth
living to a population. However, one might well wonder why there should be
such a difference. For example, two populations of different sizes do not ex-
emplify radically different values, as incomparable things are usually thought
to do. Perhaps one could claim that it is the size which accounts for the in-
comparability.16 But, this would of course also rule out that adding a person
with a life not worth living to a population makes it worse, so it would not
imply the strong version of the asymmetry.
We should therefore conclude that interpreting the strong version of the
asymmetry in terms of value incomparability or indeterminacy does not suc-
ceed in explaining the strong asymmetry. The asymmetry, on these views,
amounts to making a distinction where there does not seem to be any relevant
difference. What seems to be ad hoc about the asymmetry is not explained by
the axiological approach. If the asymmetry is to be defended on axiological
grounds then it will be by simply claiming that adding people with lives not
worth living makes a state of affairs worse, but adding people with lives worth
living does not make it better. But, the asymmetry has then not been explained,
merely reformulated, and is reduced to a brute axiological fact.
7.3 The Person-Affecting Principle
In an attempt to get around the problems mentioned above one might claim
that the addition of a person to a population does not make the population
better or worse, other things being equal, because we have not taken the value
for people into account. It is not worse for anyone if we do not add a person
with a life worth living to a population, and therefore it cannot be worse not
to add a person who would have a life worth living to a population. Perhaps
the intuition of neutrality, and the asymmetry, could be saved by saying that
whether one population is better (or worse) than another is constrained by
whether either is better (or worse) for someone.
The idea that goodness depends on what is good for people is a popular
idea. However, there are many ways to describe the relation between good
F than the other. But, for other concepts there is a version of x, x+, which is clearly more F
than y than and a version of x, x−, which is clearly less F than y. For example, if it is vague
whether x is hairier than y, then by adding enough hair to x we get something which is hairier
than y. Likewise, by removing hair from x we get something which is less hairy than y. The
indeterminacy of betterness can not, if it is to explain the asymmetry, work in this way. We can
make a population (determinately) worse by adding people with lives not worth living, but we
cannot make a population (determinately) better by adding people with lives worth living.
16 See for example Brown (2011).
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and good for. In its simplest form the view can be formulated in the following
way:
Person-Affecting Principle: if A is better (worse) than B then A is better (worse)
than B for some person p.17
This principle, as it stands, does not imply anything in particular regarding
the asymmetry because it is not clear how to interpret it in cases where p only
exists in one of A and B. A common view is that A is better (worse) than B
for p only if p exists in both A and B.18 But, this interpretation of the Person-
Affecting Principle clearly rules out the asymmetry. While it follows from
this interpretation of the principle that adding a person with a life worth living
cannot make a population better, because existing with a life worth living is
not better for the person than non-existence, it also follows for the same reason
that adding a person with a life not worth living cannot make a population
worse. This version of the Person-Affecting Principle would therefore fails to
imply the asymmetry.
Note also that this interpretation of the Person-Affecting Principle contra-
dicts Q in certain same-number cases. For example, in a case like the young
girl it would not be worse, according to this interpretation of the principle, for
her child if she does not wait. It would not be worse simpliciter if she does not
wait because it would not be worse for anyone.19
In order for the Person-Affecting Principle to have any hope of implying the
asymmetry we must therefore assume that A can be better (worse) than B for p
even though p does not exist in both. We would therefore have to assume that
a life worth living is better for a person than non-existence and that a life not
worth living is worse for a person than non-existence. While these are very
controversial assumptions,20 they will not be questioned here because even
with these assumptions the principle fails to imply the asymmetry.
To see this, note first that because the Person-Affecting Principle only states
a necessary condition it does not follow that adding a person with a life not
worth living (i.e., negative well-being) to a population makes the population
worse. A suggestion at this point is that we should appeal to the following
principle:
Dominance: If A is better (worse) than B for someone, and at least as good for
everyone else, then A is better (worse) than B.
17 Temkin (1993, p. 248) has dubbed this view “the Slogan”. Temkin formulates it in the negative
however: “[o]ne situation cannot be worse (or better) than another if there is no one for whom
it is worse (or better)”.
18 See for example Broome (2004, p. 65).
19 For further arguments against this interpretation of the Person-Affecting Principle, see Arrhe-
nius (2009, pp. 295–6) and Broome (2004, pp. 135–6).
20 See for example Holtug (2001), Roberts (2010), Johansson (2010) and Arrhenius & Rabinow-
icz (2010).
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This principle seems plausible and is sometimes assumed to be a part of the
Person-Affecting Principle.21 It also follows from the Person-Affecting Prin-
ciple and Dominance that adding a person with a life not worth living to a
population makes the population worse, other things being equal, so if the
Person-Affecting Principle is to imply the asymmetry then we seem to have
good reason to accept Dominance. However, note that it also follows from
the Person-Affecting Principle and Dominance that adding a person with a
life worth living, i.e., positive well-being, to a population makes that popula-
tion better, other things being equal. But, this contradicts the second half of
the asymmetry. According to the asymmetry in its axiological interpretation,
adding a person with a life worth living to a population does not make the
population better, other things being equal.
The Person-Affecting Principle has been developed in various ways. Two of
the most discussed versions are actualism and necessitarianism.22 According
to both these views it is a mistake to think that the Person-Affecting Principle
should take the well-being of merely possible people into account. Rather, the
principle should be more restricted in its scope. According to actualism only
the well-being of those who have existed, do exist or will exist matter when
it comes do determining the value of a population. According to this view, if
A is better than B for p, then this is only relevant to the evaluations of A and
B if p is an actual person. Necessitarianism, on the other hand, is the view
that the Person-Affecting Principle should be restricted to those who do exist
necessarily relative to the alternatives. On this view, only the well-being of
those who would exist irrespective of what we do matters to the value of a
population.23
Both actualism and necessitarianism have been criticised at length else-
where in the literature.24 Necessitarianism is the least plausible of these two,
especially since we want an axiological theory which is compatible with Q
and with the strong asymmetry. As should be obvious, necessitarianism is not
compatible with Q because no one exists necessarily relative to the alterna-
tives in same-number cases. That is, if we can create p with a well-being of
5 or q with a well-being of 10 then creating p is not worse than creating q
according to necessitarianism. Furthermore, necessitarianism does not imply
the strong asymmetry because necessitarianism gives us no reason to think
that adding people with lives not worth living to a population makes the pop-
ulation worse. Rather, it implies that adding contingent people, whether they
21 See for example Temkin (1987, p. 166) and Arrhenius (2000, p. 118).
22 See Singer (1993, p. 103) for a version of necessitarianism. Actualism has been defended by
Jackson & Pargetter (1986), Bigelow & Pargetter (1988) and Parsons (2002).
23 More modest versions of actualism and necessitarianism claim that we should discount, but
not disregard completely, the well-being of non-actual or non-necessary people. However, these
more modest versions only support weak asymmetry.
24 For example in Bykvist (2006), Arrhenius (2000, 2003) and Roberts (2010).
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would have lives worth living or not, would not make a difference to the value
of a population.
When it comes to actualism there are mainly two objections. First, assuming
some connection between value and norms, actualism implies that what you
ought to do can depend on what you will do. This is unacceptable, it has been
argued, since it rules out deliberation. You cannot know all the relevant facts
pertaining to what you ought to do and still deliberate if what you in fact will
do is one of the relevant facts. Oughts, it seems, are not like this.25
The second objection is that actualism implies dilemmas of an especially
problematic kind. Normally, a dilemma is a situation where every alternative is
wrong. Actualism, however, implies that there are situations where you cannot
avoid doing wrong as in a normal dilemma but also that whatever you do there
will be an alternative which is right.26 Suppose, for example, that the only
alternatives are to create either of two people, a or b, whose lives would be not
worth living. Suppose we decide to create a. Since a is actual her well-being,
the fact that her life is not worth living, counts against creating a. However,
since b is not actual if we create a we can disregard b’s well-being. If other
things are equal it would then be the case that if we create a then it is better to
create b, and vice versa.
Most importantly, regardless of whether these objections are decisive
against actualism, actualism does not imply the strong asymmetry since it
gives us no reason to doubt that it is better to add people with lives worth
living. If we add a person with a life worth living then her well-being counts
in full and therefore makes the world better. For the actualist version of the
Person-Affecting Principle to imply strong asymmetry one would have to
deny that adding actual people with lives worth living makes a population
better. But, this would not be to explain the asymmetry. It would be to
reassert it as an unexplained axiological fact.
7.3.1 Variabilism
A more sophisticated defence of the asymmetry is Melinda Roberts’ “vari-
abilism”. As we will see, Roberts’ approach to the asymmetry shares certain
features with the Person-Affecting Principle discussed above, though her ap-
proach differs in that she does not formulate her defence of the asymmetry in
axiological terms.
Roberts’ formulates variabilism in the following way:
25 The claim that the normative status of an act cannot depend on whether the act is performed
is sometimes referred to as the principle of normative invariance. See Carlson (1995, 2002).
Whether foreknowledge “crowds out” deliberation is however a contested matter. Bykvist
(2007b), for example, argues that there are examples where it seems plausible to say that an
acts moral status does depend on whether or not it is performed. What is crucial with respect to
deliberation is not this dependence as such but rather whether a theory which allows for such
dependencies can still be action-guiding.
26 See Bykvist (2006, p. 274-5).
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The loss incurred at a world where the person who incurs that loss does or
will exist has full moral significance both for the purposes of evaluating the act
that imposes that loss and for the purpose of evaluating any alternative act that
avoids that loss, while a loss incurred by that very same person at a world where
that person never exists at all has no moral significance whatsoever. (Roberts
2011, p. 356).27
A “loss” is then defined in terms of what is better for a person: a person p
suffers a loss in a world w if and only if there is an accessible world w′ such
that w′ is better than w for p.28
Roberts’ definition of loss raises the question whether it can be better
(worse) for a person not to have existed. Roberts’ view is that it can. On her
view, w′ is better than w for p if and only if p has more well-being in w than
in w′. If p does not exist in one of these two worlds, say w′, then we should
say that p has zero well-being in w′.29 This means that a person can suffer a
loss in worlds where she does not exist if there is an accessible world where
she has positive well-being. This also entails that a person with negative
well-being suffers a loss if there is an accessible world where she does not
exist. If p does not exist in either of two worlds then they are equally good
for p.
We can now see how variabilism purports to explain the two parts of
the asymmetry. First, if a contingent person’s life would be worse than
non-existence then there is an accessible world, one where she does not
exist, which is better for her. Therefore, she suffers a loss in the world where
her life is not worth living and there is a reason against bringing her into
existence. Regarding the second half of the asymmetry we can say that if a
person would have a life worth living, were she to exist, then she suffers no
morally significant loss by not being created. She suffers a loss but it is not a
morally significant one.
One objection to variabilism is that it only takes morally significant losses
into account and not morally significant gains (or benefits). Variabilism entails
that the loss a person with a life worth living would suffer in worlds where
she does not exist does not give us a reason to create her but so far variabil-
27 See also Roberts (2010, ch. 2).
28 In Roberts (2010) the definition reads “a person incurs a loss whenever agents (by act or
omission) create less wellbeing for that person when agents could have created more wellbeing
for that very same person” (Roberts 2010, p. 46). In Roberts (2011) she says that “to say that
a person p incurs a loss at a given world w as a result of a given act a is to say that there was
still another world w’ accessible to agents at the critical time such that their performance of an
alternative act a’ at w’ is better for p than their performance of a at w is” (Roberts 2011, p.
337). On both these formulations there is a reference to agents and their alternatives. However,
whether a person incurs a loss, on Roberts’ view, is fully determined by the better-for relations
which hold between a possible world and the accessible alternatives. See Roberts (2011, p.
337).
29 See Roberts (2011, p. 338).
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ism does not entail anything about whether the fact that she has a life worth
living counts in favour of creating her. Strictly speaking, it is compatible with
variabilism to claim that a possible future person’s happiness counts in favour
of creating her. What variabilism rules out is that this person would suffer a
morally significant loss by being left out of existence, but this is clearly a dif-
ferent question than whether the fact that she would have a life worth living
were she to exist is a reason to make her exist.
In reply to this objection, Roberts has argued that we should understand
benefits to simply be the converse of losses. She writes that
gains are important on the same variable basis on which losses are impor-
tant. More specifically: gains have moral significance, not when those gains
are accrued at the world at which the person who accrues those gains exist, but
rather when the losses those gains avoid on behalf of that person are incurred
at worlds where the person who incurs those losses exists. (Roberts 2011, p.
365).
Since “better” and “worse” are interdefinable, we can define benefits by sim-
ply replacing “better” with “worse” in the definition of morally significant
losses:
p enjoys a morally significant gain at a world w iff there is an accessible world
w′ which is worse for p and p exists in w′.
With this definition of morally significant gains we can then see how variabil-
ism accounts for the second claim in the asymmetry. The gains a contingent
future person would enjoy, were she to exist, are only morally significant if it
would be worse for this person if she did not enjoy these gains and this person
would exist if she did not enjoy these gains.
Taking gains to be the converse of losses comes with a fairly steep price
however. One feature of Roberts’ definition of a morally significant loss is
that it is impossible for a person to suffer a morally significant loss in worlds
where she does not exist. However, because Roberts takes morally significant
gains to be the converse of morally significant losses, it follows that a person
enjoys a significant gain only if she exists, not in the world where she enjoys
the gain, but in an accessible world which is worse for her. This means, among
other things, that we can bestow a morally significant gain to a person by not
creating her.
Note that it is necessary to analyse gains in this way if variabilism is to im-
ply the asymmetry. If one were to say that a person can only enjoy a morally
significant gain in worlds where she exists then, contrary to what the asymme-
try claims, that gain would be morally significant. Creating a person with a life
worth living would in that case be to bestow a morally significant gain to that
person because there is an alternative which is worse for her (non-existence).
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Variabilism therefore requires gains to be analysed as the converse of losses
in order for it to imply the asymmetry.
Why should we think that there is this difference between morally signif-
icant gains and losses? That is, why can morally significant losses only be
suffered by a person in worlds where that person exists while morally sig-
nificant gains can be enjoyed by people in worlds where they do not exist?
To this question the only forthcoming answer seems to be that this difference
between gains and losses is necessary in order for variabilism to imply the
asymmetry.30 But this is not a sufficient reason to consider the asymmetry
saved, nor does it remove what at least appears to be a conflict between its
two constituent claims. Rather, it shows that variabilism presupposes the very
view, the asymmetry, which it purports to justify.
7.4 Summary
In this chapter I have argued that axiological approaches which are congenial
with Q cannot explain the strong asymmetry. The problem with the asymme-
try, from an axiological perspective, is that it has to be explained why adding a
person with a life not worth living to a population makes it worse while adding
a person with a life worth living to a population does not make the population
better.
Both impersonal and person-affecting axiologies imply either that adding a
person with a life worth living to a population makes the population better, or
that adding a person with a life not worth living does not make a population
worse. If an axiology is to be consistent with both claims then the asymmetry
would have to be reduced to a brute axiological fact which does not allow for
further explanation.
It might, at this point, be claimed that the failure of the axiological ap-
proaches is sufficient reason to abandon the strong version of the asymmetry
and settle for a weaker version instead. This conclusion would be premature
however. As I will argue in the next chapter, the asymmetry can be defended
if we focus on the Harm Principle and an analogous Principle of Beneficence.
The Harm Principle, I will argue, is not an explanatory fifth wheel. Rather, it
does some serious work in explaining the asymmetry.
30 Roberts seems to acknowledge this point. See Roberts (2011, p. 365).
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8. The dual role of harm
In the previous chapter I argued that axiological approaches to population
ethics fail to capture the intuition that there is an asymmetry in our obliga-
tions to future people. The strong version of this asymmetry consists of the
following two claims:
(I) If a contingent future person would have a life not worth living then this is
a reason against creating that person.
(II) If a contingent future person would have a life worth living then this is not
a reason in favour of creating that person.
The asymmetry is a common view but it calls out for an explanation. As I
have argued it is very difficult to formulate an axiology which explains the
asymmetry and which is also consistent with the same-number quality claim,
Q.
In this chapter I will consider whether a plausible defence of the asymme-
try might be found if we focus on two normative principles, the Harm Prin-
ciple and an analogous Principle of Beneficence. I will argue that the strong
asymmetry can be explained by distinguishing between two kinds of reasons:
requiring and (merely) compensating. According to the defence of the asym-
metry which I will suggest benefits to contingent future people do provide a
kind of reason, but this kind of reason is not sufficient to make it required to
create a person with a life worth living. Harms to contingent future persons
can however make it required not to create a person with a life worth liv-
ing because harms provide reasons of the requiring kind. This defence of the
asymmetry does not preserve (II) to the letter because benefits to contingent
future persons do provide reasons in favour of creating them. However, I will
argue that it preserves it spirit.
I will also argue that appealing to these two kinds of reasons involves as-
signing a “dual role” to harm. First, harms provide reasons as specified by the
Harm Principle. Second, harm is a precondition for benefits to provide reasons
of the same kind. I will argue that the distinction between two kinds of rea-
sons is presupposed by two normative categories which are a pervasive part
of common-sense morality, supererogation and options, and that the asymme-
try can be defended as an instance of an option. I will argue that the most
plausible ground for this option is the importance of autonomy. Grounding
the option to create people with lives worth living involves assigning a special
importance to harm which explains why harms play these two roles in procre-
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ative decision and not benefits. Finally, I will consider some objections which
could be raised against this defence of the asymmetry.
8.1 Harms and benefits
It seems easy enough to argue for the first half of the asymmetry by appealing
to the Harm Principle. If a person would have a life not worth living then the
bad things in that life outweigh the good things. Such a life therefore contain
at least one negative well-being component. If one were to bring a person into
existence with a life not worth living then there would be a state of affairs
which makes that person’s life go worse in the sense specified by (2*) in the
Minimalist View (see chapter 4). One would also be responsible for that state
of affairs because the state of affairs would not have obtained had one not
created this person (see chapter 5). This means that bringing a person into
existence with a life not worth living would be to harm her and we therefore
have a reason against doing so.
The Harm Principle offers no guidance regarding the second half of the
asymmetry. This is because the second half of the asymmetry is concerned
with the benefits a future person would enjoy rather than the harms she would
suffer. We therefore need to consider benefits and under what circumstances
they provide reasons.1
The most straightforward approach would be to adopt a principle of benef-
icence analogous to the Harm Principle:
The Principle of Beneficence: if an act would benefit someone then this is a
reason in favour of performing that act.
We could also analyse “benefit” in a similar way as “harm” was analysed in
previous chapters. By replacing “worse” with “better” in (2*) while leaving
the other conditions as they are, we get the following analysis:
a benefits b if and only if
(1) a performs an act, φ ,
(2*) b is in a state S such that b’s life is better, taking S into account, than b’s
life not taking S into account.
(3*) if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained at all, or
would have obtained in a different way which is salient in the circumstances.
1 It might be claimed that the easiest way to defend the asymmetry would be to deny that
benefits provide reasons under any circumstances. However, this view is very counter-intuitive.
It suggests, for example, that the balance of reasons is almost always against creating people
(because most lives include at least some harmful states). I discuss this kind of “anti-natalism”
below.
152
It is easy to see however that the Principle of Beneficence together with this
analysis of benefits would be incompatible with the second half of the asym-
metry. A life worth living will include some benefits, i.e., some states which
make the person’s life better for her. According to the Principle of Benefi-
cence these benefits would therefore be a reason to create her.2 In order to
save strong asymmetry we need a reason for thinking that we should disre-
gard these benefits completely – the benefits a future person would enjoy give
us no reason to create that person.
One such ground could be the versions of the Person-Affecting Principle
discussed in the previous chapter. One could claim, for example, that we
should disregard benefits to non-actual people (a version of actualism) or con-
tingent people (a version of necessitarianism). These views are not much more
plausible here than in the axiological context for two reasons. First, it would
be ad hoc to apply this principle only to benefits and not to harms as well. Ne-
cessitarianism is the worst offender here. Applied to harm, necessitarianism
implies that we should disregard harms to contingent future people. A neces-
sitarian version of the Harm Principle would therefore not support (I). Second,
the counter-examples against these constraints apply here as well. Actualism,
for example, would still imply that there are situations where whatever we do
there is an alternative which we have more reason to do. For example, sup-
pose we can either create a or b, both of which would have lives not worth
living. If we create a then a is actual and we have a reason against this ac-
tion. However, since b is not actual there are no reasons against creating this
person. Hence, there is an alternative which we have more reason to choose,
other things being equal.
An alternative approach would be to restrict the Principle of
Beneficence:
The Restricted Principle of Beneficence: If an act would benefit someone then
this is a reason in favour of performing that act if and only if the consequences
of not performing the act would harm someone.3
Not all benefits are equal on this view. Those benefits that are not also pre-
ventions of harm do not provide reasons while those benefits that are also
preventions of harm do. This principle is not satisfied when it comes to cre-
ating people who would have lives worth living because if the person had not
2 Note that we do not need to enter the debate whether existence can be better than non-
existence for a person in order to say that a person would be harmed, or benefited, by being
created.
3 For similar views, see Shiffrin (1999) and Benatar (2006). Note that this condition is not
explicitly endorsed by Shiffrin or Benatar. They use slightly different terms but what follows is
a plausible way of interpreting what they suggest. For example, Shiffrin formulates her defence
of the asymmetry in Kantian terms and Benatar uses both personal and impersonal values.
Neither of these are necessary to formulate this particular way of defending the asymmetry
however.
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been created then she would not have existed and therefore, would not have
been harmed.4
The problem with this view is that it creates a presumption against procre-
ation.5 Suppose we could create a person who would live a very happy life.
The Restricted Principle of Beneficence holds that the good things in this per-
son’s life do not provide reasons in favour of creating this person. However, it
seems plausible to assume that this person would also suffer some bad things.
They might not be very numerous, and the good things might be greater, but
the claim that each future person we could create will suffer at least on occa-
sion is difficult to deny. What this means is that it is reasonable to think that
the Harm Principle is relevant: the person would be harmed were she to be
created and the harms she would suffer provide reasons against creating her.
The situation then is that there is no reason in favour of creating this person
but some reason against.
By appealing to the Restricted Principle of Beneficence one is therefore
committed to the view that there is a general presumption against creating new
people. If we create a person then, because almost every life contains some bad
things, we will harm her and this is supposed to be a reason against creating
her. Furthermore, the benefits this person would enjoy do not provide us with
a reason to create her. Defending the asymmetry on the basis of the Restricted
Principle of Beneficence therefore implies anti-natalism: the balance of rea-
sons is (almost) always against creating new people.6 Anti-natalism is a view
few are inclined to accept. Even though it is a consequence of this defence
of the asymmetry, it seems more plausible to deny that there are no reasons
in favour of creating happy people than to affirm that there is a presumption
against procreation.
We can summarise the difficulty with strong asymmetry in the following
way: on the one hand, if a person would benefit from being created then the
benefits this person would enjoy are not a reason to create her. On the other
hand, if the benefits do not provide reasons to create her then there does not
seem to be anything to counterbalance the reasons against creating her stem-
ming from harms. That is, we end up with anti-natalism. To defend the asym-
metry and avoid anti-natalism it seems we will have to claim that the benefits
a contingent future person would enjoy do not provide reasons to create her
while at the same time claim that the same benefits must be able to provide
reasons to create her.
It therefore appears to be the case the we cannot save the strong asymmetry
while also rejecting anti-natalism. This, it might be thought, gives us excellent
4 As I argued in chapter four, non-existence does not makes a person’s life go worse, though it
undermines that anything else makes a person’s life go better or worse.
5 This is argued by McMahan (2009, p. 53, 61). See also McMahan (1981, p. 120, fn. 28) and
(1988, p. 35).
6 Benatar endorses this view while Shiffrin merely says that procreation is not a “morally inno-
cent endeavor” (Shiffrin 1999, p. 118).
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reason to reject the strong version of the asymmetry and to retreat to defend-
ing the weak version instead. Recall that weak asymmetry grants that there are
reasons in favour of creating people with lives worth living but that reasons
to benefit carry less weight than reasons against harming. However, abandon-
ing the strong version of the asymmetry would be premature. As I will argue
below it is possible to save the spirit of the strong version of by making a
distinction between different kinds of benefits.
8.2 Two kinds of reasons
What I suggest is that we can save the spirit of the strong asymmetry while
rejecting anti-natalism. The difficulty with combining the asymmetry and the
rejection of anti-natalism only arises with the assumption that if the benefits
a contingent future person would enjoy do not provide reasons to create her
then they cannot be relevant to the balance of reasons in procreative choices.
What I suggest is that there are two kinds of normative reasons: requiring and
(merely) compensating reasons. Requiring reasons count in favour (or against)
acts and can ground a requirement to (not) perform the act should the balance
of reasons turn out in favour of (against) the act. Compensating reasons on
the other hand also count in favour (or against) acts but they cannot ground a
requirement to (not) perform the act. They can merely compensate for other
reasons when determining the balance of reasons. Requiring reasons, obvi-
ously, also have this feature. What distinguishes compensating reasons from
requiring reasons is that the former lack something. Compensating reasons
lack the possible “force” of making an act required. Should the balance of
reasons turn out in favour of an act then the fact that there are merely compen-
sating reasons in favour of performing the act is not sufficient for the act to
be required. We should not, however, understand requiring reasons to be suf-
ficient for a moral requirement. The notion of a requiring reason is rather the
notion of a kind of reason that is necessary in order for an act to be required.
With this distinction between two kinds of reasons the strong asymmetry
can be formulated in the following way: the harms a contingent future person
would suffer provide requiring reasons while the benefits a contingent future
person would enjoy provide (merely) compensating reasons. Creating a per-
son with a life worth living is favoured by the balance of reasons, because the
benefits outweigh the harms, but it is not required to create a person with a life
worth living because the reasons that tip the balance are (merely) compensat-
ing. It is required however not to create a person with a life not worth living
because these reasons are of the requiring kind.
If there is such a distinction between different kinds of reasons to be made
then one could also argue that anti-natalism does not follow from the strong
version of the asymmetry in the following way. When it comes to creating
happy people, the bad things in that person’s life provide reasons against do-
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ing so. However, the good things (the benefits) provide (merely) compensating
reasons in favour of creating the person. The balance of reasons is therefore
not typically against creating people. Note that we need not say that benefits
cannot provide requiring reasons. In some circumstances it is very plausible
that they do. In order to save strong asymmetry we need only claim that ben-
efits to contingent future persons are (merely) compensating.
It might be asked whether the distinction between two kinds of reasons pre-
serves the strong asymmetry. As the asymmetry was formulated it consists
partly in the claim that the well-being a person would have were she to exist is
not a reason in favour of making her exist. It might be objected that this is not
true on my suggestion because benefits to contingent future persons do pro-
vide reasons on my view, just not the same kind of reasons as harms. However,
even though it does not preserve the strong asymmetry to the letter it does pre-
serve its spirit. After all, the benefits a contingent future person would enjoy
cannot make it required to create her, while harms to a contingent future per-
son can make it required not to create her. This difference between harms and
benefits to contingent future people seems to be at the core of the asymmetry.
If we can preserve the intuition that harms and benefits to contingent future
people are different from a moral point of view by distinguishing between
two kinds of reasons then we would have preserved all that a defender of the
asymmetry could ever have wanted.7
McMahan (2009) entertains a view along these lines. He argues that in or-
der to save the strong version of the asymmetry we need to make a distinction
between the “reason-giving function” and the “canceling function” of goods
and bads. On his view, goods which only have a canceling function “do not
count as reasons for causing the person to exist [since they do not have the
reason-giving function]. But they do weigh against and cancel out correspond-
ing bads that the person’s life would contain” (McMahan 2009, p. 53). What
the asymmetry presupposes, according to McMahan, is that some goods, such
as benefits to future people, lack the reason-giving function but have the can-
celing function.
The way McMahan draws the distinction some goods, those that only have
a canceling function, can be weighed against bads with a reason-giving func-
tion. A problem with this way of describing the distinction is that it is difficult
to see how such “canceling goods” can be weighed against bads unless they do
in fact provide reasons. For this reason it seems more fitting to say that all ben-
efits provide reasons, they all have a “reason-giving function”, but that some
goods provide reasons which are merely compensating while others provide
reasons which are requiring.
A similar distinction is also defended by Gert (2007).8 Instead of saying that
there are two kinds of reasons Gert argues that practical reasons in general
7 This view is also not merely a version of the weak asymmetry because harms and benefits
have the same weight, though they can differ in kind, according to this view.
8 See also Gert (2000, 2003).
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have two “dimensions” of normative strength: a justifying and a requiring
dimension. A reason’s justifying strength is the degree to which the reason
justifies an act while a reason’s requiring strength is the degree to which it
requires an act. Gert argues that these two dimensions can come apart and that
a reason can have great justifying strength but very little requiring strength.
The distinction between justifying and requiring normative strength could,
if the distinction can be maintained, be used to defend the asymmetry in a
similar way as McMahan’s distinction. We can understand the justifying di-
mension of a reason as the reason’s ability to make an act permissible. In order
for an act to be required, however, it has to be favoured by reasons which have
requiring strength. If it could be argued that the reasons supporting creating
people with lives worth living has no requiring strength, but only justifying
strength, then one could avoid anti-natalism by claiming that creating people
with lives worth living is permissible (“justified”) but not required.
Gert explicitly argues against the claim that there are two kinds of reasons
because “any reason that can require me not to act on contrary reasons also
justifies me in acting against those reasons, and therefore has both requir-
ing and justifying strength” (Gert 2007, p. 542). Suppose, for example, that I
would prevent future pain by going to the dentist and that the prevention of
future pain requires me to do so. But, it seems plausible that I am also justified
in going to the dentist, and that it is the same reason which does the requiring
and the justifying. There is only one reason here, the prevention of future pain,
and that this reason is what requires and justifies a visit to the dentist.
However, this example seems to work against Gert’s view that there are two
dimensions of normative strength. Gert assumes that reasons with requiring
strength also have justifying strength but, if the two dimensions are indepen-
dent of each other then it would be a coincidence that requiring strength co-
incides with justifying strength. That they do coincide is not a coincidence
if we draw the distinction between two kinds of reasons as I did above. The
difference between requiring and (merely) compensating reasons is that com-
pensating reasons lack the ability to ground a requirement but they are alike
in other respects. We do not have to say that there is one requiring and one
compensating reason in the dentist-example. Rather, there is just one reason,
the prevention of future pain, which is of the requiring kind.
On the other hand, if the two dimensions are not independent of each other,
so that all reasons with some requiring strength have the same justifying
strength, then it is unclear why we should not say that there are two kinds of
reasons. One kind which has some requiring strength, and an equally strong
justifying strength, and another kind of reason which has no requiring strength
but some justifying strength. This possibility also suggests that the difference
between my view and Gert’s may not be that great. The main difference, it
seems, is whether we should say that there are two kinds of reasons or just
one kind with two “functions” or “strengths”. This difference seems to be one
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regarding the metaphysics of reasons and will not greatly affect the defence
of the asymmetry which I will present below.
Gert also objects to the use of phrases such as “the balance of reasons”.9
Because there are two dimensions of normative strength, Gert argues, to talk
about “the balance of reasons” is just a misleading metaphor. When weighing
two reasons we cannot simply say that one outweighs, or is stronger, than the
other in an unqualified way. On Gert’s view we can talk about the balance
of reasons with respect to requiring strength and the balance of reasons with
respect to justifying strength, but there is no balance of reasons period.
Doing away with the balance of reasons makes Gert’s way of drawing the
distinction less attractive. Talk about “the balance of reasons” in an unquali-
fied way seems to make sense, and drawing the distinction between two kinds
of reasons has the advantage that it is less revisionary in this respect. As I
will argue below, however, the balance of reasons may not be as useful as it is
sometimes thought. But, we should not give up on the notion for this reason.
Gert’s claim that it is pointless to talk about the balance of reasons raises
the question what we should say, if there are indeed two kinds of reasons,
about the relation between the balance of reasons and moral requirements.
One objection which could be raised against making a distinction between
two kinds of reasons is that it is incompatible with the following claim: if an
act is favoured by the balance of reasons then it is morally required. Making
a distinction between two kinds of reasons seems to be incompatible with
this claim because the distinction amounts to a view where an act could be
favoured by compensating reasons only. Such an act would not be morally
required because compensating reasons cannot ground a moral requirement.
However, we should not be so eager to accept the view that if an act is
favoured by the balance of reasons then it is morally required. For example,
I may have excellent reasons to scratch an itch but that does not make me
morally required to do so.10
While the worry just mentioned does not seem especially troubling, it might
be claimed that a plausible requirement on the relation between reasons and
duties is that if an act is favoured by the moral reasons then it is morally re-
quired. If compensating reasons are moral reasons then, the objection goes,
the view above would not be compatible with this requirement. However, it is
9 See Gert (2007, pp. 548–9).
10 An interesting question, which I will here merely mention, is what to think of the reverse con-
ditional: if an act is morally required then it is favoured by the balance of reasons. If we accept
the distinction between compensating and requiring reasons then we would have to deny even
this claim because it seems possible that the act which is favoured by the balance of reasons
only has compensating reasons favouring it while an inferior alternative is supported by requir-
ing reasons. If a plausible case of this kind could be construed then I should reject this claim as
well. See however Stroud (1998) who argues that a restricted version of the reverse conditional
is the only plausible version. A possible restricted version which would be compatible with the
two kinds of reasons is the following: if an act is morally required then it is favoured by the
balance of requiring reasons.
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not entirely clear what is meant here by “moral reasons”. One way to under-
stand “moral reason” is to say that a reason in favour of φ -ing counts as moral
if and only if the reason could ground a moral requirement to φ . On this inter-
pretation the requirement seems trivial and it is quite clear that the distinction
between compensating and requiring reasons is compatible with it. According
to this view of “moral reasons”, compensating reasons are not moral reasons
at all.
An alternative way to understand “moral reasons” is to say that a reason
counts as moral if and only if the reason is relevant to the moral status of
an act (or a state of affairs). On this interpretation the distinction between
requiring and compensating reasons would be inconsistent with the require-
ment.11 However, interpretating moral reasons in this way makes the require-
ment less trivial. As I will argue below, two aspects of common sense morality,
supererogation and options, are arguably inconsistent with this requirement.
We should therefore not accept the alternative notion of moral reasons in so
far as we think that supererogation and options make sense.12
A more serious objection is that the distinction between two kinds of reason
is artificial and that there are no grounds, independent of the asymmetry, to
accept it. Relying on this distinction is no more plausible than a defence of
the strong asymmetry based on the axiological approach’s “brute axiological
facts”. McMahan, for example, raises this worry and writes that introducing
the two functions he mentions seems “strikingly ad hoc” (McMahan 2009, p.
54).
On closer examination one can say that the worry mainly concerns two
things. First, the claim that some benefits count in one way under some cir-
cumstances and in another way in other circumstances seems ad hoc. It is not
very plausible to claim that benefits never provide requiring reasons, so why
do not all benefits provide the same kind of reason? Second, even if we accept
the distinction between two kinds of reasons, why should we think that ben-
efits to contingent future people provide reasons of the compensating kind?
Also, why do harms to contingent future people provide requiring reasons and
not compensating reasons?
In reply to the first worry I will argue that there are striking structural sim-
ilarities between the two kinds of reasons relevant to the asymmetry (favour-
ing and requiring) and reasons that figure in two normative categories: su-
pererogation and options. These similarities support the conditional claim that
11 There are certainly details to spell out here. It seems plausible however that compensating rea-
sons are moral reasons in this sense because they are relevant to whether an act is permissible,
as the asymmetry illustrates.
12 This applies even to those who reject supererogation and options because they think that there
are no acts which have these properties. That is, anyone who thinks that supererogation and
options are conceptually possible should reject the suggestion that “moral reasons” should be
understood as those reasons which are relevant to the moral evaluation of an act or a state of
affairs.
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if a moral theory includes options or supererogation then there exists the nec-
essary conceptual space required by the asymmetry. In reply to the second
worry I will suggest that benefits to contingent future persons provide (merely)
compensating reasons because it is important to allow people to pursue their
own aims, interests and projects as long as they do no harm. That people
are so allowed, I will argue, is a way of respecting people’s autonomy. What
“grounds” the option to create people with lives worth living, and options in
other circumstances, is the value of autonomy thus conceived.
Autonomy, understood as the freedom to pursue one’s own aims, interests
and projects as long as they do no harm, also answers why harms to contin-
gent future persons provide requiring reasons and not (merely) compensating
reasons. Avoiding harm is more important than benefiting because harms play
this second role, besides providing reasons, of setting the limits of autonomy.
8.2.1 Supererogation
Supererogatory acts are usually characterised as acts that are “beyond the call
of duty”.13 Typical examples are sacrificing one’s life in order to save oth-
ers’, devoting all one’s life and resources to help the less fortunate and so on.
Such acts are not usually thought to be required by morality even though there
are usually strong reasons in favour of them. Also, supererogatory acts are
generally, if not always, praiseworthy.
A possible approach to supererogation is to maintain that while there are
strong reasons in favour of such acts, there are also strong reasons against
them. Consider the examples mentioned above. Sacrificing one’s life to save
others’ is, after all, a great cost to the agent. It might be claimed that this cost
to the agent should be accounted for in the balance of reasons. On this view, a
supererogatory act is not favoured by the balance of reasons because the cost
to the agent of performing the supererogatory act has to be factored in.
I mention this as a possible view, but it is not plausible as a view of su-
pererogation. On this view, supererogatory acts would be those where the rea-
sons provided by the cost to the agent and the reasons provided by benefits to
others are perfectly matched. Otherwise, if the cost to the agent outweighed
the benefits to others then the agent would be required not to perform the sac-
rifice. This is not how supererogation is typically thought to work. Rather,
a supererogatory act is permissible, but not required. This view also fails to
capture the idea that to perform a supererogatory act is to do more than is
required. It is central to supererogation that the act is supported by the best
reasons, all things considered, but that it is nevertheless not required.
Also, on this account of supererogation we would have to give the cost to
the agent an implausible weight if typical examples of supererogation are not
favoured by the balance of reasons. For example, suppose that Blue can save
13 See Urmson (1958) and Heyd (1982).
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the lives of ten strangers by throwing himself on a bomb, thereby shielding the
others from the blast, and that throwing himself on the bomb is supererogatory.
There is then a reason in favour of making the sacrifice (it will save ten lives)
and, according to this view of supererogation, a reason against making the
sacrifice (it will cost Blue his life). However, note that if Blue does not save
the ten strangers then he is, in effect, saving himself. Blue’s choice is therefore
a choice between saving one, which happens to be himself, and saving ten
strangers. In order for this to be a case where there is a tie in the balance of
reasons it seems that we would have to say that Blue is allowed to give saving
his own life an implausibly greater weight than saving a stranger’s life.
It could of course be objected that this is not an example of supererogation.
That is, it could be claimed that Blue is actually required to makes the sac-
rifice. While this is a possible view it is simply to deny the premise that this
is an example of supererogation. It is therefore not a reply which is friendly
to supererogation in general. After all, sacrificing oneself to save others is
supposed to be a typical example of supererogation.
Supererogation, if it exists, therefore seems to assume that there is a dis-
tinction among reasons similar to the distinction between requiring and com-
pensating reasons. Supererogatory acts are favoured by the balance of reasons
but they are not required. The reasons in favour of performing supererogatory
acts are therefore unable to ground a moral requirement. They can however
be weighed against other reasons. It therefore seems plausible to say that su-
pererogation presupposes the existence of compensating reasons. In reply to
the first worry mentioned above it could then be argued that making a distinc-
tion between two kinds of reasons is not ad hoc because the same distinction
is presupposed by supererogation.
The second worry was that even if there is a distinction between two kinds
of reasons to be made, it still has to be shown that benefits to contingent fu-
ture people provide (merely) compensating reasons and not requiring requir-
ing. Here appealing to supererogation will not be of much help because there
are significant differences between creating people with lives worth living and
supererogation. For one thing, supererogatory acts are praiseworthy but this
is not true of procreation. Of course, most people consider having children a
good thing but they hardly think themselves heroic or saintly in having chil-
dren, and rightly so. This difference suggests that while supererogation and
the asymmetry seem to assume that there are two kinds of reasons, the latter
can not plausibly be thought of as an instance of the former.14
14 Heyd (1994, p. 115) notes and dismisses the possibility of classifying the asymmetry as an
instance of supererogation for precisely this reason. It has been argued by Chisholm (1963) that
what characterises supererogatory acts is that while it would be good if they were performed
it would not be bad if they were not performed. If one adopts Chisholm’s suggestion then it
would be plausible to say that creating people with lives worth living is supererogatory. How-
ever, as the connection with praiseworthiness indicates, Chisholm’s criteria for supererogation
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We should therefore conclude that while supererogation presupposes two
kinds of reasons, requiring and compensating reasons, the asymmetry can not
plausibly be viewed as an instance of supererogation. Let us turn to options
and see whether they make a better case for the asymmetry.
8.2.2 Options
A more plausible approach to the asymmetry is to characterise creating people
with lives worth living as “optional”. To say that agents have a moral option to
φ is to say that it is permissible but not required for agents to φ , even if φ -ing
is not supported by the balance of reasons. Typical examples of options are
giving priority to the well-being of one’s near and dear over the well-being of
strangers or to give priority to one’s personal projects over others’. It is on this
view permissible to, say, save your drowning child rather than a stranger’s,
or to work on your own dissertation rather than helping a colleague, even
if saving the stranger’s child or helping your colleague is supported by the
balance of reasons.
One attempt to account for the permissibility of saving your child rather
than a stranger’s is to say that the personal tie, the fact that it is your child,
provides you with a reason which is not applicable to anyone else. On this
view, you have an agent-relative reason which only applies to you. It is per-
missible to save your child because even if the benefits of saving the stranger’s
child are greater than the benefits of saving your child there is an agent-relative
reason, the personal tie, which counterbalances these. Options, on this view,
are ties in the balance of reasons.
However, reducing options to ties in the balance of reasons does not seem
plausible because it is characteristic of options that they are “suboptimal” in
the sense that they are not favoured by the balance of reasons yet still per-
missible.15 This characterisation of options is also a pervasive part of com-
mon sense morality. Consider certain counter-examples to act utilitarianism
which are designed to show that this theory is too demanding. Such counter-
examples start from the observation that in our everyday lives we usually in-
dulge in small enjoyments even though our time and money could be better
spent elsewhere. For example, it is morally permitted to occasionally go to
the cinema. However, it is quite plausible that more good could be done by
doing something else, such as giving the money spent on the ticket to charity.
Still, we think that we are not doing anything wrong by occasionally visiting
the cinema. However it is hard to deny that on every particular visit we do in
fact have stronger moral reasons to give the money to charity instead. What
this suggests is that options presuppose that the reasons which favour giving
the money to charity are not sufficient to make it required to give the money
are, at best, necessary and not sufficient. See also Heyd (1982, pp. 113–120) for a critique of
Chisholm’s analysis of supererogation.
15 See Kagan (1989, pp. 3–4, 75–6) and Scheffler (2003, pp. 22–3).
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to charity. That is, options seem to presuppose a different kind of reason. The
balance of reasons are in favour of giving money to charity but the reasons
that tip the balance are not sufficient to make it required.
Options, just as supererogation, seem to presuppose a kind of reason that
is relevant to the balance of reasons but which are non-requiring. The main
difference between supererogation and the asymmetry is that supererogatory
acts are generally considered praiseworthy while creating new people is not.
Options, on the other hand, do not have this connection to praiseworthiness
and it is therefore more plausible to say that the asymmetry is an instance of
an option.16 We have not shown, of course, that there are options nor that cre-
ating people with lives worth living is optional. What the structural similarities
between options and the asymmetry suggests is that if there are options, then
the asymmetry could be defended as an instance of an option.
8.2.2.1 Options and autonomy
Even if there are options it still has to be shown that creating people with lives
worth living is optional. In order to establish that an act is optional one has
to show that there is some special consideration which makes it plausible that
a suboptimal act is permitted. What is lacking, in other words, is a plausible
“ground” for the option.
One view is that what grounds an option has to do with the cost to the agent
of performing the optimal act. If performing the act which is favoured by the
balance of reasons would require that the agent sacrificed too much then the
agent is allowed to perform some other act which avoids this sacrifice. More
precisely, the suggestion can be formulated in the following way:
The Appeal to Cost: if the cost to the agent of performing an act which is
favoured by the balance of reasons is very great then the agent is allowed to
perform an inferior alternative, provided that the alternative is not very infe-
rior.17
There are a number of problems with this view as a ground for procreation as
an option. First, grounding an option to create people with lives worth living
16 One possible view of options is that they correspond to what Driver (1992) calls “the suberoga-
tory”. Suberogatory acts are “acts that we ought not to do, but which are not forbidden” (Driver
1992, p. 291). The intuition which Driver attempts to capture by this concept is that there seems
to be acts which we disapprove of but which we nevertheless think are morally acceptable. It
seems to me that while some optional acts may be suberogatory, it is not true of all options.
Options, as I will understand them, have no necessary connection to praise, blame, approval or
disapproval.
17 See for example Scheffler (2003, p. 20), though Scheffler’s version of the appeal to cost is a
bit more complicated. He suggests that it would be permissible for an agent to “promote the
non-optimal outcome of his choosing, provided only that the degree of its inferiority to each of
the superior outcomes he could instead promote in no case exceeded, by more than the specified
proportion, the degree of sacrifice necessary for him to promote the superior outcome”. See also
Kagan (1989, ch. 7).
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based on the cost to the agent would be too strong because it implies that it
would be optional to create people in cases where other people would benefit
from the new person’s existence. The asymmetry is silent with respect to this
claim. Second, it is doubtful, at best, whether the costs of procreation are
sufficient for typical cases of procreation to count as an option. It is a common
view, at least, that raising a family is not a burden but a privilege. This suggests
that the cost of procreation is typically not significantly large in order for it
to be optional. Finally, it is unclear why there would be two kinds of reasons
given the cost-approach and why benefits to contingent future people would
only provide compensating reasons. Rather, according to the Appeal to Cost
an agent could be permitted to harm contingent future people if the cost of not
harming them would be too costly to the agent. This suggests that what the
Appeal to Cost amounts to is not that there is a difference between benefiting
contingent future people and harming them, but rather that agents are allowed
to give a disproportionate weight to their self-interest.18 The Appeal to Cost
therefore fails to establish the asymmetry as an option.
An alternative view is to say that what grounds options is that people should
be allowed to pursue projects which are important to them, even if pursu-
ing these projects would be to perform sub-optimal acts. For example, Nagel
(1986, pp. 166–70) argues that there are reasons of “autonomy” which stems
“from the desires, projects, commitments, and personal ties of the individ-
ual agent, all of which give him reason to act in the pursuit of ends that are
his own” (Nagel 1986, p. 165). Nagel goes on to describe the value of these
personal projects and commitments in the following way:
Most things we pursue [...] are optional. Their value to us depends on our in-
dividual aims, projects, and concerns, including particular concerns for other
people that reflect our relations with them; they acquire value only because of
the interest we develop in them and the place this gives them in our lives, rather
than evoking interest because of their value. (Nagel 1986, p. 168).
It is clear that on Nagel’s view it is important to allow people to pursue their
own aims, projects and concerns, though he is quick to add that “[t]he crucial
question is how far the authority of each individual runs in determining the
objective value of the satisfaction of his own desires and preferences” (ibid.).
Autonomy is not the freedom to do whatever one wants but to pursue one’s
aims, projects and concerns within certain limits.19
18 The Appeal to Cost seems very similar to what Sidgwick called “the dualism of practical
reason”. Sidgwick’s view on the matter was that “in the rarer cases of a recognised conflict
between self-interest and duty, practical reason, being divided against itself, would cease to be
a motive on either side; the conflict would have to be decided by the comparative preponderance
of one or other of two groups of non-rational impulses” (Sidgwick 1981, p. 508).
19 For Nagel, the importance of autonomy appears to be connected to his claim that some things,
though not necessarily all, are valuable because people take on certain attitudes towards them.
There are of course other views on what explains the value of autonomy. For example, J. S. Mill
argues in On Liberty that “individuality” is an important component of a person’s well-being.
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A problem here is that it is not clear that Nagel’s view supports the exis-
tence of options. Rather, his view is that a person’s projects provide agent-
relative reasons whose strength is not the same as the agent-neutral reasons
these projects provide. What Nagel’s reasons of autonomy amounts to is that
people are allowed to give a disproportionate weight to their own interests
but it is not clear that people are allowed to ever perform an act which is not
favoured by the balance of reasons.20
However, we should not be so quick to dismiss the idea that autonomy, in
the sense that people are allowed to pursue their own aims and commitments
within certain limits, can ground options. This idea is independent of Nagel’s
claims about agent-relative and agent-neutral reasons and it is worth exploring
further without relying on agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons.
An alternative to Nagel’s view about the importance of autonomy is to focus
on the idea that the people are allowed to pursue their own aims within certain
limits. In order for autonomy to ground an option to procreate however, we
have to spell out what these limits are in a way which makes it plausible that
the choice not to create a person who would have a life worth living are within
these limits.
A view about what the limits to autonomy are is to say that people are
allowed to pursue their own priorities within the limits of the Harm Principle:
only when an inferior alternative would do no harm are we allowed to choose
it. Options based on autonomy, on this view, amounts to the freedom to pursue
one’s own aims provided that doing so does no harm.21
Note that this way of understanding autonomy is not to say that there are
reasons to pursue autonomy, nor that there are reasons “of autonomy” which
weigh for or against different alternatives in a situation. Appealing to auton-
omy is not to say that there is an additional reason based on autonomy in
favour of an otherwise sub-optimal alternative. Rather, the claim that people’s
On Mill’s view, the importance of being allowed to shape one’s life after one’s own priorities is
important because it allows for a better life. See also Raz (1988, chs. 14–15).
A similar view is suggested by Williams (1984) who claims that people are permitted to
pursue their own interests because doing otherwise would be “to alienate him in a real sense
from his actions and the source of his action in his own convictions [...] It is thus, in the most
literal sense, an attack on his integrity” (Williams 1984, pp. 116–7).
20 That Nagel’s view is not compatible with options has also been noted by Hurley (1995, pp.
167-8). Hurley also argues that Scheffler’s account of options, based on the Appeal to Cost,
does not allow for options (pp. 170–1).
21 Scheffler (2003, pp. 182–4) suggests a “no-harm” prerogative which “would not give agents
unqualified permission to devote proportionately greater weight to their own interests than to
the interests of other people. Rather, it would only permit agents to do this provided they did
not harm others in pursuit of their non-optimal ends” (Scheffler 2003, p. 183). See also Kagan’s
(1989, p. 188) criticism of a similar view which he calls “neo-moderete”. According to the
neo-moderete, it is permissible to pursue one’s own interest if doing so does no harm. But,
one is never permitted to perform acts which are sub-optimal and which do harm. Kagan’s
criticism is mainly targeted against a neo-moderete view formulated in terms of the Appeal to
Cost however. His main objection to the kind of view sketched here is that it relies on a dubious
act-omission distinction. I fail to see however how my view relies on that distinction.
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autonomy should be respected is a normative claim about when an act is per-
missible:
The Principle of Permissibility: an act is permissible if (i) it is favoured by the
balance of reasons or (ii) it does no harm.
This principle states two conditions which are sufficient for an act to be per-
missible. The first clause is necessary because respecting people’s autonomy
does not imply that it is not permitted to do what is favoured by the balance of
reasons. The principle is also compatible with it being required, in a specific
situation, to perform the act which is favoured by the balance of reasons. If
there is no alternative which does no harm then the only permissible act is the
one which is favoured by the balance of reasons. The second clause captures
the importance of autonomy. It is always permitted to perform an act which
does no harm, so people are allowed to pursue whatever aims and projects
they like as long as they do no harm.
Because the Principle of Permissibility only states two sufficient conditions
for permissibility it leaves it open whether an act could be permissible for
other reasons than (i) and (ii). For example, it might be claimed that peo-
ple should be allowed to perform acts which do no serious harm. Extending
the principle in this way might seem especially attractive considering that the
analysis of harm which I have argued for is very wide. It might also be ob-
jected that the principle should allow people to harm themselves if it is to
capture the importance of autonomy. For our present purposes we do not have
to decide on these possible extensions of the Principle of Permissibility be-
cause both are compatible with (ii) being sufficient for permissibility.
The Principle of Permissibility is also congenial with the claim that harms
always provide requiring reasons while benefits sometimes provide only com-
pensating reasons. A way to understand the Principle of Permissibility is as
assigning a second role to harm. On the one hand, harms provide requiring
reasons. This is the content of the Harm Principle and explains why, for ex-
ample, there is a reason against creating people with lives not worth living. On
the other hand, harm also plays the role of being a precondition for benefits to
provide requiring reasons by setting the limit on when a person is allowed to
pursue her own aims over the general good. Because a person is free to pursue
her own aims as long as she does no harm, we can say that a benefit provides a
requiring reason only if the benefit prevents harm. This explains why benefits
to contingent future people do not provide requiring reasons but only compen-
sating reasons. The benefits a contingent future person would enjoy were she
to be created only provide compensating reasons because no one would have
been harmed had the person not been created.22
22 Are there other examples where people would be allowed to perform sub-optimal acts be-
cause of autonomy, given that the analysis of harm is so wide? An example of a kind of case
where autonomy could be relevant is a kind of case discussed by Bykvist (2006). Suppose your
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Assigning a dual role to harm, and not to benefits, amounts to an asymmetry
between harms and benefits of sorts. It could be objected that this asymmetry
between harms and benefits is just as problematic as the original asymmetry.
It should be noted, first, that defending the asymmetry as an instance of an
option, grounded in the Principle of Permissibility, is not ad hoc. On my view
the asymmetry is defended by appealing to other considerations, options and
autonomy, whose plausibility is independent of asymmetry. As I argued in the
previous chapter, this is not typically the case for other ways of defending the
asymmetry. In the case of “variabilism” for example, that view only implies
the asymmetry if we adopt a counter-intuitive definition of benefits and the
only reason for adopting this definition was that it was necessary for the theory
to imply the asymmetry.
Second, assigning a dual role to harm captures the intuition that harms are
more important morally than benefits. Harms are not more important in the
sense that they typically provide stronger reasons. On the view just sketched
we should give an equal weight to harms and benefits of equal sizes. Rather,
harms are more important than benefits because all harms, regardless of the
circumstances, provide requiring reasons. That harm actually plays this role is
a normative claim which could be disputed. But, it is not a restatement of the
asymmetry. It is rather a way of showing that the asymmetry can be defended
as an instance of a more general phenomena, options, which is a pervasive
part of common-sense morality.
The possibility of explaining the asymmetry by appealing to autonomy has
also been suggested by Arrhenius (2013). Arrhenius argues that we should re-
ject an axiological version of the asymmetry and endorse the claim that a con-
tingent future person’s well-being can be a reason to create her, but that
[i]t doesn’t follow, however, that these reasons are decisive in the sense that
they can in themselves give rise to a moral obligation to procreate. [...] one
can consistently hold the view that an addition of people with positive wel-
fare might make an outcome better, other things being equal, but deny any
obligation to procreate since one can appeal to other values or deontological
considerations such as parental autonomy. (Arrhenius 2013, p. 222).
On Arrhenius’ view, to say that the reason to procreate is not decisive is to
say that such reasons are not enough, they are never “decisive in themselves”
(Arrhenius 2013, p. 222) for there to be an obligation to procreate. The notion
well-being is determined by your preference-satisfaction and that you can choose between two
careers, A or B. If you choose A you will come to prefer A and if you choose B you will come
to prefer B. Assume also that your A-preferences, those you would have were you to choose A,
would be stronger than your B-preferences. At the time of choosing you are indifferent between
the two. In such a case you would not do any harm whatever you choose because your prefer-
ences are dependent on your choice. However, because your A-preferences would be stronger
than your B-preferences, you would be benefited more by choosing A. Appealing to autonomy
allows you in cases like this to choose either A or B.
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of a reason not being decisive is very similar to my claim that the benefits a
contingent future person would enjoy can not provide requiring reasons.
A problem for Arrhenius’ view is that, for the appeal to autonomy to save
the asymmetry, it has to be assumed that autonomy can make the reason to cre-
ate a person with a life worth living non-decisive but, autonomy can not make
the reason not to create a person with a life not worth living non-decisive.
Why, for example, could not a couple who decides to have a child with a life
not worth living defend this decision by appealing to their parental autonomy?
A possible way for Arrhenius to reply to this objection would be to accept my
claim above that there are limits to people’s autonomy. The limits I have sug-
gested to individuals’ autonomy include that a person is only free to choose
an inferior alternative if the inferior alternative would not do harm. A couple
attempting to defend their decision to have a child with a life not worth living
will therefore have no business doing so on the grounds of autonomy.
To summarise, I have argued that the asymmetry can be explained in a uni-
fied way by appealing to harm, autonomy and the distinction between two
kinds of reasons. Important to this defence is the claim that harm plays a dual
role. First, harm is connected with reasons as specified by the Harm Princi-
ple. This explains why there is a reason against creating a person with a life
not worth living. Second, harm also plays the role of being a precondition for
benefits to provide requiring reasons. The benefits a contingent future person
would enjoy, were she to be created, are not also preventions of harm and do
therefore provide (merely) compensating reasons, not requiring reasons. Ben-
efits to contingent future persons can therefore only compensate for harm but
they cannot make it required to create a person with a life worth living. This
second role of harm is given by the importance of autonomy: benefits which
are not preventions of harm only provide compensating reasons because peo-
ple are allowed to shape their lives in accordance with their own priorities as
long as they do no harm.
8.3 The asymmetry and the non-identity problem
One of the main tasks of this and the previous chapter has been to argue that a
principle like Q does not render the Harm Principle redundant. However, the
distinction between requiring and compensating reasons, and the claim that
benefits provide requiring reasons only if they are also preventions of harm,
might seem to be inconsistent with Q. Q entails that if one can create either
of two persons who would have lives worth living then it would be better to
create the person with more well-being. The Principle of Permissibility, on
the other hand, implies that it permissible to create the person with less well-
being if doing so does no harm. It might then be objected that the defence of
the asymmetry suggested above forces us to give up too much.
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Here it is important to note that Q is an axiological claim while I have been
concerned with reasons. My view is consistent with Q in so far as I would
agree that creating the person with more well-being is favoured by the bal-
ance of reasons and, in a sense, better. What one would have to deny, if we are
to accept my defence of the asymmetry and Q is that one is always required to
perform the action which is favoured by the balance of reasons (or best). This
claim is inconsistent with the Principle of Permissibility and the distinction
between compensating and requiring reasons as well as the existence of op-
tions as I have characterised them. But, it would not be inconsistent to endorse
my view and Q.
Even if the defence of the asymmetry suggested above is strictly speaking
consistent with Q it might be objected that this defence has counter-intuitive
consequences regarding the non-identity problem. As was just noted, if we
could create either of two persons with lives worth living then the fact that
they would have lives worth living cannot make it required to create either of
them, even if one would be better off than the other. It might also be objected
that the view suggested above also has counter-intuitive implications in same-
people cases. For example, it could be permissible on my view to create a
person even when it is possible to create the same person but with more well-
being. Some people find this counter-intuitive.
However, it should be remembered that it is only permissible on my view to
perform a sub-optimal act if it does no harm. In order for it to be permissible to
create a person with less well-being, whether one could create the same person
with more well-being or not, we have to assume that creating the person with
less well-being would be completely harm-less. Such a life is certainly strange
and unfamiliar to us considering that my analysis of harm is very wide. What
we are supposed to imagine is a case where there is nothing in the person’s life
which makes the life go worse. Appealing to intuitions about what we should
do in such cases is therefore a bit sketchy. If there really is no harm involved
in creating the person with less well-being, then it is unclear what it is that it
so objectionable about it and why we are required to create the person with
more well-being.
It might be wondered what kind of consideration would make it allowed to
create the person with less well-being. I have suggested that the further con-
sideration is the value of autonomy. On this view, people are allowed to pursue
their own interests as long as they do no harm because this is at least a part of
what it means to respect people’s autonomy. In a case where one could create
either of two people without doing harm it is therefore permissible to create
either. It might of course be questioned whether autonomy matters in anything
like the way I have suggested, and whether harm is that central to autonomy.
But, these are further questions which take us beyond simple examples like
the non-identity problem. Simply appealing to the non-identity problem as a
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counter-example to the defence of the asymmetry sketched above is therefore
not a very fruitful strategy.23
A number of authors have argued that there is a problem with the asym-
metry if we compare it with the non-identity problem.24 McMahan (2013, pp.
25–26), for example, considers the following cases:
Case 1.
A = (10,−)
B = (−,6)
Case 2.
C = (10,−)
D = (−,−)
In these cases, a positive number represents that a particular person exists with
a certain amount of well-being and a dash represents that a particular person
does not exist. Case 1, for example, represents a choice between creating ei-
ther of two people who would have lives worth living, but the A-person would
be better off than the B-person.
When comparing these two cases, McMahan fails to find a morally relevant
difference between A and C. It also seems plausible, according to McMahan,
that B is worse than A. Furthermore, according to the asymmetry we should
say that D is not worse than C. But, if that is the case then we should also say,
according to McMahan, that B is worse than D.25 But that is clearly false. It is
not worse to create a person with a life worth living than to not create anyone.
However, the reply which was made above applies to McMahan’s argument
as well. There is a relevant difference on my view between the two cases,
namely that in Case 2 there is an alternative (D) which does no harm. On the
view suggested in this chapter, this feature is relevant to the evaluation of Case
2. Furthermore, my view is consistent with B being better, or favoured by the
balance of reasons, when compared with D. What we can not say, on my view,
is that B is required when D is an alternative.
Still, it has been argued that there is a problem for the asymmetry here.
Bradley (2013) argues that the relative strength of a reason in favour of or
23 It might also be questioned whether autonomy is relevant to all decisions which affect fu-
ture people. Consider for example a “social planner” who has to decide on which policy to
implement and that the policy will affect the number of people who will exist in the future. By
choosing one policy, the planner can effectively “create” future people. Autonomy seems to be
less relevant from this perspective than from a personal perspective. One important difference
is that it is not clear that there are any personal aims at stake for the planner at all. For this
kind of impersonal planner, therefore, it might only be permissible to choose the policy which
is favoured by the balance of reasons.
24 See Rachels (1998, p. 95, 103) and Belshaw (2003).
25 If A and C are equally good, and B is worse than A, then B is also worse than C. If C and D are
equally good, as McMahan thinks a defence of the asymmetry requires, then B is also worse
than D.
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against an act is not affected if we add further alternatives to that act.26 The
intuition behind this principle is easy enough to see. For example, if a’s alter-
natives are to torture b severely or not at all, then the reason against torturing
b severely remains just as strong even when we add the alternative to torture
b slightly. Bradley then argues that several attempts to save the asymmetry
violate this principle and that the asymmetry should therefore be rejected.
Bradley’s objection is similar to McMahan’s. In Case 1 there is a reason in
favour of doing B and, according to Bradley’s principle, the strength of this
reason should not be affected by whether D is an alternative or not. We should
therefore say that there is more reason to do B than D, and therefore also more
reason to do C than D.
Note however that all this is compatible with my view. On my view the
strength of the reason in favour of B is unaffected by the addition of D. What
is not unaffected however is the “quality” of the reason: the reason goes from
being requiring to merely favouring because we add an option which would
do no harm.
McMahan’s and Bradley’s objections do however highlight an important
aspect of the way I have defended the asymmetry, namely the relation be-
tween reasons and duties. Because there are two kinds of reasons we cannot
say that, necessarily, a person ought to do what she has most reason to do. I
have suggested that this is not as counter-intuitive as it may seem by arguing
that common-sense morality includes two normative categories, supereroga-
tion and options, which assume that people are sometimes allowed to perform
acts which are not favoured by the balance of reasons. However, this means
that the defence of the asymmetry suggested here involves a significant nor-
mative commitment.
Are these normative commitments reasonable? The final objection which I
will consider is that my view rules out otherwise plausible claims about the
ethics of procreation. Savulescu (2001), for example, defends the following
principle:
Procreative Beneficence: couples (or single reproducers) should select the
child, of the possible children they could have, who is expected to have the
best life, or at least as good a life as the others, based on the relevant, available
information. (Savulescu 2001, p. 415).27
This principle is a clear statement of the view that we ought to have the best
child and might therefore seem to conflict with my defence of the asymmetry.
After all, on my view it is only required to have the best child if there is
26 This principle is a version of the “independence of irrelevant alternatives”. For a discussion
of this principle and population ethics see, Arrhenius (2009).
27 See also Kahane & Savulescu (2008). However, the version of Procreative Beneficence Ka-
hane & Savulescu (2008) argue for is significantly weaker than the one stated here. According
to their view, there is a significant moral reason to have the best child in procreative decisions
but this reason is not necessarily decisive.
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no alternative which does no harm. Couples would therefore, on my view, be
permitted to have a child which would not be expected to live the best possible
life when having this child does no harm.
In defence of my view there are a number of things to be said. First, we
should bear in mind that benefits are not the only things that matter on my
view and that my view implies a modified version of Procreative Beneficence.
It is required to have the child with the better life if that child would be harmed
less than the other child, for example. Second, my view is compatible with Q
and we can therefore say that it would be better if couples (or single repro-
ducers) selected the child with the best chances of living the better life. We
can also say that having the child with the best life is favoured by the balance
of reasons. We can even say that couples ought to have the opportunity to se-
lect the best child and that any relevant information in order to select the best
child should be available to them. What we cannot say is that they ought, or
are morally required, to have the best child. This, it seems to me, is not very
counter-intuitive.
8.4 Summary
I have argued that the spirit of the strong asymmetry can be saved by making
a distinction between two kinds of reasons: requiring and (merely) compen-
sating. Harms, I suggested, always provide requiring reasons while benefits
to contingent future people only provide compensating reasons. The spirit of
the strong asymmetry can then be explained because while the fact that per-
son would have a life not worth living is a requiring reason not to create that
person, the benefits a contingent future person would enjoy can only com-
pensate for reasons against creating this person. Creating people with lives
worth living is therefore favoured by the balance of reasons but not required
by morality.
This distinction between two kinds of reasons is presupposed by two nor-
mative categories: supererogation and options. Of these two, the asymmetry
is clearly most plausible as an instance of an option because supererogatory
acts are always praiseworthy. These structural similarities suggest that if there
are options or supererogation then there exists the necessary conceptual space
necessary in order to defend the asymmetry.
However, this similarity with options does not show that creating people
with lives worth living is optional. I argued that one way of grounding such
an options, the Appeal to Cost, does not succeed. Instead, I suggested that we
should appeal to a Principle of Permissibility:
The Principle of Permissibility: an act is permissible if (i) it is favoured by the
balance of reasons or (ii) it does no harm.
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This normative claim, I suggested, captures the importance of autonomy in
the sense that it allows people to pursue their own, sub-optimal, aims as long
as they do no harm.
Appealing to the Principle of Permissibility is also congenial with the dis-
tinction between two kinds of reasons. A way to understand the principle is
as ascribing a second normative to harm in addition to the role specified by
the Harm Principle. According to the Harm Principle, harms provide reasons.
The second role of harm is that a benefit provides a requiring reason only if
it also prevents harm. This role explains why it is permissible, for example,
not to create a person who would have a life worth living. The benefits such
a person would enjoy do not satisfy this requirement and do therefore provide
(merely) compensating reasons.
Finally, I considered some objections to this defence of the asymmetry. One
of these objections was that this defence of the asymmetry is incompatible
with Q. I argued that this is mistaken. My defence of the asymmetry is com-
patible with the axiological claim that it would be better if those who exist are
better off. What we would have to deny on my view is rather the claim that
we are required to do what would be best.
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9. Applications and conclusion
The main focus of the thesis has been harm as a moral concept and the focus
of much of the discussion has been on topics related to population ethics.
However, harm is typically appealed to, not only regarding future generations,
but in applied ethics, political theory and normative ethics in general. The
analysis of harm which I have argued for therefore has potentially far-reaching
consequences.
In this final chapter I will explore three areas where the analysis of harm
and the claim that there are two kinds of reasons can be applied: the ethics
of procreation, liberalism and the person-affecting view. First, however, I will
restate the main claims from the previous chapters.
9.1 A brief summary of the thesis
In this thesis my main concern has been to defend the Harm Principle:
The Harm Principle: if an act would harm someone then this is a reason against
performing that act.
The defence consists of a negative and a positive part. For the negative part
I argued that a common objection to the Harm Principle based on the non-
identity problem does not succeed. The objection is that the Harm Principle
can not explain why, for example, it is morally objectionable for a couple to
have a child now rather than later if the child they could have now would
suffer from some serious medical condition, while the child they could have
later would be perfectly healthy. After all, the child they could have now would
have a life worth living and she would not exist had the parents waited, so it
cannot be worse for her that the act is not performed. We therefore have to
conclude, according to this objection, that the parents would not harm their
child if they do not wait and that the Harm Principle can not explain why they
should wait.
A crucial premise in this argument is the Counterfactual Condition:
The Counterfactual Condition: An act harms a person if and only if that person
would have been better off had the act not been performed.
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In chapter two I argued that the Counterfactual Condition should be rejected
as an analysis of harm in a morally relevant sense because it has unacceptable
consequences with respect to overdetermination. The upshot of this conclu-
sion is that the argument against the Harm Principle, based on the non-identity
problem, fails.
In chapter three I considered an alternative to the Counterfactual Condition:
the Non-Comparative View. I argued that Non-Comparative Views fail to cap-
ture the plausible claim that to harm someone is to make that person’s life go
worse. Furthermore, Non-Comparative Views typically rely heavily on claims
about the nature of well-being, something which an analysis of harm should
avoid.
For the positive part I suggested an analysis of harm (chapters four to six)
which I argued has plausible implications with respect to the non-identity
problem. According to this Minimalist View of harm, a harms b if and only
if:
(1) a performs an act, φ ,
(2*) b is in a state S such that b’s life is worse, taking S into account, than b’s
life not taking S into account.
(3*) if φ had not been performed then S would not have obtained at all, or
would have obtained in a different way which is salient in the circumstances.
According to the Minimalist View it is plausible that a couple who chooses
to have a child now rather than a different child later, where having a child
now would result in a person coming into existence with a serious medical
condition, would harm their child even if the handicap is not so severe as to
make the child’s life not worth living. If they do not postpone the pregnancy,
then the child will be in a state which makes her life go worse in sense of
(2*). Also, the couple are responsible for this state of affairs because had they
postponed the pregnancy then state of affairs would not have obtained.
In chapters seven and eight I argued that with this analysis of harm there
is a reason to appeal to harm in population ethics. I argued that a common
intuition, strong asymmetry, can be defended by making a distinction between
two kinds of reasons (requiring and compensating) and assigning a dual role
to harm. The first role of harm is specified by the Harm Principle. If an act
would harm someone then this is a reason not to perform the act. The second
role, I suggested, is captured by the following Principle of Permissibility:
The Principle of Permissibility: an act is permissible if (i) it is favoured by the
balance of reasons or (ii) it does no harm.
According to this principle, it is always permissible to perform an act which
does no harm, even if it is not favoured by the balance of reasons. I suggested
that this normative claim captures the importance of autonomy. The second
role of harm is then that harm sets the limits within which a person is free
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to pursue her own aims even when doing so would not be favoured by the
balance of reasons.
The Principle of Permissibility is also congenial with the distinction be-
tween two kinds of reasons. Because it is permissible to perform sub-optimal
acts which do no harm, we can say that the benefits in favour of an optimal
alternative in such cases only provide compensating reasons because these
benefits are not preventions of harm. Preventing harm, on this view, functions
as a precondition for benefits to provide requiring reasons. By attaching this
importance to harm it is possible to defend the asymmetry as an instance of a
moral option grounded in autonomy.
9.2 Procreative freedom
A consequence of the dual role of harm which I introduced in order to defend
the asymmetry is that people have considerable procreative freedom. Accord-
ing to my defence of the asymmetry it cannot be required to create a per-
son because of the benefits she would enjoy since these benefits only provide
compensating reasons, not requiring ones. Assuming that there are no further
relevant considerations besides harm and benefit, the only way it could be re-
quired to create a person is then if doing so would benefit other people or if it
would prevent harm.
Defending procreative freedom in this way has interesting consequences
regarding selection and enhancement of future people. Regarding selection, it
is very likely that we will to a great extent be able to select children on the
basis of whether they are more likely to have certain traits because of their
genetic makeup. The moral question with respect to this practice is whether
it is permissible to effectively see to it that people with certain traits are not
born. The obvious worry about this practice is that it is elitistic, or “eugenic”,
and that we should therefore not try to prevent people from being born with
certain traits.
The analysis of harm, and the limits to procreative freedom, which I have
argued for in this thesis implies that there is a moral ground for preventing
people from being born with certain traits. If those traits make a negative con-
tribution to a person’s life then there is a reason against creating that person.
However, the view I have been arguing for does not imply that any trait which
would be detrimental to a future person’s well-being suffices for an obliga-
tion not to create that person. If the person would enjoy benefits which would
compensate for the harmful trait then the choice to create this person would
be within a couple’s procreative freedom.
Regarding enhancement it is sometimes claimed that there is a morally rel-
evant difference between enhancements and treatments. We are not morally
required to provide enhancements which would make people better off but we
are required to develop treatments for harmful conditions. To emphasise treat-
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ments instead of enhancements can also be a way of arguing against selection:
instead of selecting people who lack certain traits we should provide treatment
to people with these traits.
That there is a morally relevant difference between enhancements and treat-
ments is however hard to maintain. One difficulty lies in that the distinction be-
tween enhancement and treatment seems to presuppose that there is a morally
relevant distinction to be made between normal and abnormal traits or condi-
tions. The very notion of a “treatment” suggests that there is a disease, or ab-
normality, involved while the notion of “enhancement” suggests that the per-
son to receive the enhancement passes for “normal”. But, it is unclear why it
should matter whether a condition, shortness for example, is the consequence
of a genetic abnormality or of “natural” genetic variation.1 To give another
example, it is unclear why it would be more important to treat a depression
when the cause is a abnormal, say a bipolar condition, rather than when the
depression is caused by something more normal, such as stress. This places
an unwarranted emphasis on irrelevant conditions, namely, whether the cause
of one’s shortness or depression is natural or not. What matters, at least from
a moral point of view, is whether and how shortness or depression affects the
quality of one’s life and this is in general quite independent of what caused
these conditions.
There are also pragmatic reasons against making the distinction part of
common practice. In so far as the distinction between enhancement and treat-
ment relies on some traits being “natural” and it therefore reinforces the view
that people who suffer from abnormal conditions, those that need “treatment”,
are defective in some way and should be fixed.
In this context, the distinction between two kinds of benefits can perhaps
serve as a replacement for the enhancement/treatment distinction. On my
view, there is a difference between enhancements which are preventions
of harm and those which are not. The former kind, “pure” enhancements,
are like “pure” benefits in that they are not sufficient to ground a moral
requirement. We are therefore not morally required to develop enhancements
in cases where a person who would enjoy the enhancement would not
have been harmed otherwise. However, we do have good moral reasons for
developing enhancements which would prevent harm. At the moment it is of
course difficult to say where this distinction is to be drawn, partly because I
have remained neutral with respect to the details of what makes life worth
living, or well-being. However, the distinction between two kinds of benefits
can capture what is plausible in the enhancement/treatment distinction.
A typical example of procreative freedom which deserves comment is abor-
tion. My analysis of harm might seem to imply that in many cases a foetus
would be harmed by being aborted. In cases where the foetus would have de-
veloped into a human being with a life worth living, had the abortion not been
1 See also Buchanan et al. (2001, pp. 110–15) who argue against the distinction on similar
grounds. They do however defend a more limited use of the distinction on pragmatic grounds.
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performed, then the foetus would have developed into a person with a life
worth living then performing the abortion would be, it could be argued, worse
for the foetus. It could perhaps be objected that the foetus is not the same per-
son as the grown human, and that aborting a foetus is not to harm that person.2
However, as Luper (2009, pp. 202–3) argues, the foetus is certainly the same
animal as the grown human. Whether or not the foetus is the same person as
the human is therefore quite irrelevant to whether abortion harms the foetus.
The difficult question regarding abortion is therefore not whether the foetus
is a person or not but whether it is the kind of entity which can be harmed.
The Minimalist View of harm is neutral with respect to this question. It is
uncontroversial that persons can be harmed, but when we consider other kinds
of entities there is considerable room for disagreement. Animals, collectives
of people, social institutions or even inanimate objects are all candidates for
being proper harm subjects. The Minimalist View does place some constraint
on what can plausibly be harmed because it is formulated in terms of well-
being. Only things which can be said to have well-being are therefore possible
subjects of harm on this view. However, this still leaves it open whether all
animals, for example, can be harmed in a morally relevant sense.
9.3 Liberalism
The Harm Principle, as I understand it, is a moral principle specifying one
source of moral reasons. However, it is sometimes claimed that harm also
plays an important role in political theory, especially in liberal views. J. S. Mill
famously claimed that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others” (Mill 2003, p. 94) and many liberals have followed
Mill in this respect. Of course, liberals are not the only ones who think that
harm is one ground for justified coercion. What characterises the liberal view
is that harm is the only ground for justified coercion.3
Liberalism, thus conceived, is typically thought to have two features. First,
liberalism is anti-paternalistic because it is only justified to limit a person’s
liberty in order to prevent harm to others. On the liberal view, there are things
which are not the state’s business and what an individual chooses to do with
him or herself is one of those things.4 Secondly, liberalism is supposed to
be anti-moralistic in the sense that the state is not justified to enforce public
opinion or commonly held values for their own sake. It is not enough that
2 McMahan (1988, p. 54), for example, claims that a foetus and the person this foetus would
develop into are not the same person because there is no psychological continuity between the
two.
3 See Feinberg (1987, pp. 10–16, 26–27).) for an overview of other so-called “liberty limiting
principles” and how they relate to liberalism.
4 See Dworkin (1997).
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an act would be offensive to public sentiment or morality for the state to be
justified in exercising coercion.5
Can a liberal view which preserves these two features be formulated on
the basis of the analysis of harm presented in this thesis? Consider the anti-
moralistic feature first. In a sense, my analysis of harm is trivially compatible
with this feature of liberalism because I have merely been arguing for an anal-
ysis of harm and have left the relevance of any non-harmful effects, such as
offences, to one side. Also, I have not analysed harm in terms of public opin-
ion or sentiments so Mill’s principle, interpreted as I have suggested we should
understand harm, would not justify coercion in order to enforce public opinion
or commonly held values. However, the Harm Principle as a liberty limiting
principle is clearly not “anti-moralistic” in the sense that the state is justified
in enforcing good, or moral, behaviour. Many instances of enforced benef-
icence, charity taxes or so-called “bad samaritan laws” for example, would
on the analysis argued for in this thesis be preventions of harm and therefore
sanctioned by a liberty-limiting principle based on harm to others.
However, liberals tend to differ with respect to how much emphasis they
place on the anti-moralistic part of their view. Feinberg (1987, ch. 4), for ex-
ample, argues that bad samaritan laws are in principle sanctioned by the most
plausible liberal view though there might be pragmatic reasons for restricting
their use. What is important about the anti-moralistic part of liberalism is, pre-
sumably, that members of society should not be coerced on the basis of public
opinion. That is, the liberal is not asserting that the state is not allowed to use
coercion when there are good moral reasons for doing so.6
Turning to the second feature of liberalism, anti-paternalism, it should be
clear that the Harm Principle and the Minimalist View of harm have pater-
nalistic implications. As I formulated the Harm Principle it does not make a
difference between harm to oneself and harm to others. Basing the limits of
justified coercion on this version of the Harm Principle would therefore imply
that the state is justified in coercing individuals for their own good.
Suppose that there are other reasons for limiting coercion to preventing
harm to others. It could be argued, for example, that there are pragmatic rea-
sons for not giving the state the authority to coerce people for the sake of
preventing harm to oneself. However, the analysis of harm which I have ar-
gued for would allow paternalistic coercion but in a more indirect way since,
as was noted above, my view allows bad samaritan laws. Consider for example
child labour in sweatshops. Even if the state would not be allowed to prevent
children from applying for work in such places in order to prevent harm to the
5 This point is emphasised by Hart (1963).
6 See also Hart (1963, pp. 21–24). Hart makes a distinction between public opinion and critical
morality (“positive” and “critical” morality in Hart’s words) and argues that coercion based on
public morality is unjustified by the liberal’s standards. See also Dworkin (1977, pp. 254–5) for
similar remarks. For Hart and Dworkin, it seems, the important question for the liberal is not
whether morality can justifiably be enforced as such but whether mere public opinion can be.
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children, it would be justified in coercing the employers to not hire children
as workers. This would amount to paternalistic coercion since the reason for
restricting the employers freedom is to prevent harm to potential employees.
There is one form of paternalism which my view does not endorse. If we
consider the distinction between requiring and compensating reasons we can
say that coercing individuals to bestow benefits of the latter kind is not jus-
tified. This restriction creates a sphere of personal freedom which is not the
state’s business. As I have argued, procreative decisions are often within this
sphere but liberals typically think that it is larger than that. It should be em-
phasised however that harm-prevention, on any plausible liberal view, is not
a sufficient reason for legitimate state coercion but only necessary. That is,
one could claim that many instances of state coercion which prevents harm
is illegitimate but for reasons which are unrelated to harm. This suggests that
coercion constrained by a liberty-limiting principle of Mill’s kind does not es-
tablish a sphere of personal freedom, nor does it protect against paternalism,
to the extent which it has been thought to do.7
9.4 The person-affecting view
In chapter one I argued that the Harm Principle belongs to a class of nor-
mative theories which are commonly classified as “person-affecting”. Exactly
how to formulate the person-affecting view is however an unclear and con-
tested matter. The general, though imprecise, idea is that whether an act is
wrong or morally objectionable depends of how the act would affect people.
Many philosopher’s have found the person-affecting view plausible. Scanlon
(1998), for example, claims that the morality of right and wrong (morality in
a “narrow sense”) is characterised by what we owe to each other. Wrongness,
on Scanlon’s view, is constrained by person-affecting considerations since an
act cannot be wrong unless it fails to conform to the standard of what we owe
to other people – whatever that standard in the end is and whoever is to count
as “other people”.8 Another example is Roberts who in a series of publica-
tions (2003a, 2003b, 2010) has developed and defended the claim that an act
is wrong only if it wrongs someone.
The non-identity problem is sometimes claimed to be a devastating objec-
tion to such views and that we should therefore abandon the person-affecting
7 Holtug (2002) argues for a similar conclusion.
8 See Scanlon (1998, pp. 172–3, 177–87, 229). It should be noted however that Scanlon seems
to suggest a slightly different view at times. For example, he claims that when considering
whether an act is a part of what we owe to each other “we cannot envisage the reaction of
every actual person. We can consider only representative cases” (p.171). Whether this is just
a pragmatic device which we have to make use of because of our limited cognitive capacities
or whether Scanlon thinks that this is a more principled part of morality is however unclear.
Parfit (2003) argues that Scanlon’s theory can be formulated without any commitment to the
person-affecting view.
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approach in favour of a neutral approach, for example Parfit’s principle Q.9
As I have argued in this thesis this is not the case: we can explain the moral
objection to the young girl’s choice by appealing to the harm she would be
responsible for. This conclusion is significant to population ethics because
it puts person-affecting views on a par with neutral views when it comes to
same-number cases like the non-identity problem.
We should not overestimate the consequences of appealing to the person-
affecting view for two reasons. First, I do not claim to have put all views
which, at some time or other, have been called “person-affecting” on a par
with theories which are neutral with respect to identity. Some versions of the
person-affecting view gain no credibility from the defence of the Harm Prin-
ciple presented in this thesis. For example, a person-affecting view according
to which an act is wrong only if it makes someone worse off than they would
otherwise have been is, it seems to me, refuted by the non-identity problem.
Axiological versions of the person-affecting view which use the same restric-
tion, i.e., that A is worse than B only if A is worse than B for someone, are
also not supported by my defence of the Harm Principle. Regarding these ver-
sion of the person-affecting view I would therefore agree with their critics
and say that morality is not person-affecting in that sense. Second, as was
also mentioned in chapter one, we can distinguish between cases where the
same number of people will exist whatever we do, same-number cases, and
cases where a different number of people will exist depending on what do,
different-number cases. Cases of the latter kind pose new and comparatively
more difficult problems for ethical theory than same-number cases, the most
famous being the repugnant conclusion.10 Since I in this thesis have mainly
been concerned with same-number cases it would be premature to claim that
harm, or the person-affecting view, can help us solve all of the puzzles of
population ethics.
One puzzle which I have argued can be solved is the asymmetry. This so-
lution relied on there being two kinds of reasons and in particular that some
benefits only provide compensating reasons. This approach to harms and ben-
efits does however seem to lead to the repugnant conclusion. What my defence
of the asymmetry amounts to is that even though it would be better, by any
reasonable axiological standard, to add a person to a population it does not
follow that it is morally required to add that person. That is, a very large pop-
ulation where everyone lives on “muzak and potatoes” might be better than a
9 See for example Broome (2004, p. 136). However, Broome only claims that the non-identity
problem refutes axiological versions of the person-affecting view. Parfit (2011, pp. 217–43)
argues that Scanlon’s version of the person-affecting view should be rejected partly because of
the non-identity problem.
10 “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of
life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are
equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit
1984, p. 388).
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smaller population where people enjoy Mozart, fine cuisine and the poetry of
William Blake. If the benefits to the additional people in the large population
are of the compensating kind then we are not required to choose the larger
population over the smaller one. However, suppose that the two populations
represent possible states of the world in the far future and that they are com-
pletely disjoint: no one who exists in the larger population would exist in the
smaller population. The solution I have suggested to the asymmetry therefore
indicates that it would be permissible to choose either. This, some would say,
is counterintuitive. It is not enough that we are allowed to opt for the smaller
population, we should do so. The claims made herein do not determine how
to go about solving this problem. All that we can say, so far, is that a person-
affecting view, based on the Harm Principle, is over the first hurdle in that it
is adequate for same-number cases. But, there is a lot more work to be done.
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